THE CHRISTIAN MESSAGE IN THE THEOLOGY OF PAUL TILLICH

by

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II	__________. Systematic Theology, Vol. II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.
III	__________. Systematic Theology, Vol. III. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.
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"LDR"	__________. "The Lost Dimension in Religion," Adventures of the Mind, (pp. 52-62). New York: Vintage Books, 196_
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MB	__________. Morality and Beyond. New York: Harper & Row, 1963.
PE	__________. The Protestant Era. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.
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INTRODUCTION

The title of this study, "The Christian Message in the Theology of Paul Tillich," is virtually its thesis: "The Christian message is in the theology of Paul Tillich." The issue, of course, is how the Christian message is in Tillich's theology. His critics maintain it is there in a distorted fashion, if, indeed, it is there at all. Tillich's intention is for the Christian message to be his theology's center, and an omnipresent polar element throughout.

An introduction to such a study could conceivably have three parts: I. The Life of Paul Tillich, II. The Theology of Paul Tillich, and III. The Christian Message. This study offers no "Life of Paul Tillich." There are enough of these based on Tillich's published autobiographical writings. Nothing further can be offered until additional biographical material is available. There is likewise little need for a sketch of Tillich's theology. Such sketches do little more than present the table of contents of Systematic Theology, and that, presumably, is well enough known by now. But a study which asserts that the Christian message is the core, the omnipresent polar element of the theology of Paul Tillich, restated for our present situation, must discuss what is meant by the term "Christian Message."

What is the "Christian Message?" This question is straightforward and simple enough. Surely it can easily be "correlated" with a simple and straightforward answer. Unfortunately, this is not the case.

One might derive an answer to this question by collating various answers that have been offered, or by abstracting from them their common denominator. Such an answer would satisfy no one. It would contain too much if the first were used, and not enough if the second were followed. A definition of the Christian Message in the fragmented state of present-day Christianity seems impossible. An indirect approach, however, might be helpful at this point.

What is a message? It is a report of something that has happened that has altered "the way things are." It is sent or delivered to someone so that he might adapt himself to the altered situation. The Christian Message is such a report. It tells of something that has happened--the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth--and explains how this event has changed "the way things are" for every man. This message is given so that those who hear it might adjust themselves to the new situation that now prevails throughout the universe.

The Christian Message, whenever it appears, and in whatever form it is given, contains two primary elements: 1) a recital of the event that has changed the human situation, and 2) an interpretation of how this event has brought about this change. It is not enough, however, simply to relate the event and tell its significance. The history of Christian thought shows that there are inacceptable ways of presenting the Christian Message. It is possible to distort the message of Christianity and to lose its substance. How is this to be avoided? How may one avoid being labeled a Christian heretic--one who distorts the Christian Message in some way?

One way to avoid being labeled a heretic is to simply repeat previously accepted formulations of the message--to recite Scripture and repeat the formulas of the classical confessional statements. These, surely, do not distort the Christian Message. They present the event and precisely state its significance. Obviously, one must not present another event nor give another significance to this "Christian event" than that which is presented in these documents.

But what if a situation is encountered in which these formulations of the message are incomprehensible? In such a situation an attempt must be made to restate, in language that is comprehensible, this event and its significance. Is this really possible? Can one ever do more than simply translate from one language to another the forms of the scriptural or confessional presentations of this message?

This is the crucial issue in the debate that rages over Tillich's work. Tillich has sought to express the Christian Message in forms other than the "safe" scriptural and ecclesiastical forms. He has made use of a language that is not usually used. His intention, certainly, has not been to distort the Christian Message, but his critics are sure that this is what has happened. It is not difficult to find critics of Tillich. Defenders of his presentation of the Christian Message are rare. Perhaps it is because if one agrees with Tillich the "objective criteria" for presentations of the Christian

Message tend to lose their absolute quality. They become simply "previous formulations"--which must be kept in mind but are not the message *in themselves*.

There is a sense in which the author of the present study ought not attempt a work of this kind. His denominational heritage is the Disciples of Christ, a group that sets little store by the history of Christian thought. "No creed but Christ" is its motto, which makes it difficult for a Disciple to take with *ultimate* seriousness the historical Christian dogmas. On the other hand, since no demand--other than the confession that Jesus is the Christ--is incumbent upon a Disciple of Christ, it has been possible for the writer to accept Tillich as a Christian, for Tillich obviously confesses that Jesus is the Christ! This has enabled this writer to "stay with" Tillich, to return again and again to his work with no great nagging doubts as to his "orthodoxy." He has been able always to say: "Tillich is a Christian. Tillich is not a theological neophyte. Tillich is no enemy of the faith." Thus he has been able to learn much from Tillich and to keep looking for explanations of his more difficult and unfamiliar terminology rather than to dismiss it as heretical. Perhaps a liberal Disciple--who finds himself considerably "deliberalized" by reading Tillich--can attempt what this study tries to show. However, it must be confessed that this "deliberalization" has also been a "Tillichianization." This study is not a cool, detached, "objective" work. It is quite frankly biased on Tillich's behalf. Tillich confesses that Jesus is the Christ. The present writer is inclined to believe that Tillich is talking about the Jesus of Nazareth the churches call the "Christ." He believes that Tillich's interpretation of the Christ is not radically different from the orthodox interpretation. Jesus' life is the final revelation of God and God's decisive saving act. Through the Christ men are reconciled to God.

We will consider what Tillich has to say about "the Reality of the Christ." Then we will examine the other "answering" sections of his theology, those dealing with Revelation, the Kingdom of God, God and Spirit.

But it would be unfair to Tillich to read his Systematic Theology without first carefully considering what he has to say in his "Introduction" to this, his major work. This Introduction provides a key to the way in which Tillich saw the problem he was tackling and how he went about wrestling with it. Of particular interest to this study is what Tillich has to say in this Introduction about the place of the Christian Message in his work. It would be well to remember that this "Introduction" is more of an "afterthought" than a proposal for doing theology. It tells us what Tillich came to understand about how he had done his theological work. It can be profitably reread, in this light, after one has read the Systematic Theology, and should be read then as well as before one reads his work.

CHAPTER I

THE "INTRODUCTION" TO TILLICH'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Tillich begins this "Introduction" by expressing his conviction that every theological statement is an effort to present the Christian message for some particular situation. The "situation" Tillich understands himself to be addressing is "the scientific and artistic, the economic, political, and ethical forms" in which men in Western Civilization, since 1914, express their understanding of and "their interpretation of existence" (I 3,4). A part of the task of understanding Tillich's theology involves coming to see what he means by "the present situation." (An appendix presenting this material may be found at the end of this study.)

Every Christian theology must contain the proclamation of the Christian message, the "kerygma." If a theology is preoccupied with this proclamation and stresses it "over against the changing demands of the situation," the result is what Tillich calls a "kerygmatic" theology (I 4). Such theologies are needed by the church. Without them, "theology would lose itself in the relativities of the 'situation'" (I 5). There is also need for theologies which take into account "the changing demands of the situation." Such theologies are called by Tillich "apologetic" theologies. These theologies seek out "common ground, however vague it may be," (I 6) between the interpretation of existence given in the situation, and that given by the

Christian message. Basically, this means that apologetic theology must use the common language of this situation. But there is more to it than this. The apologetic theologian must learn how to hear, in the situation, its basic, human questions, how these are expressed and answered by the situation. Only then can there be an "encounter" with "the situation." Apologetic theology must try to give the answers of the Christian message in the forms in which the situation asks and attempts to answer these basic human questions. This is "adapting the Christian message to the modern mind," and it is what "has kept theology alive" (I 7). Whenever it is done, apologetic theologians must be alert to the possibility that "the apologetic bias" might be found to have "dissolved the Christian message" (I 8). The apologist's work is done "with passion and risk" (I 8). He has no guarantee of success, and his labor is rightly subject to close scrutiny. An apologist can only offer his work as a help in understanding "the Christian message as the answer to the questions implied in . . . every human situation" (I 8).

A theologian, Christian or non-Christian, is one who lives in a religious community which entrusts him with the task of interpreting its religious life. His role is not a disinterested "student of religion." He is one who is committed to the message of the religious community to which he belongs. This message is the center of his theological existence. He lives in a "theological circle" (I 9).

The Christian apologist is one who lives and works within "a theological circle, the center of which is the Christian message" (I 9).

He does not consider the Christian community, based upon this message, to be simply "one example of religious life . . . but not the final one and not unique" (I 10). If he mistakenly does this he is a "scientific" theologian, not a "Christian" theologian. The Christian theologian is "ultimately concerned" with the Christian message and regards it as the "criterion" of all religion (I 9).

The Christian message and the Jesus it proclaims as the Christ are matters of ultimate concern for the Christian theologian. The Apologist must deal with people who have other matters which they regard as of ultimate concern. They have something which, for them, is to be "taken as universal" and "given infinite significance" (I 13). Statements of the sort, "x is a matter of ultimate concern," must be dealt with by Apologists. Any "x," stone or star, which is regarded as an object of ultimate concern or as an expression of that which is regarded as of Ultimate Concern, is a religious phenomenon. And Apologists must discuss the religious phenomena of their situation.

Every man has ultimate concern. Every man has the capacity to be aware of that which has "the power of threatening and saving . . . the whole of human reality, the structure, the meaning, and the aim of existence" (I 14). He has this as the consequence of his being in the image of God. This power of "threatening and saving" can be willfully and wrongly attributed to something which does not have this power in any ultimate sense. This power, this ultimate power, resides only in the God who is manifest in Jesus as the Christ. The Apologist must challenge those who have misdirected their ultimate concern. He is to proclaim the Christian message that the God manifest in Jesus the Christ is the true object of man's ultimate concern.

The Apologist gives a "methodical interpretation of the contents of the Christian faith" (I 15). He must do this in such a way as to show that these contents are not totally alien to what other religions have been striving to express. He is to show that "trends which are immanent in all religions and cultures move toward the Christian answer" (I 15). He will give a "rational interpretation of the religious substance of [the] rites, symbols, and myths" of the Christian faith, which express the Christian message. But he will try to show that Christian theology is "the theology" (I 16), able to interpret all religious phenomena.

The claim of Christian theology to be the theology has been made before by apologetic theologians. It is made on the basis of the Christian message's claim that Jesus as the Christ is the "Logos" (the universal rational structure of all things) who has become "flesh" (I 16). This claim gives the apologetic theologian something that is both concrete and universal, and, therefore, something which "infinitely transcends the foundation of any other "theology" (I 16). Early apologists used this concept to make all truth Christian truth, and to announce the Church's faith in the victory over all demonic-natural powers which contradict truth and prevent salvation (I 17).

Apologetic theologians in any situation will encounter such powers, expressed in polytheism, and though they may not specifically use the concepts "Logos" and "made flesh" they will make use of these concepts to express their belief that all truth is Christian truth, and that truth, in whatever form, is not contradictory to that truth which is made known in Jesus the Christ. This is a part of the universal meaning of the event Jesus Christ. It offers a way in which other religions can be encountered by the apologetic theologian.

In the present situation, the Christian apologetic theologian has to come to terms with "scientists" and "philosophers." These persons are actively engaged in searching out "the nature of reality as such" (I 18). They inquire "into those structures, categories, and concepts which are presupposed in the cognitive encounter with every realm of reality" (I 18). Philosophy, particularly, "asks the question of reality as a whole" (I 20). That is, it deals with ontological matters. Theology, too, is concerned with reality as a whole, but primarily in terms of that which sustains reality, "that which determines being or not-being, the ultimate and unconditional power of being" (I 21).

The Christian theologian believes this to be the God manifest in Jesus as the Christ. And he believes that this God expresses himself "in and through the structure of being" (I 21). He believes that "we can encounter . . . be grasped by . . . know . . . and act toward" the being of the world and the God who reveals himself "in and through" it. God is--as in the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper--in, with, and under the structure of being as a Real Presence. This makes the articulation of these structures important. The structures and categories which philosophy seeks to find and articulate are presupposed in theology "in every sentence. . . . Theology . . . cannot escape the question of being" (I 21). It must use terms like "time, space, cause, thing, subject, nature, movement, freedom, necessity." These terms are philosophical *and* theological. The language theology uses in common with philosophy must be taken seriously by the theologian. He "must take seriously the meaning of the terms he uses" (I 21).

The theologian, however, is not *merely* concerned with the conceptual structure of reality. He is concerned with what reality *means*. The Christian theologian is convinced that the meaning of reality is most clearly seen in Jesus the Christ, the Logos made flesh. Thus he is committed to this "place" where, for him, meaning is *given*, namely, the Christ. He does, and must, "look where that which concerns him ultimately is manifest," "and he must stand where its manifestation reaches and grasps him." This "place" (Jesus the Christ and his living presence in the Church) is "the source of his knowledge in the Logos 'who became flesh'" (I 23). It is "not common rationality" but rather "the church, its traditions and *its present reality*" (I 24, Italics added). "The concrete logos"--the Christ--"which he sees, is *received* through believing commitment and not . . . through rational detachment" (I 24, Italics added). The word "received" is important. The theologian is not *seeking* the meaning of reality for us, because it is already *given* to him in and through the Christ. When the apologetic theologian uses ontological terminology he is seeking to express, with these terms, the Christian understanding of the meaning of reality as he receives it in Jesus the Christ.

Philosophers are not unconcerned about the meaning of reality. "Every creative philosopher," says Tillich, "is a theologian in the degree to which his existential situation and his ultimate concern shape his philosophical vision" (I 25). The philosopher is not necessarily committed to any one "place" where reality seems to most clearly manifest its meaning. As a matter of fact, though, there will be some such place for him. And it will function for him in almost precisely the way in which Jesus the Christ functions for the Christian theologian. In discussing their differences regarding this place, the theologian and the philosopher are discussing theology. In discussing the language used to describe the structure of reality, they are discussing philosophy. Philosophy and theology do not, as such, disagree. Philosophers and theologians do, and may disagree philosophically or theologically.

The apologetic theologian is one who engages in discussion with differing points of view about "the place" where reality manifests its meaning. Since he believes that every place where the meaning of reality is manifest is evidence of the work of the divine Logos, the apologist is receptive to what is said about such places, even by non-Christians. He attempts to reconcile these "places" with the Christian "place" and show that they are not fundamentally at variance. This means that he runs the risk of "being driven beyond the boundary line of the theological circle" (I 25). But this "boundary line" is simply a line drawn between what the Christian community regards as "Christian-talk" and "non-Christian-talk." The apologetic theologian is going to engage in some talk that is definitely regarded as "non-Christian talk." He will be tempted to view as expressions of the work of the divine Logos some meanings which can be related to the meaning manifest in the Christ only by virtue of a considerable stretching of the imagination. If he does this in what he supposes is an "objective" manner, which does not permit his own expression of faith to "endanger" his work, this procedure can be a "demonic temptation for the theologian" which can "destroy the necessary involvement of faith." His work can then become "a stumbling block for the Church" (I 26). But using non-Christian-talk, which may bring suspicion and even condemnation from "the pious and powerful in the church" (I 25), may be the necessary prelude to the churches' eventual enlarging of the theological circle to include his work. But then, again, the judgment may stand that his non-Christian-talk was indeed non-Christian-talk. This is "the burden and the greatness of every theologian's work" (I 26), particularly that of the apologetic theologian.

Returning to the philosophical discussion of terms used to express the structure of reality, the theologian engaged in such discussion is obligated to follow the philosophers' rules of the game. That is, he must use reason and rational argument when discussing and using philosophical terms. He is free, however, to point out the philosopher's "existentially conditioned . . . ideas" (I 26). That is, he can make a theological analysis of the discussion. That, after all, is his main task. Actually, says Tillich, the apologetic theologian will discover that modern philosophy is "not pagan." Even "atheism and anti-Christianity are not pagan. They are anti-Christian in Christian terms" (I 27). All contemporary philosophical traditions are shaped by the Christian faith in Western Civilization. It is not hard to find common ground. The apologetic theologian, who believes that "no philosophy which is obedient to the universal logos can contradict the concrete logos, the Logos 'who became Flesh'" (I 28), will find it unnecessary to pronounce, ex cathedra, that this or that Western philosophical tradition is Christian or anti-Christian. He need not try to force the Christian message into an alliance with any of these traditions because, being shaped by Christianity, all of them may, to some degree, be used to help express that message.

The apologetic theologian is engaged in what Tillich calls one of the "constructive" disciplines of theology. There are other constructive disciplines, as well as what Tillich calls "historical" disciplines in theology.

The historical disciplines are engaged in the study of the biblical texts, the documents of church history, and the history of religion and culture. These disciplines are theological because they treat material that is of ultimate concern to Christians or non-Christians and material with which the apologetic theologians--or any theologian--must come to terms.

The "constructive" disciplines are oriented toward philosophical discussion. What is discussed are questions which fall under categories often called "philosophy of religion" or "natural theology." The results of such discussion is not a universal theology, but "materials out of which the questions" the apologetic theologian is seeking to formulate "are asked" (I 30). These disciplines discuss and help formulate the universal human problems. But the apologetic theologian does not regard this discussion as "the place" where answers can be found (I 30).

As far as the apologetic theologian is concerned, both what is usually called "apologetics" and what is usually called "ethics" are present in all his work (I 31). His work also includes what is often called "dogmatics." The Church's dogmata, says Tillich, are to be regarded as protective devices safeguarding the Christian message (I 32). They are profound expressions of the Church's experience of, and response to, the Christian message. They must be restated and their original significance recaptured as a part of the apologetic task. This, says Tillich, is "a matter of life and death for theology" (I 32).

Practical theology, which is concerned with the technically most effective way of presenting the Christian message in a situation, is closely linked with apologetic theology, which provides it its theoretical basis and which is provided, in turn, with concrete problems and materials from the present day needs of man and society (I 33). Practical theology, in its own way, can become "a bridge between the Christian message and the human situation" (I 33). But it must not get lost in mere technique. It must, like all theology in Christianity, be "driven by the ultimate concern which is universal and concrete at the same time"--that is, Jesus the Christ.

Tillich's method is one of the most discussed features of his work. Any method grows out of an encounter with the object the method handles. It is, upon reflection, seen to be "a description of a decisive aspect of the object to which it applies" (I 60). The method Tillich finds himself using is rooted in that decisive aspect of the Christian message, which is its being the answer to basic human problems. Because Tillich knows beforehand this aspect of the Christian message, there is a sense in which it may be said that he knows his method to begin with, and even the decisive assertions of the system (I 34), because he knows the Christian message.

The apologetic theologian uses a variety of material in his work and Tillich speaks about the "sources" of this material. In this context, "sources" do not mean "authorities."

For the Christian theologian the basic source of material is, of course, the Christian Scriptures. This source contains the description of the event upon which Christianity is based, "it contains the original witness of those who participated in the revelatory events" (I 35). It is itself a part of the event as its receptive side. "The act of reception is a part of the event itself" (I 35). It is thus a participant in the event's authority. The New Testament writers tell us of Jesus of Nazareth and their acceptance of him as the Christ. Their acceptance constitutes "the inspiration of the biblical writers" (I 35), and this inspiration makes the Bible "both original event and original document" (I 35). The apologetic theologian must rely upon the biblical theologian to make this material available to him. But

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he cannot tell the biblical theologian to work according to the apologetic point of view. That would be what Tillich calls "sacred dishonesty." He can ask the biblical theologian, however, to remember that the material he works with is a matter of ultimate concern for the Christian community. He can ask him to provide an exegesis of the biblical material that is "historically critical . . . and at the same time divotional-interpretive" (I 36), that is, honest, "scientific" exegesis that is made by persons who understand that the biblical material is of ultimate concern for Christians. Such exegesis can "open the Bible" to the apologetic theologian "as his *basic* source" (I 36, Italics added).

When the apologetic theologian uses the biblical material he "implicitly uses church history as a source," since "the genesis of the Bible is an event in church history" (I 36). This history is obviously not limited to the biblical decades, nor is the biblical material the only creation of the ecclesiastical tradition. These extra-biblical creations, especially the creeds, often have to do with the Christian message; they are, in fact, expressions of it. But the apologetic theologian cannot allow any of the creations of the church to become *identified* with the Christian message, since "their witness to what is really ultimate concern is also a conditioned expression" (I 37). The apologetic theologian is certainly free to use these expressions, even bound to use them, but he is not bound by them in the way in which he is bound by the Christian message itself.

The material from the ecclesiastical tradition includes "the concrete life of his denomination" which cannot help being a "decisive source" even if the theologian wishes to use it ecumenically (I 38). His denomination has been the "place" where he first encountered the New Being in Jesus as the Christ, where he first learned of the Christian message, and where his Christian existence has been shaped and molded. He does not need to be ashamed of this. His denomination's tradition, and other Christian traditions, which together make up the history of Christian life and thought, are "matters of ultimate concern" since they are responses to the Christian message, and a continuation of the receptive side of the event upon which Christianity is based.

The apologetic theologian, since he deals with a special human situation, needs material from the history of the religion and culture of this special situation. If he is addressing his own cultural situation, as is usually the case, he himself will already be a source for this material, having been shaped by this tradition "from which he takes some content in every moment of his life, in his theological work and also outside it" (I 38). Some of this material he will be able to affirm, but some of it he must reject. Thus he uses this material dialectically. To some of it "he points . . . for confirmation of his statements" and against some of it "he fights . . . as contradictions of the Christian message" (I 38).

This "source" of material is vast. It is made available through a discipline which Tillich calls "theology of culture" (I 39).

This discipline analyzes cultural creations to discover the ultimate concern being expressed "in the ground of a philosophy, a political system, an artistic style, a set of ethical or social principles" (I 39). The basic method of this analysis of cultural expressions is what Tillich calls the reading of styles. "It is an art as much as a science to 'read styles' and it requires religious intuition, on the basis of an ultimate concern, to look into the depth of a style, to penetrate to the level where an ultimate concern exercises its driving power" (I 40).

This material, biblical, ecclesiastical, and cultural, does not all have the same value for apologetic theology. What is decisive is its "relationship to the central event on which Christianity is based, the appearance of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ" (I 40).

The apologetic theologian can use this material, of course, only insofar as he participates in it "through experience" and makes it his own. This means he must clearly understand the role his own experience plays in his theological work. Above all, he must clearly recognize that the Christian message is "not derived from experience; it is given in history" in the event upon which Christianity is based (I 42, Italics added). The apologetic theologian's experience cannot be "the source from which the contents" of his theology are taken, but it is "the medium through which they are existentially received" (I 42). Experience has no normative, confirming, verifying quality. Existentially, theology is an act of "surrender and participation . . . in which the theologian risks himself in the ultimate sense" in a kind of "test" that "is never finished, not even in a complete life of experience" (I 44). Tillich says that "an experimental verification in time and space is impossible" (I 44). The nature of the object of Christian theology, as a given, and the nature of Christian experience as a risking venture of faith preclude experience's being a source for the Christian theologian. "Christian theology is based on the unique event Jesus the Christ, and in spite of the infinite meaning of this event it remains this event and, as such, the criterion of every religious experience. This event is given to experience and not derived from it. Therefore experience receives and does not produce" (I 46).

The apologetic theologian, indeed, needs to participate in this event. But an experience of participation does not mean that the Christian message is transcended, or that there are post-Christian experiences which add "new material to the other sources" (I 46). Only in the sense that his experience is the "place" through which, and by means of which, the theologian participates in his material can it be called a source. To be sure, the apologetic theologian's experience will aid him in his task of restating and reshaping the Christian message, but he must not intend to transform the substance of the message. His experience is to "receive and only to receive" at the point at which the message is encountered (I 46). If transformation is intended at this point "the act of reception becomes falsification" (I 46). When he does transform the message it is the "old" message he wishes to restate, and not a new message produced partly by his experience. The restated message, since his experience has had a hand in its production, is subject to the "criterion of every religious experience," "the unique event Jesus the Christ," which "is given to experience and not derived from it" (I 46). The apologetic theologian knows that his experience "could become an independent source . . . only if man were united with . . . the divine Spirit in him. . . . But . . . this unity is not a fact" (I 46). He knows that there "may be revelation through him," but this revelation is also "against him and to him and not from him" (I 46). This leads to a discussion of "the criterion to which the sources as well as the mediating experience must be subjected" (I 47)--the "norm" for theology.

Such norms as the Church has used, says Tillich, are, "on the whole," the result of an historical process that is more or less "unconscious" (I 48). A norm is the work "of the spiritual life of the church" (I 48). "It happens in and through the encounter of the church with the Christian message" (I 48).

The norm Tillich proposes to use is offered "with reservations" (I 48). It is not "known at the present time" whether it will become an expression of the present day Church's encounter with the Christian message" (I 48) as it is of Tillich's. It cannot be a genuine norm so long as it is merely "a private opinion of the theologian" (I 48). Tillich's norm is "based upon what Paul calls 'the new creation'" (I 49). It seems appropriate to the present situation in which the man of today "experiences his present situation in terms of disruption, conflict, self-destruction, meaninglessness, and despair in all realms of life" (I 49). Tillich's norm speaks of "The New Being"--"a reality in which the self-estrangement of our existence is overcome, a reality of reconciliation and reunion, of creativity, meaning and hope" (I 49). It refers to the "power of overcoming the demonic cleavages of the 'old reality' in soul, society, and the universe" (I 49). It is akin to what first century Judaism looked for in the coming "Kingdom of God" and the "Messiah" who would bring it. The description of modern man's anguish and yearning is the result of Tillich's probing to the depths of the present situation. His forming the Christian message in terms of "The New Being" is his attempt to state the Christian message's answer to this yearning in a phrase meaningful for the men of this situation. Thus, "if the Christian message is understood as the message of the 'New Being,' an answer is given to the question implied in our present situation" and, he adds, "and in every human situation" (I 49).

"The New Being," however, is just a phrase. Is it merely a hope, an ideal, a product of Tillich's wish to give an answer to the deepest needs of the contemporary situation? If it were, it would be "not sufficient." Is this New Being a reality and not merely an ideal? And if so, where is it manifest? Tillich answers, it is manifest, it is real "in Jesus the Christ" (I 49). Jesus the Christ is the New Being. This affirmation is to be understood as having the same content as the ancient baptismal confession that "Jesus is the Christ" (I 49). This confession was, and is, a paradox. It affirms that "the man Jesus" (I 50) is the one "who brings the new eon" (I 49). One real man has done this. This is a paradox; it is something unexpected, the more so when the one real man is said to be Jesus of Nazareth. Yet "without this paradox the New Being would be an ideal, not a reality, and consequently not an answer to the question implied in our human situation" (I 50).

Tillich combines the expression "the New Being in Jesus as the Christ" with the principle that theology must speak of matters of ultimate concern, and says that "the New Being in Jesus as the Christ as our ultimate concern" (I 50) is the full statement of the norm he proposes to use in his theological work. This "norm is the criterion for the use of all the sources of systematic theology" (I 50). It is also the criterion of the use of the apologetic theologian's experience.

The Bible itself is subject to this norm. Like Luther, Tillich wishes to subject the Biblical writings to a criterion whereby they "should be interpreted and evaluated, namely the message of Christ or of justification through faith" (I 50). This norm, of course, is found in the Bible and derived from the Bible. Like all norms, it grows out of an encounter "with the biblical message" (I 50). Church history contributes to but does not of necessity validate the norm, since all the decisions of the Church Fathers, councils, creeds, etc. *might* "have fallen into error" (I 51). These ecclesiastical decisions do have the function, however, of "pointing to dangers to the Christian message which once have been overcome" (I 52). They "offer a very serious warning and a constructive help to the theologian" (I 52). But the apologetic theologian, working on a new frontier, will have to work out his own norm--because, in a sense, he *is* the church in the new situation, if only for a time--and he will have to courageously apply his norm "to church-historical material, irrespective of whether it has been affirmed by the most important or the least important authorities" (I 52). Otherwise, he will not be able to enter into communication with his present situation.

The norm will subject the situation's religious and cultural expressions to its criterion, but it will also be influenced by these. This is unavoidable. And it means, immediately, that no theological statement, as such, can ever be totally identified with the Christian message. Theological interpretation is culturally conditioned. The message is not. Theology is "on earth," it is culturally conditioned and the refusal to recognize this is "a symptom of that religious arrogance against which . . . theologians are fighting, presumably" (I 52).

It must also be affirmed that, as experience is not a source for the content of theology, so it is not the producer of the norm, either individual, or collectively. Experience has a hand in the form of the norm, but nothing to do with its content. "The content of the norm is the biblical message" which is "the criterion of any experience," even that experience through which it is "received, colored, and interpreted" (I 52).

The apologetic theologian, being concerned to present "an interpretation of the Christian message . . . relevant to the present situation" (I 53), is not interested in merely telling what people in the past have thought about the message (although he may also do that). He wants to make the message intelligible to the men of the present situation, and that means, among others things, making it rational. How is a theological statement to be made rational? Tillich says that in the final analysis this problem "must remain unsolved" (I 54). This is partially because reason does not produce the content of theology. "Reason is not a source of theology. It does not produce its content. . . . The contents of faith grasp reason" (I 53). And partially because the reason involved in theological statements is not a merely technical, logical reasoning (I 53). "It has a completely existential, self-determining, and self-surrendering character," which arises out of the apologetic theologian's being grasped by the New Being and its truth (I 53).

Nevertheless, the theologian must be as rational as possible. He must not use language irresponsibly, giving terms his own personal meaning. He can try--although the present "chaotic state of the philosophical and the scientific terminologies" (I 54) makes it almost impossible--to use words as they are generally understood. He can try to make clear the general connotations which a word or symbol has in the Christian community. This double effort to be rational must be made, and is called by Tillich the principle of the "semantic rationality." It is a principle which, he recognizes, is difficult to apply. It is "a difficulty which is rooted in the fact that every significant theological term cuts through several levels of meaning" (I 55). The apologetic theologian can, and must, use whatever words "he deems . . . helpful for his task of explaining the contents of the Christian faith" (I 55). He need not restrict himself "to the biblical terminology or to the language of classical theology" (I 55). Two things only are required: 1) he must be as clear and unambiguous as he can, and 2) he must take care not to distort the Christian message "by the intrusion of anti-Christian ideas" in his use of "non-Christian" language (I 55, 56). This last is an ever present possibility which makes doubly important the rigorous application of the criterion of the norm.

The Christian message is an absolute paradox--a fact that "transcends all human expectations" and possibilities (I 57). To express it requires paradoxical statements, such as Paul's "series of paradoxa (II Corinthians)" (I 56). But these paradoxical statements, which must be made, do not give the theologian license to accept or produce "a senseless combination of words" (I 56). The apologetic theologian may indeed find it helpful, even necessary, to use dialectical logic. But dialectical logic does not contradict formal logic or abandon the structure of human thought processes. What it implies is that thought can follow the movement of reality which is not a static structure of being. Dialectics affirms a dynamic ontology, an ontology which, says Tillich, developed under "the influence of voluntaristic and historical motives rooted in the Christian interpretation of existence" (I 56). "It follows the movement of thought through yes and no," but it does not thereby play loosely with words. When a concept changes and takes on new meaning in dialectical logic, "the dialectician describes in a logically correct way the intrinsic necessity which drives the old into the new" (I 56). This logic is particularly useful for the apologetic theologian who wishes to do just this with some of the symbols and concepts of the situation he speaks to, "baptizing" these by "driving" these concepts into new Christianized meanings.

God's act is paradoxical. He at once affirms finite reason and transcends it in the "one genuine paradox of the Christian message" (I 57). God acts through the Logos which is the transcending source of the logos structure of thought and being. "God does not annihilate the expressions of his own Logos" (I 57). Neither will the apologetic theologian "destroy" logical forms of thought by making absurd and irrational statements in his presentation of the Christian message. He may use paradoxical language, but "with discrimination" (I 57). And he will not demand his hearers to sacrifice their own reason "in order to accept senseless combinations of words as divine wisdom" (I 57). "Christianity does not demand such intellectual 'good works' from anyone" (I 57)--a Tillichian watchword!

The apologetic theologian will, of course, use a method, "a definite way of deriving and stating" his theological expressions. He wants his statements to hang together, to be coherent and consistent. He is not afraid of a "system," of a "consistency of cognitive assertions" (I 58). But his "system" is not a "deductive system" (I 58). Because of the existential character of the Christian truth, such an attempt to produce a deductive system would be a "contradiction in terms" (I 58). The attempt to put theological statements together into a consistent "whole" is difficult but fruitful. It discloses hitherto unsuspected relations, and opens up hitherto unsuspected arenas of thought. It advances rather than stifles the adventure of ideas.

The apologetic theologian is not likely to produce a summa. He does not have the time to deal with all actual and potential problems. Neither is he likely to produce a series of essays which deal with one problem only. A systematic theology, such as Tillich's, deals with a number of problems in a particular situation, and tries to relate them to the basic problems of man. It attempts to show how the Christian message answers these problems. It deals with a group of "actual problems which demand solution in a special situation" (I 59). Such theological systems are needful today "in view of the chaos of our spiritual life" (I 59). A system is the result of the consistent application of a particular method.

Tillich's method is "The Method of Correlation." It grows out of his conviction that a decisive aspect of the Christian message is its character of being an answer to human problems. As he sought to state the answers of the Christian message for the problems of our situation, Tillich became aware that he was formulating the material of the situation into a series of existential questions, and reformulating the Christian message, in terms of these questions, into a series of answers to these questions. "The method of correlation explains the contents of the Christian faith through existential questions and theological answers in mutual interdependence" (I 60). As he reflected upon his work and the method he seemed to be using, Tillich came to feel that there was nothing unique about what he was doing, that apologists have always used this method "sometimes more, sometimes less, consciously." And he felt that apologetic theologians must use this method today "consciously and outspokenly, especially if the apologetic point of view is to prevail" (I 60).

The "apologetic view" spoken of here is the conviction that all men have asked, and are asking, questions to which the Christian message gives the answer. These questions cannot be answered by men. God gives the answer and the answer is the Christian message. This answer is not to be thrown, like a stone, at men, but carefully phrased to answer the real and implied questions in every human situation.

This means that the apologetic theologian must do a "philosophical task." That is, he must make an analysis of the human situation and the particular situation he confronts, using materials "made available by man's creative self-interpretation in all realms of culture" (I 63). In doing this he is not limited to philosophy per se. He can and will use "poetry, drama, the novel, therapeutic psychology, and sociology" (I 63). He organizes this material in relation to the Christian message, and he may, thereby, "make an analysis of existence which is more penetrating than that of most philosophers" (I 63). Indeed he most likely will, since the Christian message is based on the event in which the meaning-giving structure of reality is most fully manifest. Analyses of human existence and of existence itself are old, "as old as man's thinking about himself." They are occasioned by man's becoming aware that he is both a part of the world of objects and a stranger to it, and by his deeper awareness that in some way he "himself is the door to the deeper levels of reality, that in his own existence he has the only possible approach to existence itself" (I 62). To express a doctrine of existence "as experienced in him as man" (I 62, 63) is a philosophical task. But the apologetic theologian who engages in this age-old philosophical task has an added dimension given him by his being grasped and drawn into the power of the New Being. He has further insight into the essential nature of man through his encounter with the Christ. He can formulate his analyses of human existence into something that is more than a mere description. He can make it into a question for which the Christian message that Jesus is the Christ, the New Being is the answer. This makes him more than a mere philosopher engaging in a particular philosophical task. It makes him a theologian and keeps "his eyes partially focused by his ultimate concern" (I 63, 64).

The apologetic theologian is committed to Jesus as the manifestation of his ultimate concern. For him, "the Christian message provides answers to the questions implied in human existence" which, because of his having received this message, he is able to formulate for his own particular situation (I 61). The answers are God's answers and the very formulation of the questions are "under the impact of God's answers" for the apologetic theologian (I 61).

God's answers, of course, are not dependent on man's being able to ask the right questions. However, the way in which man manages to ask these questions does determine how God's answers can be given. The apologetic theologian is concerned with how men ask the existential questions. He may try to reformulate these questions, but he cannot so radically and so abruptly change their form that the men who ask them no longer recognize their questions in the new form.

The question of all questions and the problem of all problems for man is the human situation itself. The apologetic theologian knows that this problem can be stated as man's turning away from God and the consequences of this act. Man is separated from God--not totally, else man would not have life at all. He remains united with God and a symptom of this unity is that he asks about the infinite. But he is separated and a symptom of his separation is that he must ask about that to which he belongs and cannot himself give the answer. His asking is ipso facto evidence of his not having unity with God (I 61). This is his problem. And it remains his problem. Nor does the apologetic theologian escape this problem. He, too, must struggle as a participant in human existence. And insofar as he seeks to understand the situation of those who do not yet know of the Christian message, he must even struggle as one who himself has not yet heard of it--becoming, as Paul suggested, "all things to all men." And even though he himself has been grasped by the grace of God, and, responding in faith, has been drawn into the Christian community. His vocation in the church is to find an expression (for himself and others) for faith that is adequate for the times, and which does not create artificial stumbling blocks for those still without this faith. Achieving such an expression is not automatic. It never has been in the history of Christianity. The new expression of the Christian message is not simply given to the apologetic theologian. He must struggle for it, in risk and passion.

What is given him is the content of the Christian message, "the revelatory events on which Christianity is based" (I 64). His task of reformulating the message so that it communicates its answers may be relatively easy, as in Western civilization, which, for all its blundering blustering anti-Christian noisings, is still basically shaped by this message so that the questions men ask in this civilization are still fundamentally the Christian questions. It may be relatively difficult, as in the Orient, where men have been shaped by centuries so as to make it almost impossible for them to even ask the Christian questions or to recognize the human situation as something to which the Christian message has an answer. In both instances the method of correlation and the apologetic viewpoint remain the same. The method is never easy even in the West. It requires deep searching into the heart of a special human situation, and into the Christian community's faith and life, to be able to express, meaningfully, the Christian message. For it is an absolute paradox which contradicts man's expectations and his own self-understanding. Since the human situation and any particular expression of it, and all men, apologetic theologians included, are always a problem which cannot be fully explored, the apologetic theologian must wrestle. He wrestles with this problem because he is committed to the Christian message, which, he knows, must be proclaimed to all men in every situation. In the final analysis the mandate and the Magna Carta of the apologetic theologian is, and remains, the Great Commission: "Go ye therefore into all the world, and make disciples of all nations" (Matthew 28).

Summary of Tillich's "Introduction"

A brief summary of this "Introduction" with particular regard to Tillich's articulation of the Christian message would stress the following:

1. The Christian message is the center of the theologian's "circle," or, using another metaphor, one of the omnipresent polar elements in his work.
2. The Christian message is an answer to the problem of the human situation generally and every particular situation. Theologians must seek ways to express this "answering" characteristic of the Christian message.
3. The Christian message must be the ultimate concern of the Christian theologian, and not simply one concern among others.
4. The Christian message claims that Jesus is the Logos become flesh, in a concrete, historical event.
5. The Christian message is contained in the Bible and the Church's tradition, but it is not identical with these.
6. The Christian message is given to man, it is not derived from his reason or his experience.
7. The norm for theology is derived from the encounter of the Church with the Christian message.
8. "Jesus the Christ as the New Being" is the norm derived from the encounter of Tillich with the Christian message.

9. Christianity's christological dogma, along with other ecclesiastical decisions, have the function of pointing to dangers to the Christian message, and of being a guide for its proper formulation.

10. The content of the norm used by theology must be the substance of the biblical message.

11. The answers of the Christian message, like the message itself, are God's answers, and are given by the grace of God.

CHAPTER II

"THE REALITY OF THE CHRIST"

As we have seen from the "Introduction" to *Systematic Theology*, Tillich intends to make the Christian message central in his theology, and to regard it as the answer and the source of answers to the existential questions asked and implied in the present situation. If we wish to see what Tillich has to say about this message, and how he has formulated it for our time, we must turn to those sections of *Systematic Theology* which Tillich calls the "answering" sections. We shall consider first the section titled "The Reality of the Christ," the answering section of Part III.

"The Reality of the Christ" opens with a definition of the Christian message. "Christianity is what it is through the affirmation that Jesus of Nazareth, who has been called 'the Christ,' *is actually the Christ*, namely, he who brings the new state of things, the New Being. Wherever the assertion that Jesus is the Christ is maintained, *there is the Christian message* . . ." (II 97, Italics added). This message, says Tillich, is based on a historical event with "two sides"--a factual side and a receptive side. The factual side is the historical man, Jesus of Nazareth. The receptive side is the historical act in which he was received as the Christ. Tillich has much to say about "the fact to which the name Jesus of Nazareth points" (II 98). Some of the words and phrases which Tillich uses as synonyms for this historic fact are: "Jesus of Nazareth" (II 97), "the man Jesus of Nazareth" (II 97), "a certain man who lived in Nazareth between the years 1 and 30" (II 97), "a historical fact" (II 98), "a personal life" (II 98), "the actual fact to which the name Jesus of Nazareth refers" (II 98), "the factual side of the message of Jesus the Christ" (II 99), "the man who is called Jesus of Nazareth" (II 99), "that personal life which the New Testament expresses in its picture of Jesus as the Christ" (II 107), "'historical Jesus' . . . used to mean that the event 'Jesus as the Christ' has a factual element" (II 107), "a personal life in which the New Being has conquered the old being" (II 114), "the concreteness of the New Being" (II 114), "the actual personal life [which is analogous to the New Testament picture of it] . . . this reality . . . encountered by the disciples" (II 115), "a personal life" (II 120), "the full humanity of Jesus as the Christ" (II 127), "a personal life" (II 135), "an individual person" (II 136), "the substance in which the power of the New Being is present" (II 138), "the Jesus-character of Jesus as the Christ" (II 142), "the Jesus-character of Jesus as the Christ or . . . his full human nature" (II 144), "a personal life living in a limited period of time, having been born and having to die, being finite, tempted, and tragically involved in existence" (II 148), "historical reality" (II 148), "the center of a personal life" (II 148), "historical reality (flesh)" (II 149), "a unique event . . . an individual . . . this concreteness . . . a real, individual life . . . a life really lived . . . a concrete reality"

(II 151), "the one who conquered the death of existential estrangement . . . the one who subjected himself to the death of existential estrangement" (II 153), "the concrete individual life of the man Jesus of Nazareth" (II 157), "a personal life" (II 158), and "the event Jesus the Christ" (II 166).

In the light of these citations, there can be no doubt that, for Tillich, Christianity is based on an event whose "factual" side is the personal life of a man who lived in Nazareth in the years 1 through 30. His disciples knew him as "Jesus of Nazareth." He was a flesh-and-blood, actual, historical reality, a personal life, fully human, though absolutely unique. The life of this man is given to us in the New Testament in a "real picture" (II 116). It was the reality of the life of this man, "when encountered by the disciples," that "created the picture" (II 115). The picture mediates to us "an adequate expression of the transforming power of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ" (II 115). The mediated character of our knowledge of this Jesus "does not diminish its truth-value, because what is given us . . . is dependent on the object of our knowledge"--this man's personal life as his disciples knew it through their encounter with him.

We are asked, according to Tillich, to take the risk of faith with regard to this man, that is, to affirm with other Christians that this man was, and is, the Christ. But we are not asked to take the risk of historical uncertainty about this man's actual existence in history. The reality of the event upon which Christianity is based, "the personal life in which the old being is conquered by the New Being," is guaranteed by faith, by the immediate awareness of those who find themselves transformed by their acceptance of this Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ. The most radical historical doubt, as far as the Christian is concerned, can do no more than suggest that this man's name might not have been "Jesus of Nazareth." (Faith cannot guarantee his *name*, and can even entertain the "historically absurd" idea that he *might* have had a different name.) But the name, after all, is not important. "Whatever his name, the New Being was, *and is*, actual *in this man*" (II 114, Italics added). Tillich himself has no hesitancy whatever in referring to this man as "Jesus of Nazareth." He is firmly convinced that historical research can neither destroy nor confirm the reality of this man's life, this historic fact, in which Christians participate whenever they affirm that this man "Jesus of Nazareth" is *actually* the Christ.

Tillich often used the phrase "the picture of Jesus as the Christ." Some of his critics seem to feel that it is this *picture* that Tillich is speaking about throughout his theology, rather than the *man* Jesus this picture portrays. This is sheer nonsense. Tillich is, of course, content with this picture of Jesus that the New Testament gives us. He does not feel that we *need* to substantiate that there actually was a man who existed as this picture portrays him. He feels that all attempts thus far to provide an acceptable, extra-biblical substantiation for this picture have been failures. Tillich feels that the whole enterprise is unnecessary because there is what he calls "an *analogia entis*, namely, an analogy between the picture and *the actual* *personal life from which it has arisen*" (II 115, Italics added). This is so, Tillich feels, because the biblical portrayal portrayal has had "in all periods of the history of the Church" the power to create "both the church and the Christian." This could only be because "the picture has . . . creative power . . . the power of the New Being" *as it was manifest in Jesus of Nazareth* (II 115, Italics added). Tillich makes free use of the New Testament's picture of Jesus, because he is fully convinced that in doing so he is not speaking merely of a picture but of that which the picture portrays. That is, the "factual side" of the event upon which Christianity is based, the personal life of Jesus of Nazareth.

Tillich discusses the content of this factual side under three headings: "The Expression of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ" (II 121-125), "The New Being in Jesus as the Christ as the Conquest of Estrangement" (II 125-135), and "The Historical Dimension of the New Being" (II 135-138).

The expressions of the New Being on its factual side must be seen, says Tillich, as a totality. "Jesus as the Christ is the bearer of the New Being in the totality of his being, not in any *special* expressions of it" (II 121, Italics added). That is, Tillich is opposed to isolating some facet of Jesus' life and saying "*this* is his Christ-character." Jesus' "Christ-character" is the totality of his being. This does not mean that the "special expressions" lose their significance. They are significant, but not as isolated from his total being. The special expressions have significance because

Jesus is the Christ in the totality of his being. His words are the words of the Christ. His suffering and death are the suffering and death of the Christ. Because, and only because, of this do they have significance.

Jesus' words, for example, are not the words of a moral teacher or a social reformer. They do not stand by themselves as "great truths" independent of the one who uttered them. They are expressions of Jesus being "The Word," the final self-manifestation of God to humanity (II 121). His words are "his prophetic message of the presence of the Kingdom of God within himself" (II 122). They thus have the power to create the New Being, the power which enables a man to hear them and to transform them into reality (II 122).

Jesus' deeds are significant expressions of his being. We are not asked to reproduce Jesus' particular deeds. There is a legitimate demand placed upon us to imitate Christ (II 122). But what we are asked to do is to "participate fully in the New Being present in him" (II 122), and, within our own concrete situation, to express this New Being insofar as we are enabled to do so (II 122-123).

Jesus' sufferings are significant, but only in the total context of his being and his vocation as the Christ. His violent death upon the cross was a sacrifice. But the sacrifice of Jesus was a lifelong sacrifice of himself "as a particular individual"--the carpenter from Nazareth--"to himself as the bearer of the New Being," to his vocation as the Christ (II 123). The sacrifice, the surrender, and the suffering that this entailed were the result of the "inescapable conflict between the forces of existential estrangement" and what he was bound to represent (II 123). His being the Christ is what is significant in this "of which the necessary consequences are suffering and death" (II 123). Tillich finds Anselm's theory of the atonement "astonishing," because it says that suffering and death were not required of Jesus as a part of his being the Christ (II 124). On the contrary, thinks Tillich, in order to maintain the undisrupted unity between himself and God, Jesus had to suffer continually and finally die in order that God, in him, might participate fully in man's existential estrangement. This, together with God's conquest of this estrangement, was the purpose of Jesus being the Christ.

Jesus is the Christ in all aspects of his being, including his "inner life." It is difficult to penetrate to the inner life of any man, but the uniqueness of Jesus makes this doubly difficult in his case. Attempts to state his "inner life," Tillich finds "questionable" and "extremely doubtful" (II 124). The New Testament writers do not attempt to do this. They tell us of Jesus' resistance to temptation, his love, his loneliness, and his anxiety, but this is not a report of his inner life. It is rather an attempt to "show his total participation in human finitude" (II 125), and his conquest, not only of anxiety, but of all the forces which perpetuate existential estrangement. "In all its concrete details the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ confirms his character as the bearer of the New Being or as the one in whom the conflict between the essential unity of God and man and man's existential estrangement is overcome" (II 125).

The absense of any marks of estrangement is in itself an expression of the conquest of estrangement by God in Jesus. Jesus shows no traces of unbelief, of *hubris*, or of concupiscence (II 126). This does not mean that there was no *possibility* of estrangement in Jesus. He was *fully* human, and this means that temptation was a reality for him. Like all other men who know "aroused freedom," who can ponder the possibility of existing without God, Jesus, too, was tempted. He, too, made the transition from potentiality to actuality. He, too, actualized his freedom through a free decision. Tillich insists that Jesus' temptations must be regarded as "real and serious" (II 129). However, though his decision was free and human (not the non-decision of a divine automaton), Jesus did not respond to temptation in the usual human way. He chose instead to keep his unity with God. Jesus' existence is therefore not a "Fall," as in all other men. He does not contradict his essence in his existence. The image of God in him is not lost, not distorted, not broken. In him we can see "God-for-us"--the genuine relation between God and man intended in creation.

Jesus, who, by the power of God, achieved this victory over temptation, did not, on this account, refuse to participate in the life of men who are fallen men. He, in *his* mode of existence, lived among men, in the midst of *their* mode of existence, in spite of all the conflict, tragedy, disappointment, suffering, and death that this inevitably entailed. In doing so, he allowed God to conquer the consequences of our mode of existence, to break its power of maintaining the estrangement between God and man.

This victory over temptation and over all the forces of estrangement was not contingent on the free decision of the one man, Jesus of Nazareth. "The appearance of Jesus as the Christ and his resistance to the attempts to deprive him of his Christ-character are both acts of decision by himself and the results of divine destiny" (II 130). Like all men, his freedom was in polarity with his destiny. In Jesus' case, this destiny was the destiny of one born within the Jewish religious community and shaped by the divine acts which created that community. At decisive points, he could, and did, draw upon the power of this destiny. (For example, he had the words of Jewish scripture to not only defeat the temptor, but to guide his own self-understanding of how his mission should be accomplished.) His destiny, which was a "divine destiny," was a part of his victory--it was God-in-him giving him the power to fulfill his vocation as the Christ.

Tillich is interested in emphasizing the full humanity of Jesus. This is always threatened by the popular piety of the church and by the ever-present tendency to read semi-monophysitic theology into the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ (and into the creeds of Christendom). Tillich calls attention to the "degree to which the biblical picture of Jesus stresses his finitude" (II 131). He mentions Jesus' "anxiety of having to die," "the threat of the victory of non-being over being," "the lack of a definite place," "his loneliness," "his various finite concerns," "his being affected by the misery of the masses," "the tensions which follow from the self-relatedness of a finite person," "his uncertainty in judgement," "his error," "his wants and desires," "his doubt," "his feeling of having been left alone by God" (II 131-132). All this tends to be forgotten in popular conceptions of Jesus' personal life.

He also points out what it meant for Jesus to participate in the tragic ambiguities of our mode of existence--how, for example, he made the High Priest and Judas guilty simply by the course of action he took. Yet, says Tillich, because Jesus took upon himself the consequences of this tragic involvement and conquered them, "the New Being in him has eternal significance also for those who caused his death, even Judas" (II 132-134).

The statements made by Tillich under the heading "His Permanent Unity with God" (II 134-135) deserve to be quoted in full.

> The conquest of existential estrangement in the New Being, which is the being of the Christ, does not remove finitude and anxiety, ambiguity and tragedy; but it does have the character of taking the negativities of existence into unbroken unity with God. The anxiety about having to die is not removed; it is taken into participation in the "will of God," i.e., in his directing creativity. His homelessness and insecurity with respect to a physical, social, and mental place are not diminished but rather increased to the last moment. Yet they are accepted in the power of a participation in a "transcendent place," which in actuality is no place but the eternal ground of every place and of every moment of time. His loneliness and his frustrated attempts in trying to be received by those to whom he came do not suddenly end in a final success; they are taken into the divine acceptance of that which rejects God, into the vertical line of the uniting love which is effective where the horizontal line from being to being is barred. Out of his unity with God he has unity with those who are separated from him and from one another by finite self-relatedness and existential self-seclusion. Both error and doubt equally are not removed but are taken into the participation in the divine life and thus indirectly into the divine omniscience. Both error and truth are taken into the transcendent truth. Therefore, we do not find symptoms of repression of doubt in the picture of Jesus as the Christ. Those who are not able to elevate their doubts into the truth which transcends every finite truth must repress them. They perforce become fanatical. Yet no traces of

> fanaticism are present in the biblical picture. Jesus does not claim absolute certitude for a finite conviction. He rejects the fanatical attitude of the disciples toward those who do not follow him. In the power of a certitude which transcends certitude and incertitude in matters of religion as well as secular life, he accepts incertitude as an element of finiteness. This also refers to the doubt about his own work--a doubt which breaks through most intensively on the Cross but still does not destroy his unity with God.
>
> This is the picture of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. It is not the picture of a divine-human automaton without serious temptation, real struggle, or tragic involvement in the ambiguities of life. Instead of that, it is the picture of a personal life which is subjected to all the consequences of existential estrangement but wherein estrangement is conquered in himself and a permanent unity is kept with God. Into this unity he accepts the negativities of existence without removing them. This is done by transcending them in the power of this unity. This is the New Being as it appears in the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ.

This is what Tillich means by the "biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ." It is clear that he is not talking about a mere picture but the Jesus whom this picture portrays. Tillich's description of Jesus, which makes full use of the New Testament's picture, is what he means by "the factual side of the event upon which Christianity is based." The life of Jesus is absolutely essential to the Christian message. It is absolutely essential, too, in Tillich's theology. What is proclaimed in the message as an offer of salvation must be firmly rooted in an actual, historical reality--the personal life of Jesus the Christ. Jesus was the decisive, unique, paradoxical event that saves man. Jesus, in the totality of his being, is the final revelation, the final self-manifestation of God's revealing and saving activity. He is the objective, historical reality upon which Christianity is based.

This personal life, says Tillich, "is the criterion by which past and future are judged" but "it is not an isolated life" and "it is not restricted to his being" (II 135). That which is fully manifest in his total being is, and has been, at work throughout human history. The early Christian apologists spoke of this as logos spermatikos. It is that which creates meaning and order throughout the universe, and which creates in "preparatory revelation" in human history. This Logos became flesh in Jesus as the Christ, but is not limited in its activity to the years "1 through 30." Prior to these years (and even yet prior to an existential encounter with the Christ), there is preparatory revelation. Subsequent to the "final revelation," there are "received" manifestations of revelation. These occur in the Christian community insofar as it acknowledges Jesus to be the Christ. The divine power actualizes itself in the churches by creating a new mode of being in persons and communities after the ecample of the New Being manifest in Jesus as the Christ.

If Jesus had not been received and acknowledged as the Christ, says Tillich, "he could not have become the Christ, because he would not have brought the New Being to anyone" (II 135). He has been so received, and continues to be so received. The reception of Jesus as the Christ involves one immediately in this event upon which Christianity is based, and makes it unnecessary to "jump over the millenia to the years '1 through 30'" (II 136). Jesus being the Christ, says Tillich, presupposes both "the community out of which he came and the community which he creates" (II 136). The community which he creates thus presupposes his coming. To participate in the reality of this community by accepting Jesus as the Christ is to participate in, and to know, the reality of this man Jesus of Nazareth in his spatial and temporal breadth (II 136).

The New Testament "is the book of the community whose foundation is the acceptance of Jesus as the Christ" (II 136). This book contains numerous pictures of Jesus as the Christ. These "are different, and somehow contrasting, ways of interpreting the assertion that Jesus is the Christ" (II 136). These differences of emphasis do not touch the substance of the life they are presenting. The Synoptics emphasize his participation in the conditions of our mode of existence. The Johannine emphasis is on the victory over these conditions. Neither emphasis excludes the contrasting element (II 137). There is a contrast in the self-consciousness of Jesus suggested in the pictures. There is a difference in "the way in which Jesus places himself in the eschatological framework" (II 137). These varying pictures are an essential part of the presentation, but they remain true to the personal life of Jesus, which, of course, is the substance of the factual side of the event upon which Christianity is based.

> . . . in all cases, the substance is untouched. It shines through as the power of the New Being in a threefold color; first and decisively, as the undisrupted unity of the center of his being with God; second, as the serenity and majesty of him who preserves this unity against all the attacks coming from estranged existence; and third, as the self-surrendering love which represents and actualizes the divine love in taking the existential self-destruction upon himself (II 138).

Tillich has thus given a great deal of attention to Jesus of Nazareth. Any attempt to get something more factual than the New Testament picture of Jesus misses the whole point, says Tillich. The "research for the historical Jesus" has been a failure (II 101-107). The New Testament contains authentic historical data of the historical Jesus, but the attempt to abstract this data to reconstruct a "historical Jesus" as he stood "behind the New Testament portrayal of him" fails to recognize that this is neither necessary nor what the New Testament writers were interested in, nor what can be a foundation for Christian faith. The event upon which Christianity is based is not simply its factual side. Without its receptive side it would not be the event. Had Jesus not been received and acknowledged as the Christ "he could not have become the Christ, because he would not have brought the New Being to anyone" (II 135). The New Testament is a document of both sides of the event and is itself essential to it as the original witness to, and expression of, the reception of Jesus as the Christ. To isolate the factual side from the receptive side is to isolate an "event" which is not the event. To show him as other than the New Testament shows him--that is, as Jesus the Christ--is to show something that is, in the final analysis, not what Christianity is really interested in.

> The search for the historical Jesus was an attempt to discover a minimum of reliable facts about the man Jesus of Nazareth, in order to provide a safe foundation for the Christian faith. This attempt was a failure. . . . Christianity is not based on the acceptance of a historical novel; it is based on the witness to the messianic character of Jesus by people who were not interested at all in a biography of the Messiah (II 105).

Much has been made of the fact that Tillich feels that historical research cannot, as he sees it, confirm the factual side of the event. But the real point is that even if it could confirm Jesus' "facticity" it would not thereby confirm his messianic character. Many of his contemporaries had no doubt of his being a real person and they knew of what he had done and said, but were, nevertheless, unable to receive him as the Christ. This would still be the case even if historical research could somehow guarantee that the New Testament account is 100% "reliable."

Tillich, while being very skeptical about what historical research can offer regarding the fact of Jesus' life, feels that it can be a useful tool helping us to understand the reception of Jesus as the Christ. Historical research can teach us the ways in which the New Testament expressed the reception of Jesus as the Christ. "Theology has learned to distinguish between the empirically historical, the legendary, and the mythological elements in the biblical stories of both Testaments" (II 108). Historical research gives us insights which have the effect of preventing us from giving "dogmatic validity to historically probable judgments" (II 108). It provides "insight into the development of the christological symbols" (II 108).

Tillich gives examples of several New Testament symbols ("Son of Man," "Son of God," "Messiah," and "Logos") and shows how the New Testament writers made use of the symbolic materials that were available, modified them, and used them to express what was meant when Jesus was received as the Christ. Tillich also indicates how these materials were distorted when their symbolic character was forgotten and they were taken literally.

The symbol "Son of Man" "designates an original unity between

God and man" (II 109). Jesus was understood to be the expression of this unity which was lost by man in the Fall and which was restored by the life of Jesus. The symbol "Son of God" expresses the belief "that human nature makes possible a father-son relation between God and man." When this symbol was applied to Jesus it expresses the belief that in this man this relation was not broken. Instead it is once more made manifest and re-established for "all those who participate in his being" (II 110). The symbol "Messiah" (or "Christ") which is applied to Jesus despite his apparent defeat by the powers of the old eon (which the Messiah was supposed to defeat) involves the paradox that this defeat was itself defeated in a paradox which Christianity acknowledges--and accepts (II 111). That is, he is indeed the One who brings the new reality--but in a totally unexpected way, the way of suffering and death. The symbol "Logos," which, says Tillich, is partly conceptual as well as being symbolic, is applied to Jesus as one who reveals the mystery of God and reveals God's order by appearing in a personal life, as a historical reality, reuniting the estranged and giving meaning once again (II 112). Tillich then shows how these symbols are literalized. But by understanding this process the literalized symbols can be "deliteralized" and used once again as what they are--symbols. Then they will no longer be "an unnecessary stumbling block for those who want to understand the meaning of Christian symbols" (II 112). Theology will be able to use them once again for expressing the Christian message.

The misuse of symbols is no new phenomenon in the history of

Christianity. They can be misused by being taken literally, or by not being sufficiently reinterpreted. There are numerous symbols which express man's yearning for a new state of things. When these symbols are adopted by Christianity they must also be adapted--sometimes radically--in order to express the Christian message. Otherwise some very unchristian ideas might be expressed by the symbols, and something affirmed about Jesus as the Christ that contradicts the heart of the Christian message. For this reason, "the early church began to interpret the christological symbols in conceptual terms" (II 139). It used concepts from Greek philosophy to do this because there were no other concepts available (II 139).

The conceptualization of the Church's christological symbols resulted in the creation of the christological dogmas. These, in turn, became the presuppositions of the Church's doctrinal statements, "above all, those concerning God and man, the Spirit, and the Trinity" (II 139). These dogmas are themselves based on the "baptismal confession that Jesus is the Christ," which is "the text of which the christological dogma is the commentary" (II 139).

This dogma has been often attacked. Some of the attacks have been against "its substance . . . and some against its form" (II 139). For the most part, these attacks miss the point. The dogmas were formulated "to preserve the substance of the Christian message" against the misuse and misinterpretation of the Christian symbols by those inside and outside the church (II 139-140). They should be understood in this light.

Tillich feels that these christological dogmas "saved the church but with very inadequate tools" (II 140).

> The inadequacy of the tools is due partly to the inadequacy of every human concept for expressing the message of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. It is due partly to the special inadequacy of Greek concepts, which are universally significant but nevertheless are dependent on a concrete religion determined by the divine figures of Apollo and Dionysus (II 140).

That is, the concepts are not completely nonsymbolic and are in need of correction themselves. The use of the Greek concepts gave "a Hellenistic character" to the christological dogma of the early Church (II 140). This was necessary, and even desirable, in the Hellenistic world. But the church did not thereby "cease to be an assembly based on the message that Jesus is the Christ" and it was "able to rise to moments of self-criticism" and to "reconsider" its adopted and adapted Hellenistic terminology.

Two kinds of failure resulted from the inadequacy of the Greek concepts. One was a failure to remain true to the Christian message which was exemplified by "the half monophysitic changes" in the interpretation of "the Creed of Chalcedon since the middle of the sixth century" (II 141). Here philosophical terminology was used to express something contrary to the baptismal formula which says simply that Jesus is the Christ. The changed interpretation was a result of "a very powerful stream of magic-superstitious piety" (II 141) that "wanted a God, walking on earth . . . not involved in the conflicts and the ambiguities of life" (II 144). The other kind of failure was the result of the inadequacy of the term "nature" in Chalcedon's "two-nature" formula (II 142). This inadequacy will be discussed shortly.

The decision at Nicaea that Jesus the Christ is homoousios, of the same substance as the Father and not a half-god, led to interpretations which endangered his full humanity. The Council of Chalcedon finally prevented this by its doctrine of the two natures in Jesus, one of which was fully human. Says Tillich, "In the two great decisions of the early church, both the Christ-character and the Jesus-character of the event of Jesus as the Christ were preserved" (II 143).

Nevertheless, the terms used by these councils are inadequate. The term homoousios--"of the same substance"--which was intended to express the conviction that only if Jesus were the God who is really God could he create the New Being, and which rejected interpretations which would have "deprived him of his power to create the New Being," raises the difficult question of "how a difference could exist between Jesus and God and how the picture of the Jesus of history could avoid becoming completely un-understandable" (II 143). The two-nature formula of Chalcedon is even more inadequate. Though it protects the Jesus-character of Jesus the Christ, it sets beside this human nature a divine nature, relating these two "natures" to one another "through an accumulation of powerful paradoxa" (II 141), and through the use of the term persona which, however, is a static and not a dynamic concept. Moreover, since the "nature" of God is to be beyond essence and existence. Then, too, human "nature" should really be reserved for our mode of existence. It is confusing if it is applied to Jesus and his unique mode of existing. The formula at Chalcedon, while in "intent and design . . . true to the genuine meaning of the Christian message," proved too vulnerable to semi-monophysitic readings, which takes away the very Jesus-character of the Christ which Chalcedon wished to protect.

Tillich has no quarrel with the substance of these two Councils. They did, after all, save the Christian message. He does have reservations about their conceptual forms. They cannot be the last word in christological discussion. Tillich is convinced that theologians can and must be free from those concepts in order to be free for what they tried to express.

> Theology must be free from and for the concepts it uses. It must be free from a confusion of its conceptual form with its substance, and it must be free to express this substance with every tool which proves to be more adequate than those given by the ecclesiastical tradition (II 142).

Accordingly, Tillich offers a christological statement which he thinks is more adequate for the times. He says,

> The assertion that Jesus as the Christ is the personal unity of a divine and human nature must be replaced by the assertion that in Jesus as the Christ the eternal unity of God and man has become historical reality. . . . We replace the inadequate concept "divine nature" by the concepts "eternal god-man-unity" or "Eternal God-manhood." Such concepts replace a static essence by a dynamic relation . . . we are open to relational concepts which make understandable the dynamic picture of Jesus as the Christ (II 148).

The use of the term "eternal" points to that in God which makes unity with man in the divine life possible, and to the unique event Jesus as the Christ in which this unity became actualized. The concreteness of this unity is pictured in the Gospel stories. An abstract definition of it is impossible. "One can only say that it is a community between God and the center of a personal life which determines all utterances of this life and resists the attempts within existential estrangement to disrupt it" (II 148). Tillich wishes the phrase "essential unity between God and man" to be interpreted as an ontological assertion. The relation is between two entities who have a fundamentum in re, and it calls attention to both sides of this relationship. It also wishes to stress the full participation in existence of the Jesus the Christ who is "essential man" (II 150).

Tillich utilizes certain Adoptionist motives in his christological statement. These, he says, are necessary to complement (not supplant!) motives dominant in the traditional incarnational Christologies. These Christologies stress the destiny aspect in Jesus the Christ. Incarnation is a familiar concept in pagan religions where the gods "can easily enter into all forms of the universe," because "endless metamorphoses are possible" (II 149). There is justification for using the concept "Incarnation" in christological assertions, since they speak about "he who transcends the universe" and who "appears in it and under its conditions" (II 149). But the "became" in the phrase "the Word became flesh" is no metamorphosis. "The incarnation of the Logos is not metamorphosis but his total manifestation in a personal life" (II 149). There is a dynamic process in a personal life that involves freedom as well as destiny. This, says Tillich, is what is stressed by the Adoptionist motives. In them, Jesus' freedom "to be other than divine" is acknowledged. "God, through his Spirit adopted the man Jesus as his Messiah" (II 149). This is partially by way of his destiny and partially by way of his freedom. The divine Spirit makes Jesus the Christ, because Jesus chooses to allow this. A dynamic interplay is going on in which the spirit of the man Jesus acts in such a way that the divine Spirit is able to make him the Christ. Without this interplay Jesus would not be a real, personal, individual life. He would be a divine figure like those of the mystery cults, a divine automaton. It is precisely the "fresh colors of a life really lived" in Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ which enabled the early Church, in its message, to conquer the mystery cults "through the power of a concrete reality" (II 151). Adoptionist motives protect the picture of Jesus from being that of "a transmuted divine being" who "does not have the freedom to be other than divine" (II 149). "The incarnational Christology was needed to explain the adoptionist Christology. This was a necessary development. But it is equally necessary--although not always seen--that incarnational Christology needs adoptionist Christology for its fulfillment" (II 149). It is needed to protect Christ's full participation in sinful existence, which, if lost, means that the paradox of the man Jesus being the Christ is lost, and with it the paradox of the justification of the sinner. "The christological paradox and the paradox of the justification of the sinner are one and the same paradox. It is the paradox of God accepting a world which rejects him" (II 150). The factual side--the fully human, personal, historical life of Jesus of Nazareth--must be affirmed against all attempts to dehumanize him into "a God walking on earth" (II 150).

Tillich has thus gone to great lengths to affirm the concrete historical reality of Jesus the Christ as a unique and factual event in human history. Tillich is equally concerned to show the universal significance of this event as the saving event. "We must ask in what sense and in what way Jesus as the Christ is the savior or, more precisely, in what way the unique event of Jesus as the Christ has universal significance for every human being and, indirectly, for the universe as well" (II 151).

Tillich utilizes the New Testament's two central symbols, "The Cross of Christ" and "The Resurrection of Christ," which have "the character of a direct confession" and which provide "the materials for the creedal expressions of the Christian faith" (II 151) to express the meaning of the Christ-event. He uses other New Testament material to "corroborate" these two symbols (II 152). Each symbol is based on an event, but each is to be understood in a symbolic sense. Each event points to more than just a historical happening. As symbols, they have "the power to express . . . the New Being in Jesus as the Christ" (II 152). They must be allowed to express what they are intended to express rather than to simply refer to a historical moment--which they also do.

The two central symbols "correspond to the two basic relations of the Christ to existential estrangement . . . his subjection to it . . . his conquest of it" (II 152). Both symbols are based on an event. The event on which the symbol of the Cross is based "took place in the full light of historical observation" (II 153). There is, however, "a veil of deep mystery over the event" on which the symbol of the Resurrection is based (II 153). These two events are fully objective. And, despite the mystery surrounding the report of the event of the Resurrection, the New Testament "lays tremendous significance on the objective side of the Resurrection" (II 153). Says Tillich, "whatever the historical circumstances," the Resurrection is a "symbol based on a fact" (II 154). The event of the Resurrection, its objective historical side, is "a real experience" which "made it possible for the disciples to apply the known symbol of resurrection to Jesus, thus acknowledging him definitely as the Christ. They called this experienced *event* the Resurrection of the Christ, and it was a combination of *event* and symbol" (II 154, Italics added). The attempt to isolate the factual elements of these two symbols is not a primary concern of faith. The factual element in the Cross "is the surrender of him who is called the Christ . . . death" (II 155). The "factual element" which is a "necessary implication of the Resurrection" is confirmed by the "experience of being grasped by the power of the New Being" (II 155).

The event of the resurrection is discussed at some length by Tillich. He says we can say of it that it is, on its subjective side, "an ecstatic experience" of the disciples in which they came to know that Jesus "is present . . . Death was not able to push him into the past. . . . He 'is the Spirit' and 'we know him now' only because he is the Spirit" (II 157). This event happened and continues to happen "to all those who in every period experience his living presence here and now" (II 157). In the symbol of the Resurrection of Christ, "the central Christian symbol," "the concrete individual life of the man Jesus of Nazareth is raised above transitoriness into the eternal presence of God as Spirit" (II 157). Because this event happened, Jesus was restored, in the estimation of his disciples, to his being "the Christ." His death had seemed to make that view of him impossible. But the Resurrection happened, and whatever it might have been in terms of its factual details, it created the "certainty that . . . the New Being has appeared in its fulness . . . and the death of Jesus has not been able to separate" Jesus from his being the Christ (II 158). This is enough for faith. We may want more than this, but this is all that is really necessary. Tillich hopes that literalists will at least recognize that the New Testament's attitude, "and especially that of the nonliteralist Apostle Paul justifies" what Tillich has said to be what we can say about the event, about its objective and subjective sides, upon which the symbol "The Resurrection of Christ" is based (II 158).

Tillich discusses some of the New Testament material which corroborates the symbol "Cross of Christ." He mentions the servant passage in Philippians 2, the birth of Christ in Bethlehem, and "the descriptions of his subjection to finitude" (II 158). These all support the symbol "Cross of Christ" which, as symbol, "does not report an isolated event in his life but that toward which the story of his life is directed. Their meaning [this corroboratory material] is that he who is the Christ subjects himself to the ultimate negativities of existence" (II 158).

In the same way, the symbol of the Resurrection of the Christ does not "report an isolated event after his death." This event is anticipated in other events of his life in which he is "victorious over the existential estrangement to which he has subjected himself" (II 159). New Testament material that tells of his pre-existence and post-existence, his virgin birth, the transfiguration, the miracle stories, the Ascension, his sitting at the right hand of God, his Second Coming, the ultimate judgment of the world by the Christ, all corroborates the meaning of the "Resurrection of the Christ" (II 159-165).

This corroborating material, says Tillich, has "been greatly distorted . . . because of a literalism which makes" it "absurd and non-existential" (II 164). It needs to be reinterpreted and shown to be "based on things and events" in which they participate and symbolize rather than literally describe. Some of this symbolic material may no longer communicate what it intends to express. Symbols "die." But the divine creativity does not die, and it can use the living consciousness of the church to produce new expressions. But "symbols cannot be replaced at will," and this means that the theologian's task is not to decide which symbols he should interpret. His task is to interpret the symbols which live in the church (II 165).

The universal significance of the Christ-event proclaimed by the Christian message is expressed by the word "salvation" (II 165). This term means deliverance "from ultimate negativity and from that which leads to ultimate negativity" (II 165). In our present situation, thinks Tillich, this can be expressed by the word "healing" (II 166). This word means "reuniting that which is estranged, giving a center to that which is split, overcoming the split between God and man, man and his world, man and himself" (II 166). Healing processes "occur throughout all history." They are coextensive with the processes of revelation (II 166). "Revelation . . . is the ecstatic manifestation of the Ground of being which has shaking, transforming, and healing power. . . . on these healing forces the life of mankind depends" (II 166-167). There is, in Tillich's thought, a universalism that does not make salvation absolutely dependent "upon the encounter with Jesus as the Christ and the acceptance of his healing power" (II 167). If this were the case, "only a small number of human beings will ever achieve salvation" (II 167). Tillich considers this an "absurd and demonic idea" (II 167). The whole problem needs to be stated differently. "In some degree all men participate in the healing power of the New Being. Otherwise they would have no being. . . . But no men are totally healed" (II 167).

Yet there is a peculiar character of the healing that comes through Jesus as the Christ (II 167). "In him the healing quality is complete and unlimited." "Wherever there is saving power in mankind, it must be judged by the saving power in Jesus as the Christ" (II 168), because "he is the ultimate criterion of every healing and saving process" (II 168).

How is this so? It is because his being is the New Being, and he has fulfilled his "function to reunite what is estranged" (II 169). "In his face we see the face of God, and in him we experience the reconciling will of God" (II 169). "God reveals himself to us " in him, and achieves "man's liberation from demonic powers" (II 170). In short, God accomplishes atonement in and through this man Jesus the

Christ. The message of Christianity, in telling us of Jesus the Christ and his universal significance, tells us that "God . . . is eternally reconciled, and wants us to be reconciled to him" (II 170).

There are two sides to this atonement: 1) "that in the manifestation of the New Being which has an atoning effect," and 2) "that which happens to man under the atoning effect." The one is objective, the other subjective. The one is the act of God. The other is man's response. The objective side, the act of God, is experienced as the "victory of the love of God in Christ over all the demonic powers" (II 171). The subjective element is "the experienced impact of the inner power . . . of the New Being . . . the impression of his self-surrendering love and . . . the answering love" which "this love awakens in man" (II 172).

When doctrines of the atonement are stated, "the objective and the subjective sides" must be "balanced." Tillich offers six principles as guides for such statements:

1. "The atoning processes are created by God and God alone" (II 173).

2. "There are no conflicts in God between his reconciling love and his retributive justice" (II 174).

3. "The divine removal of guilt and punishment is not an act of overlooking the reality and depth of existential estrangement" (II 174).

4. "God's atoning activity must be understood as his participation in existential estrangement and its self-destructive consequences" (II 174). Tillich says: "Here we are at the very heart of the doctrine of atonement" (II 174).

5. "In the Cross of the Christ the divine participation in existential estrangement becomes manifest" (II 175). Tillich says this is not merely that something becomes possible or known but that something "happens . . . which has effects and consequences. . . . It is . . . an actualization . . . the central one . . . the criterion of all other manifestations" (II 175).

6. "Through participation in the New Being, which is the being of Jesus as the Christ, men also participate in the manifestation of the atoning act of God" (II 176). This participation is: 1) "participation in the divine participation," 2) "accepting it," and 3) "being transformed by it" (II 176).

The final principle indicates that there is a "threefold character of salvation in which the effect of the divine atoning act upon men is expressed" (II 176).

Participation in the saving power of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ has an objective side. The New Being grasps and draws men into itself producing "the state which Paul called 'being in Christ'" (II 177). This is possible because the "objective reality of the New Being preceded subjective participation in it" (II 177). The message is the message of the objective reality of the New Being and the "new reality to which one is asked to turn" (II 177). Such turning in its subjective side is "faith, which accepts Jesus as the bearer of the New Being." But faith would not be possible without the grasping and drawing power of this reality, as an objective reality.

When one is drawn into the Christ, a development takes place.

It, too, has an objective side. This is "the eternal act of God by which he accepts as not estranged those who are indeed estranged" and in which "he takes them into the unity with him that is manifest in the New Being in Christ" (II 178). There is an "in spite of" here which "is decisive for the whole Christian message," and which is expressed in "the paradoxical formula, simul peccator, simul justus, which is the core of the Lutheran revolution" (II 178). The subjective side of this process is man's acceptance of the divine acceptance of him. "Accepting that one is accepted is the paradox of salvation" (II 179). God's act is "grace." Man's response is "faith." We are accepted by grace through faith. Our faith is a response to a gift that we do not merit and cannot force.

The process of salvation is thus an act of, and initiated by, God. Our acceptance is our acceptance of what God does in and for us through Jesus as the Christ. Our acceptance opens the way for the power of the New Being to actualize itself in us, transforming "personality and community inside and outside the church" (II 180). The power of the New Being prepares us for our encounter with its final manifestation in Jesus as the Christ and, upon our encounter with and acceptance of him, actualizes itself in us in every moment in which Jesus is accepted as the Christ.

Summary of the Christian Message as It Is Expressed in "The Reality of the Christ"

There was a man who lived in Palestine in the years "1 through 30." He was known to his disciples as "Jesus of Nazareth." He was a fully human, completely real, fully historical person. He gathered together a community of disciples who came to regard him as the Messiah. He taught. He healed. He participated fully in human existence. But he was unique for all this. Unlike all other men, he did not yield to the temptation to disrupt his unity with God. He did not repeat the Fall of man in the actualization of his human freedom. He was, and is, a new mode of human existence, a New Being.

This man had all the characteristics of a finite human being. Together, Tillich sometimes refers to them as his "Jesus-character." As such, he had the possibility of living according to the usual modes of existence. He could have been, all his life, the carpenter from Nazareth. He could have been, and was urged to be, a Revolutionary. But he was conscious of himself as destined to be the Christ. He knew God was at work in him, and this gave the totality of his being the quality which Tillich calls his "Christ-character." He did not resist this Christ-character, but allowed it to have full sway over his Jesus-character. He allowed himself, his finite being, to be put to death, sacrificing at one blow all the other possibilities open to him, in order to fulfill his calling to be Jesus the Christ. This is his "sacrafice of himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ." He freely chose to be and do what his destiny had set him to be, and what God wished to be and do in him. Thus he was unique. And thus he suffered and died. And thus he was the Christ.

Following his death, his disciples experienced an objective event which enabled them to speak of the "Resurrection of the Christ." His death had, not surprisingly, severely shaken their belief in him as the Christ. But this event enabled them to come to see that his death had been a part of his Messianic function. Then they understood his resurrection as the climax of this man's triumph over all temptations and over all the demonic forces of estrangement--even death itself--which perpetuate man's estrangement from God. Their belief in him as the Messiah was restored, never to be shaken again, that this man was, and is, the One who brings the new reality into human history.

Thus in this man God was able to do the decisive thing for the salvation of all mankind. This is the "factual side" of the event upon which Christianity is based.

The "receptive side" is this man's being received as the Christ (first by his disciples, and then by all those who become a part of their community). In this reception it is the power of God which grasps, draws, transforms, and heals the believer, and creates the response of faith. This power of the self-manifestation and healing activity of God is fully and definitively manifest in Jesus as the Christ, but it is not limited to his being or to the years 1 through 30. The Christ has spatial and temporal breadth. The power of the New Being is at work in all of human history in its revealing and saving activity. When it is recognized and accepted in Jesus it is able to create not merely a latent Spiritual Community, but a manifest Spiritual Community, the churches who are made up of people who accept Jesus as the Christ and the revelation and salvation as it appears in him as the criterion of all other claims of revelation and healing.

The reception of Jesus as the Christ, the receptive side of the Christ-event is expressed by means of symbols which express men's longing for a new state of things which are adopted and adapted by the Christian community to express its conviction that this longing receives its answer in the reality of the Christ. The New Testament is the original document of this receptive side. It makes use of a variety of such symbols. It presents Jesus as "The Messiah," "The Son of God," "The Son of Man," "The 'Word' of God," and "The Lord of history" (among others). It shows us a concrete historical reality but it is not a historical novel it offers but rather an original response to this man. It is a living document of the original event upon which Christianity is based. Its presentation of the Christ (Tillich refers to it as the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ) has had, throughout the Christian centuries, the power to arouse the response of faith. It has this power because it is authentic, because there is an _analogia entis_ between it and the Christ it portrays. It is adequate for the needs of faith, which does not require an additional picture, provided by historical research, to guarantee it. The response of faith to the Christ portrayed in the New Testament is a response to this man, Jesus of Nazareth, who _is_ the Christ and through whom we are saved.

The act of God in Jesus the Christ is an act of revelation and salvation. And it is an act of grace. God participates fully in human history in this man and in him overcomes the consequences of human estrangement. In this act the possibility is once more opened up of our being united with God. Indeed, through this act we are reunited with God. It is an act of atonement. And this is an objective fact as Jesus is an objective reality. Our response is subjective but it is elicited by the objective act of God. *By* God's grace, *through* our faith and because of what God has done for us in Jesus the Christ, we see God-for-us and we are healed. We participate in, and share, the victory of God over the meaninglessness and estrangement that is consequent upon the Fall.

The Christian message is about a concrete, objective, historical event with universal significance. It is about Jesus who is the Christ. The message tells of God's salvation, his participation in and acceptance of a world which rejects him. It calls us to accept this divine acceptance. It calls us to a life of faith and love, a new mode of existence--a New Being. And it tells us that this is not merely an ideal but a reality--Jesus the Christ--in whose life we can participate. This is Tillich's restatement of the Christian message.

We may summarize this by noting what Tillich has affirmed in this section titled "The Reality of the Christ."

1. He has affirmed that the central event of Christianity is the personal, concrete, historical, fully human man which the New Testament presents as Jesus of Nazareth.

2. He has affirmed that this man is the Christ in the totality of his being.

3. He has affirmed that the power of God was at work in this man in an undisrupted unity with the center of his person.

4. He has affirmed that the New Testament's picture of this man is sufficient for our knowledge of him.

5. He has affirmed that this man actually died and actually was known to his disciples after his death in an event which can only be called the Resurrection of the Christ.

6. He has affirmed that this "Jesus of Nazareth" is a unique event in human history because of his refusing to yield to the temptation which would have separated him from God.

7. He has affirmed that this man is the Christ and that the Christ is God-for-us.

8. He has affirmed that in this man's life God acted objectively to save mankind.

9. He has affirmed the validity of the two major conciliar decisions: Nicaea's insistence that the power of the Christ is the full power of God, and Chalcedon's that the Christ has a fully human quality.

10. He has affirmed the New Testament as an original part of the event on which Christianity is based, and decisive for Christian theology.

11. He has affirmed the Old Testament as a document of preparatory revelation and activity of God, leading to his decisive and final revelation in Jesus as the Christ.

In all these affirmations, Tillich has restated the Christian Message without any reduction.

CHAPTER III

"REVELATION" AND "THE KINGDOM OF GOD"

Tillich indicates that in his Systematic Theology parts one and five are made up of material "split off" from the three central sections (I 67). Thus we may look at these two parts to find additional material that, presumably, belongs properly to the section we have been considering--"The Reality of the Christ." We have seen that Jesus as the Christ is the final manifestation of God's revealing and saving activity. We may consider "The Reality of Revelation" and "The Reality of the Kingdom of God" as extended treatments of these two aspects of "The Reality of the Christ."

"Revelation"

We shall consider first "The Reality of Revelation." Much of its material will be familiar to us since we have already seen what this reality is for Tillich.

Tillich begins this section with some observations on "The Meaning of Revelation." He notes that if one uses a phenomenological method to examine examples of alleged revelations (suspending judgment as to whether or not they are true revelation), one would still require some criterion. One would still have to decide which of these revelations should be regarded as "final." "Such a decision . . . is dependent on a revelation which has been received and which is considered final" (I 107). When such a decision has been made, phenomenology becomes "critical phenomenology" and may then be used by a Christian theologian as a "technique by means of which the meaning which is manifest" in the criterion "is portrayed" (I 107). Tillich makes it quite clear that in his theology the "classic example" of revelation is "the reception of Jesus as the Christ by Peter" (I 107-108). This "special revelation . . . is the final revelation and . . . it is, consequently, universally valid" (I 107-108). Having made this clear, Tillich gives a preliminary definition of revelation.

Revelation, says Tillich, is "a special and extraordinary manifestation which removes the veil from something which is hidden in a special and extraordinary way" (I 108). This "something" is a mystery, to know which "contradicts the attitude of ordinary cognition" (I 108). Ordinary cognition is a matter of knowing subjects and objects. But this mystery "'precedes' the subject-object relationship" and is therefore "impossible to express . . . in ordinary language" (I 108). This mystery the name God "names." When God reveals himself, he does not become an object or a subject of ordinary cognition. His revelation is a reality and becomes a part of, and a matter of, experience (I 109). But the knowledge that this gives is not an addition to the knowledge that we have of the subject-object realm. What is known in revelation is deeper. It "tells" us something about the ground, the underlying basis, of both subjects and objects. This ground is the power of being which conquers non-being and thus makes being possible (I 110). Men are concerned about what this power is, how it operates, and how one might control it. This is a matter of life and death. It is a matter of ultimate concern. When revelation occurs in a concrete situation, its appearance becomes, ipso facto, a matter of ultimate concern. But it only occurs in a concrete situation through someone actually being grasped by it. "There is no revelation if there is no one who receives it as his ultimate concern" (I 111). Every revelation has two sides: 1) an objective event--the manifestation of the mystery in a concrete situation, and 2) a subjective side--someone is grasped by this and receives it as revelation. The objective side, Tillich calls "miracle;" the subjective side, "ecstasy" (I 111).

A "miracle" is a "sign-event." Such an event is a natural event. That is, it "does not destroy the structure of being" by its occurrence (I 115). On the other hand, it is "an astonishing unusual event" for those who receive it in an ecstatic experience. It expresses the relation of mystery to us in a definite way (I 117). In the ecstatic experience of a sign-event the "feeling that the solid ground of ordinary reality 'is taken out from under' our test" (I 116). We become aware that reality, as we know it, is not solidly grounded in itself, and that it could become nothing. It bears "the stigma of non-being" (I 116). This awareness comes as a shock--Tillich calls it an "ontological shock"--in which "the mind is thrown out of its normal balance" but not, therewith, destroyed (I 113). One becomes aware of "the abysmal element" in reality--its infinite depth beyond the ability of the ways of ordinary language to search out. Yet one also becomes aware that the "abyss" of being and of meaning is also the "ground" of being and meaning. The "annihilating power of the divine presence," which makes us aware of the contingent nature of the world as we ordinarily know it, is also "the elevating power of the divine presence" (I 113). In revelation "reason is grasped by the mystery of its own depth and of the depth of being generally" (I 113).

Everything is sustained in being by God, the power of being. In this sense, everything participates in God through its participation in the power of being. Every "thing" or "event" can be, therefore, a medium of revelation (I 118). A person, however, is the bearer of the fullest revelation because a "person represents the central qualities, and by implication all qualities, which can point to the mystery of revelation" (I 118).

No thing, of course, nor person _is_ the power of being. And no thing nor person can be a _medium_ of the revelation of this power _by itself_. What is required for there to be revelation, says Tillich, is a "revelatory constellation . . . a correlation of ecstasy and sign-event" (I 120). Such a constellation cannot be produced--it is given. When a person or a group becomes a medium of revelation, they themselves have not caused this to happen, and they must point to that which has. They must "point to something which transcends them infinitely"--to God--"to the self-manifestation of that which concerns us infinitely"--to the power of being. The medium asks not to be looked _at_ but _through_. He must be "transparent for the ground of being" (I 121). Only thus can the medium become a "sign-event" for others (I 121).

Since revelation does give a kind of knowledge, and since knowledge comes to us in the form of language, we can speak of revelation as "The Word of God." But if this term is used, it must not be delimited to that which can only be heard. This "Word" can be "seen and tasted as well as heard." On the other hand, this "Word" can and does use "ordinary language . . . as its medium" (I 123). Language is used but in such a way as to point "through" its ordinary usage in order to express what its ordinary usage cannot express--the inexpressible (I 124). When words become "The Word" in this way, they grasp, shake, and transform, not as "revealed doctrines," but as bearers of "revelatory events" (I 125). They thus accompany and interpret revelatory situations. They should not be referred to as "inner words" because "The Word" is not an inner word. Revelation is not recollection--an awareness of something already in man. The Word comes to him [man]. It is said to him ". . . it is not "our moral conscience reminding us of what we essentially know" (I 126).

Tillich makes a distinction between "Original Revelation" and "Dependent Revelation" (I 126-128). The original revelation, in Christianity, is Jesus of Nazareth who is received as the Christ by Peter. Subsequent encounters with this Jesus are dependent on Peter's original encounter and reception. It is their "permanent point of reference" (I 126). The subsequent encounters are "dependent revelation." Church history is "the locus of continuing dependent revelations . . . the cognitive element[s] in the process of actualizing the New Being" (I 127). In Christianity's view, these dependent revelations are the result of the divine Spirit" who brings men "into [a] revelatory correlation with the event upon which Christianity is based" (I 127). There is dependent revelation wherever "the divine Spirit grasps, shakes, and moves the human spirit" (I 127). It has revelatory power "for those who participate in it, who enter into the revelatory correlation" (I 127). The original revelation is never exhausted or superceded by these dependent revelations (I 128).

Tillich turns to a consideration of "Actual Revelation" after these preliminaries in which he has described "the meaning of revelation in the light of what Christianity considers to be revelation" (I 132).

Christianity considers "the revelation in Jesus as the Christ as the final revelation" (I 132). "Final" here means "the decisive, fulfilling, unsurpassable revelation, that which is the criterion of all others . . ." This claim is "the basis of a Christian theology" (I 133). It is an astonishing claim. Tillich says it can be made because Jesus surrendered himself completely--became completely "transparent" to the mystery he reveals--and was able to do this because he possessed "himself completely--there was no inner conflict in him which is characteristic of men separated from God. He could, and did, surrender himself completely to his Messianic function. He renounced all claim to "ultimacy for his finite nature" (I 133) and therefore that which was truly Ultimate in him could work and be made manifest. "In his cross Jesus sacrificed that medium of revelation which impressed itself on his followers as messianic in power and significance. . . . as the crucified . . . he is 'grace and truth' . . . as he has sacrificed his flesh . . . he [is] Spirit or New Creature" (I 134). Tillich says of Jesus, "he remained transparent to the divine mystery until his death, which was the final manifestation of his transparency" (I 134). He did not impose his finite being on us as a new law in the name of God. Christians, following their Lord's example, do not demand that Jesus be worshipped as a first century Jew, but the God whom he revealed as to be worshipped.

Certain theories of the atonement make Jesus' death itself the whole point of his life and the key event in a cosmological drama. Tillich does not interpret the death of Jesus this way. It is, indeed, a sacrifice which Jesus makes to God, but this sacrifice is his willingness to let God make him the Christ. It is a sacrifice in which Jesus gave up all possibilities to be something other than the Christ. As the Christ, he inevitably had to die. He knows this and submits to this. But it is only one element of a continual sacrifice of "himself as Jesus to himself as the Christ"--to God in him. This sacrifice is a continual living sacrifice up to, and culminating in, his willingness to die rather than give up his Christ-character. In Tillich's view, the "sacrifice" is Jesus allowing God to act through and in him to reveal himself and to save men. Jesus making a sacrifice of his life for the purpose of "satisfying" God's justice by offering a "substitute" for mankind is not Tillich's way of speaking.

Tillich feels that this sacrifice of Jesus of himself is what enables Christianity to be "final and universal" (I 134). Christian theology has a concrete picture which "mirrors the occurrence of the final revelation" and from which may be drawn "an abstract principle which is the criterion of every real or assumed revelation" (I 135). The abstract principle is that a revelation must be judged in terms of how thoroughly the medium of revelation is "transparent" to the mystery it reveals. Jesus is the norm for this perfect transparency. To judge revelation by revelation is admittedly circular, "the criterion of final revelation is derived from what Christianity considers to be final revelation, the appearance of Jesus as the Christ" (I 135).

The concrete event of final revelation, Jesus' life, is given us in the "reports and interpretations of the New Testament" (I 135). They tell us that the "being of Jesus as the Christ is determined in every moment by God . . . it is the presence of God in him that makes him the Christ" (I 135). The New Testament also tells us that he did not exploit "his unity with God as a means of advantage for himself" (I 136). He sacrifices everything that could have caused him to be himself worshipped as "an overwhelming personality" in order to bring men "to that in him which is greater than he or they" (I 136).

The "final" revelatory event, for Tillich, is first of all the event Jesus as the Christ--"the miracle of final revelation" on its objective side. On its subjective side, the "ecstasy" side, it is "enunciated by Peter when he said to Jesus 'Thou art the Christ,' . . . this acceptance is part of the revelation itself" (I 136).

The final revelation, Jesus as the Christ, does not occur in isolation but rather in the framework of "universal" revelation" (I 138).

"Universal" revelation, for Tillich, is the activity of God in human history preparing men for the final revelation. God reveals himself to men in sign-events. These are experienced and given symbolic expressions. These expressions become vehicles by means of which the meaning of final revelation, when it occurs, can be expressed. The revelatory experiences of preparatory revelation are precious. They are kept by priestly elements in the religions they create. But priestly religion tends to confuse, after a time, the media of the revelation with the revelatory power itself. Then there is a protest aroused against this distortion of the media. Mysticism is one kind of protest. It proposes to eliminate the media altogether, but in doing so it loses "the concrete character of revelation," and makes it "irrelevant to the actual human situation" (I 140). Rational protests also occur. The most decisive protest is the prophetic. The prophet has the concrete revelatory event as his foundation--as does the priest--but he remembers what the priest forgets, namely, that the medium of the revelation is not the revelatory power itself, and it, too, is subject to "the judgment of the divine law," to the "power of the divine form" (I 142).

Preparatory revelation is universal. It occurs throughout human history. But the revelation through the prophets of Israel is the direct, concrete preparation for the final revelation (I 142). It provides the paradoxes without which "the paradox of the cross could not have been understood and accepted" (I 142). The gnostics who separated the Old Testament from the New Testament "lost the Christological paradox" (I 142). They could not hold on to the paradox that final revelation is not simply an example of universal revelation but is also an event in history, concrete and fully human--as was the life of the "elected nation" (I 142). This elect nation was not, however, able to "perform an act of complete self-sacrifice" (I 143). Only a personal life can do this because only a personal center can legitimately sacrifice that of which it is the center. (The ruling center of a nation cannot legitimately sacrifice the nation.) Only the personal center of a personal life can possess completely, and thus surrender completely, the totality of its being. "The history of Israel shows that no group can be the bearer of the final revelation, that it cannot perform a complete self-sacrifice. The breakthrough and the perfect self-surrender must happen in a personal life or it cannot happen at all. Christianity claims that it has happened . . ." (I 143).

Another aspect of universal revelation is God's continuing self-manifestation after the final manifestation. A continuous process goes on in which the church continues to receive, interpret, and actualize the final revelation. This is due to "the presence of the divine Spirit in the Church," which, "dependent on the event of the final revelation from which it takes its meaning and power, creates new correlations in all periods, groups, and individuals" (I 144). The original revelation is finished, in principle. But if it is accepted, it "continues to the end of history" (I 144).

Revelation and salvation are not separable. Salvation is "every act of healing" and "takes place in time and history, just as revelation" (I 145). "Revelation has an unshakeable objective foundation in the event of Jesus as the Christ, and salvation is based on the same event" (I 146). These are final in this event itself, but fragmentary with respect to the persons who receive them (I 146). Revelation may first be experienced as condemnation, but "it is a basic part of the process of salvation" nonetheless (I 146). Ultimately, in the Kingdom of God, where "God is everything for everything" (I 147), revelation and salvation are in complete unity.

Tillich discusses the ways in which the conflicts of reason are overcome in revelation which requires an exposition of the first section of this part to be appreciated. We must pass this discussion.

Revelation is the "Word of God." The "Word" is a name for "Jesus as the Christ" who reveals the basic and determinative relation of the ground of being--God--to us. To call Jesus the "Word" means to affirm that God is _finally_ manifest in Jesus as the Christ (I 159).

This section, in which Tillich indicates what is meant by saying that Jesus is the final revelation of God, is given first position in _Systematic Theology_ because "every theologian is asked, 'On what do you base your assertions; what criteria, what verification do you have?'" (I 67). Tillich clearly answers, "On the revelatory event Jesus as the Christ." This is "the ultimate source of the contents of the Christian faith" (I 68). This section anticipates (because it contains material taken from) the section "The Reality of the Christ" in Part III. Both sections insist on an event that is both objective and subjective, both "miracle" and "ecstasy,"--Jesus, and his reception as the Christ. Both sections speak of the revealing event as having universal significance as a saving event. "Revelation and salvation are elements of God's directing creativity" (I 157).

"Kingdom of God"

If we turn to the answer section of Part V of *Systematic Theology* to see what Tillich has to say about the salvation aspect of the Christ event, we discover that Tillich chooses the word "*kairos*" and the phrase "the Kingdom of God" to express what he wishes to say about God's saving acts in history.

Immediately prior to this section, Tillich indicated four "connotations" and two "elements" in this symbol of "the Kingdom of God." The connotations are: 1) political--God has controlling power over a transformed realm which is a new heaven and a new earth--a new creation, 2) social--it implies peace and justice, 3) personalistic--it is the fulfillment rather than the negation of humanity, 4) universality--it includes the fulfillment of life in all its dimensions, the whole creation (III 358-360). The two "elements" are "inner-historical" and "transcendent-historical" (III 360). The two elements provide a basis for the two major divisions of this section. We shall be primarily interested in the first division which discusses the Kingdom of God "in" history. The second division is basically a continuation of the discussion of the symbols for God as Divine Life.

Tillich takes note of the popular term "*Heilsgeschichte*," and indicates a certain hesitancy about it. "Salvation history" could be misconstrued as somehow identifying history and salvation. For Tillich this cannot be. Salvation is not identical with history. It is not created by history because it comes to history from "beyond" history. Tillich thus prefers to speak of "manifestations of the Kingdom of God" (III 363-364). This is an unwieldy phrase, so Tillich uses the term *kairos*, and its plural, *kairoi*. A *kairos* is a breaking into history of the power of salvation. It is a moment of "the fulfillment of time" (III 369). It is the "moment of maturity in a particular religious and cultural development" (III 370). It is a "manifestation of the Kingdom of God."

Tillich speaks of the great, central, unique *kairos*. It is, of course, "the appearance of the Christ" (III 372). "Centra" suggests that all the *kairoi* are a part of a coherent series. *Kairoi* leading up to the central *kairos* constitute a process of maturity, and the *kairoi* leading from this central *kairos* are likewise maturing processes (III 365). This makes history "not only a dynamic movement, running ahead it is this, too , but also a structured whole in which one point is the center" (III 366). The center of history is the place where the question which marks history's beginning is answered and this is the end (goal) of history, which also has an end (ending)--a moment in which the question ceases to be asked. The question is how the human predicament can be solved and how a new state of things can be achieved. The answer to this question, says Tillich, could only be given in an event *like* the Christ event. To affirm that the Christian event, *Jesus* as the Christ, *is* the answer to this question is "a matter of daring faith" (III 368-369).

The Kingdom of God is never absent from human history. Man is not left alone. But the "experience of it is not always given" (III 371). The experience of its manifestation is a kairos, and kairoi are "rare" and "unpredictable" (III 372). The great kairos is, of course, "unique" (III 372).

The great kairos, the Christ-event, is the great victory over the demonic and profanizing forces that are the consequence of man's estrangement from God. This victory is the saving event in human history. But although these powers are finally defeated, their defeat is "in principle"--that is, in beginning and in power. The fight against them goes on, though now with the knowledge and confidence of their ultimate defeat and their ultimate lack of power. The battle that goes on against these powers is the Kingdom of God in its "inner-historical" meaning.

The churches, in both their latent and manifest forms, are the representatives of the Kingdom of God in this inner-historical struggle. They represent, but they are not identical with, the Kingdom of God. They are its "tools" (III 376). Insofar as the churches are sociological entities, they themselves are demonized and profanized in the very struggle against these forces. This is part of the tragic ambiguity of history. Yet the manifest churches, at least, have a criterion against this--"the New Being in Jesus as the Christ" (III 381). They know the way these forces may be conquered. They know the nature of the sacrifice demanded for this. Through them, the Kingdom of God works to overcome these powers and when, momentarily and fragmentarily, they are conquered, the churches participate in the victory. As agents of the

Kingdom of God, they become the uneasy conscience of the world and challenge the misuse of power, the unfairness of social growth, complacency, and utopianism wherever it appears (even in the churches, themselves). They provide their members with a way to participate meaningfully in history and teach them how to make the worthwhile and necessary sacrifices that are a part of the process of personal self-fulfillment and Eternal Life(III 352).

The other "element" of the Kingdom of God is its transcendence over history. An individual is "in" history from the moment of his becoming human until the moment of his ceasing to be human (most usually, at the moment of his death). Then he is "out" of history. Mankind is similarly "in" history. It is difficult to conceive of the death of mankind--though not so difficult anymore! To be "out" of history suggests that one still "is"--that is, "in" Eternity, in the presence of the Eternal, that which transcends history and the temporal and spatial world.

The Christian use of the symbol Kingdom of God not only brings a message of the meaning-giving, healing manifestations of the Eternal in history with its central manifestation in Jesus as the Christ, it also carries a message about man's life "out" of history. There is a transition from the temporal to the eternal in which the positive quality of history is elevated into the Divine Life. This is what is meant by the symbol Eternal Life. All life has this as its aim for it is the purpose of God in creation. Tillich calls this essentialization. It is a process in which the individual is not destroyed (although life in the eternal is not merely an extension and continuation of his present temporal consciousness). "Eternal life is still life and the universal centeredness does not dissolve the individual centers" (III 401). In Eternal Life the ambiguities of our present mode of existence come to an end. (In a way prefigured by the life of Jesus as the Christ.) There is blessedness--being undisturbed by negativities--in Eternal Life. The process of essentialization means that negativities are exposed and forgotten. This suggests degrees of essentialization which means that man's decisions are absolutely serious. But there is no "eternal damnation" which would mean that God would be ultimately defeated in his aim and purpose. Eternal Life is God's gift of an immortality which is not man's by nature. Eternal Life is God-present-to-man transforming his spirit. A totally transformed personality may be called a "Spiritual Body." This is the body of the resurrection, the participation of man's whole personality, purged of negativities, in the Divine Life. It is the final transformation of the old being into the New Being which we experience "in" history only fragmentarily. Eternal Life is not life in time and space and these categories are useless in describing it. It is not timeless, nor is it unending time, either. It is a state--the state of blessedness. It may be preceded by a state of despair, as the Divine Spirit drives man out of the negativities of life, but despair is not an eternal state. God is not a demon. He drives for the fulfillment not the destruction of all his creatures (III 418).

In the end--"out" of history--there is God, the Eternal, the

Divine Life. Eternal Life, the purpose of creation, is life in the Divine Life, a participation which may be said to enrich the Divine Life in a highly symbolic statement. God is not a dead entity. His blessedness is the essentialization of everything that has being.

In these two sections in which Tillich speaks of Revelation and the Kingdom of God, he makes use of two symbols for the Christ which he finds very useful: the _Logos_ and the _Kairos_. The Christ is both _Logos_ and _Kairos_.

The _Logos_ is the meaning-giving, ordering, structuring, rational principle. It is also the self-revealing principle of God. It is never absent in the universe. It may be seen, even though distorted, in all the ordered meaningful creations of the human cultural creativity and the processes whereby man orders his own individual and his communal life. To affirm the _Logos_ as the Christ is to affirm that there _is_ meaning and order-giving power at work in the world.

But the Logos-affirming aspect of the Christ event is balanced by the Kairos aspect. Logos without Kairos could suggest a static unchangeable order that would have little if any room for the creation of the new. It would suggest the Greek view of the universe which Christianity, with its Old Testament background, never wanted to wholly affirm. God is not bound to the forms created by the Logos. He can break these forms and create new forms. There is a dynamic, form-bursting, form-creating power in the power of God. This is suggested in the concept of the Kairos, the Eternal breaking into history, overcoming old, profane, demonized forms through the creation of a new form, a new reality, a new state of things, a new being. This had to be affirmed of God when it was said that Jesus was the Christ.

The breaking of forms can be seen as demonic and it is if individuals are thereby destroyed or reduced in being and meaning. But it can also be seen to be the preparation for a new kairos, a new state of things. It was the Kairos aspect of the Christ that brought upon him death by those who were threatened by his threatening of the old forms of religion and culture. The Kairos aspect of the Christ is seen in his desregard for the ordered niceties of Jewish piety which sought to preserve the work of the Logos for a previous age. It is seen in the "but" of "You have heard that it was said . . . but I say." But the Kairos aspect, too, is balanced. There is a Logos aspect to the Christ who does order the new order, after all; who does bring meaning even if it is new meaning. Both Kairos and Logos must be affirmed, of the Christ and hence of God. Tillich captures this in the opening and closing parts of his Systematic Theology.

The examination of the answer sections of Parts I and V of Tillich's Systematic Theology shows that Tillich regards the Christian message as the answer to the problems connected with Reason and History. The Christian message that Jesus is the Christ, the final revelation of God, the Logos become flesh, is presented by Tillich as an account of a revelatory event which opens up a level of reality deeper than that experienced in the ordinary subject-object experience of the world. In the Christ, God is revealed as the depth of reason, and life is shown to be possible and actual in the Christ, that is, it is able to overcome the apparently insoluble problems of reason. The Christian message that Jesus is the Christ, who came at "the right time" and is the "unique" *kairos*, is presented by Tillich as an account of a saving event which is the culmination of God's saving activity throughout human history. In the Christ, God is revealed as saving men, creating the possibility, and the actuality, in the Christ, of a new mode of existence in which man is no longer estranged from God. This is offered to men as a "gift" of God's "grace." It is realized fragmentarily "in" history and "beyond" history, fully and completely. The Christian message is the message of God's healing of man, and his gift to man of Eternal Life. Tillich's presentation of the Christian message is that the love of God, his desire for the fulfillment of all his creatures, will not be eternally frustrated. His saving power will triumph over ultimate negativity.

Summary of "The Reality of Revelation"

The following points summarize what Tillich has to say about the "Reality of Revelation" with regard to the Christian message.

1. To discuss revelation, a theologian must decide what will be, for him, the "classic example." For Tillich, this is the reception of Jesus as the Christ by Peter.

2. Every revelation has an objective event. For Tillich this is the life of Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ. It is the "classical revelation" for him.

3. Every revelation has someone who receives it as such. For Tillich, this is Peter's ecstatic experience in which he received Jesus

as the Christ.

4. Revelation can use many media. The fullest revelation requires a person because a person sums up all dimensions of reality. For Tillich, the person in whom the fullest revelation occurred is Jesus the Christ.

5. Revelation is given to man, it is not simply a recollection of something he already knows. It is the giving of an awareness of God's reality as the ground and abyss of being and meaning.

6. Jesus as the Christ is the final revelation, the criterion of all other revelations. They lead to him or are dependent upon him.

7. Jesus is the fullest revelation of God because he is completely transparent to the God revealing himself and saving man in and through him. This is most clearly apparent at the Cross.

8. The revelation in Jesus as the Christ is given to us in the New Testament, and in the preaching and sacraments of the church.

9. The revelation in Jesus as the Christ is decisively prepared for in the revelations which are reported in the Old Testament, and it cannot be separated from that preparatory revelation.

10. Revelation and salvation are one and the same and have an unshakeable objective foundation in the event of Jesus as the Christ.

11. Revelation is God's solution to the problems and conflicts of reason in man's present mode of existence.

12. Revelation is miracle and ecstasy. Its criterion is Jesus and his acceptance as the Christ. No miracle and no ecstasy can contradict this.

Summary of "The Kingdom of God"

A summary of the section in which Tillich presents the answers of the Christian message to the problems of history includes the following:

1. The Kingdom of God appears "in" history as moments in which God's saving activity occurs. Awareness of such activity is the awareness of a kairos. The kairos toward which all kairoi are directed or derived is the "great Kairos," the event upon which Christianity is based--the coming of Jesus as the Christ.

2. Jesus' life is the center and aim of history. To affirm his life as the center and aim of history is an act of daring faith. To participate in this life is to become a part of the representatives of the Kingdom of God in history,--the churches, which are based on this acceptance of Jesus as the Christ.

3. "Beyond" history, there is "the Eternal." Man's life has as its aim becoming united finally with the Divine Life in Eternal Life. All history moves toward this end. This is final salvation and final revelation--the life of blessedness in the blessedness of the Divine Life.

CHAPTER IV

"GOD" AND "THE DIVINE SPIRIT"

We have now considered the central affirmations of the Christian message as they are stated by Tillich in the sections on the Christ, Revelation, and the Kingdom of God. We must now turn to two sections in which the implications of this message (and the christological dogmas that grow out of it) for the doctrine of God are indicated. The section entitled "The Reality of God" develops a "systematic foundation" for a Christian doctrine of God and the sections on "The Divine Presence" and "The Divine Spirit" develop a full Christian doctrine of God. It is possible only after it is affirmed that God, as Christians understand him, is that power in Jesus the Christ which makes him the Christ.

"God"

Every theologian, says Tillich, "derives his doctrine of God from what he considers to be the final revelation" (I 219). This, we know, in Tillich's theology, is Jesus as the Christ. Tillich does not hurl his doctrine of God at the situation he is addressing. He seeks "common ground." Tillich wishes to establish "typological analogies" among doctrines of God--his own included. He wants to emphasize "the element of universal preparatory revelation which they [other doctrines of God] carry with them" (I 221). A Christian theologian will quite naturally regard the final revelation in Jesus as the Christ to be a much better revelation of God, a "real progress over preparatory revelation" (I 219). So, indeed, it is. But he ought not to forget that he stands in the locus of a _dependent_ revelation, which is _not_ a progress over the original, final revelation. Thus, in a real sense, he is in somewhat the same situation of those in the latent stage of the Spiritual Community. Like them, his "concept of God is dated" (I 220). He can no more "transcend his period" than anyone else. His doctrine of God is conditioned by the times and he cannot and must not be arrogant _vis a vis_ other doctrines of God.

The final revelation in Jesus as the Christ, we have seen, is _concrete_ and _universal_ at the same time. And it is a matter of _ultimate concern_. Using these three concepts, Tillich works out a "critical phenomenological" description of the various ways in which the word God has been used. This phenomenological description opens this section. In it Tillich uses material from the "history of religion" and the "theology of culture" disciplines. It is suggestive but not complete. The structure of _Systematic Theology_ prevents him from bringing in material of a christological character, and that is reserved for Part III of the _Systematic Theology_. (The time lapse between the issuing of Volumes I and II, let alone between I and III, has unfortunately been the source of much misunderstanding of Tillich's work.)

Whenever the word "god" appears in the history of religion, it is expression of somebody's or some group's ultimate concern. This concern must be expressed in both universal and concrete concepts and symbols because the concern itself is universal but also very concrete. Polytheism stressed expressions of the concreteness, while monotheism stresses the universality of the ultimate concern.

That which is regarded as of ultimate concern has the quality of holiness. Holiness is the depth dimension. "Everything has the dimension of depth and in the moment in which . . . [this] is actualized, holiness appears" (I 218). The medium through which it appears may come to be regarded as holy, too, and even holy in itself. Then a prophetic reaction against the identification of that which represents God with God himself occurs.

Tillich considers various expressions of the experience of God. He notes varieties of polytheism (I 222-225), varieties of monotheism (I 225-229) and briefly indicates the rise of the trinitarian problem (I 229-230). He then discusses how these varieties of ways to religiously express men's ultimate concern have been transformed into the various philosophical traditions (I 230-235). This discussion is interesting, but we are primarily interested in the second division of this section, "The Actuality of God" (I 235-289).

In making assertions about the actuality of God, Tillich tells us that, with one exception, all statements must be regarded as symbolic. A symbolic statement is one in which a portion of finite reality is used to say something about the Infinite. This is justified, for the Christian, by his belief that God made himself manifest in Jesus the Christ who was most certainly a "portion" of finite reality. So, for example, when Tillich comes to speak of the divine love which is given as "the final answer to the questions implied in human existence" (I 286), he says, "this answer is given only in the manifestation of the divine love under the conditions of existence" (I 286). This, we know, for Tillish, is the Christ-event. He says, "It is the Christological answer to which the doctrine of divine love gives the systematic foundation, although *no one would be able to speak of this foundation without having received the Christological answer*. But what is existentially first may be systematically last and vice versa. This is also true of the doctrine of the trinity" (I 286, Italics added). The basic Christian experience of God in Jesus the Christ, which is "existentially first," is not *presented* first in *Systematic Theology* for *apologetic* reasons. Tillich, as an apologetic theologian, has decided that what is existentially last, the working out of "systematic foundations" for the presentation of the Christian message, should be *presented* first in his apologetic situation. (We are reversing this in the present study in order to point out the Christian message in Tillich's theology as that which is "existentially first" in his thought.)

Shortly, we shall discuss what Tillich means by the "non-symbolic" statement that can be made about God.

The first symbolic statement which Tillich makes about God is that he is living. Tillich says that the "character of the divine life is made manifest in revelation" (I 243). Theology, he says, can only explain and systematize the existential knowledge of revelation. That is, it cannot *derive* the doctrine of God as living "from an ontological system" (I 243). The Christian experience of the Christ event as

God-for-us revealed in a personal life would seem to be the basis for Tillich's claim that the "symbol 'personal God' [is] . . . absolutely fundamental" (I 245). God, for Tillich, cannot be "less than personal" (I 245). Yet it must not be forgotten that even in the Christ something is pointed to which is beyond his personal life. And in the preparatory revelation in the Old Testament, the prophets, while always concrete and anthropomorphic when speaking of God, "preserve the mystery of the divine ground" (I 242). They never make God into *a* person, "something conditioned," "a being alongside other beings" (I 242). Tillich therefore says God "is not a person, but he is not less than personal" (I 245). God, as life, "participates in every life as its ground and aim" (I 245). Life is not something alien, something over against him; it is rather his creation. "The divine participation creates that in which he participates." This, it would seem, Tillich *derives* from God's participation in the life of Jesus the Christ.

By affirming that God is living, and by using "life" as a *fundamental* symbol of the Christian experience of God in Christ, the way is open for Tillich to make use of another symbol, "spirit," to speak of God. "Spirit," says Tillich, is "the unity of power and meaning" of a centered personality, its self-transcending vitality and its freedom for self-determination" (I 249). When Tillich says that God is Spirit, he means "that life as a spirit is the inclusive symbol for the divine life" (I 250). Calling God "living" and "spirit" is based on the "christological assertion that Jesus is the Christ. The Christian doctrine of the trinity [which arises out of calling God "living" and "spirit"] is a corroboration of the christological dogma." Tillich does not discuss this fully here because he has not yet presented the christological dogma.

The divine life creating the lives in which it participates as their ground suggests the symbol Creator. The Christian experience of God in Christ sharply rejects any view of creation which implies a dualism in which the "stuff" of the universe is "evil" over against a "good" God. For Christians, God has appeared in the finite in Jesus as the Christ, and whatever problems finitude poses, it means that the finite is "not conquered by avoiding the finite" (I 254). "God can appear within finitude only if the finite, as such, is not in conflict with him" (I 253). Tillich says that the Christian "doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is Christianity's way of protecting the Christian experience from being expressed in terms of any type of ultimate dualism" (I 253). Christianity knows that "the tragic character of existence is not rooted in the creative ground of being; consequently it does not belong to the essential nature of things" (I 254).

Tillich discusses God's "originating" creativity and his "sustaining" creativity (I 253-263). What he has to say about God's "directing" creativity is of interest for this study. In Christianity, God's directing creativity is seen in "the victory of Christ over the forces of fate and fear just when they seemed to overwhelm him at the cross. Here faith in providence was definitely established" (I 264). "Providence" is called by Tillich "God's directing creativity" (I 264). He says, "Providence is a permanent activity of God. He is never a

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spectator; he always directs everything toward its fulfillment" (I 266). This is his activity in Jesus as the Christ as well as all his actions in which he reveals himself and saves men. The Christian can therefore affirm, "with the courage of faith, that no situation whatsoever can frustrate the fulfillment of his ultimate destiny, that nothing can separate him from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus"(Romans, Chapter 8) (I 267). There is thus the paradox in the belief in providence, that even "when the conditions of a situation are destroying the believer" he does not have to beg that the situation be changed lest he be himself cut off from God and God's situation. He believes that the "divine condition" is such that this special situation does not *need* to be altered.

Since the Christian participates in the New Being, he knows that God can be related. "If God is said to be in relation, this statement is as symbolic as the statement that God is a living God" (I 271). God is "essentially holy" and to be related to him is always paradoxical. We *must* speak of an ego-Thou relation between God and man (I 271), but it is one in which "the thou embraces the ego," and from which "there is no place to which man could withdraw from the divine thou" (I 271). Our relation is, strictly speaking, not a relation but a consecration of all relations (I 272).

The Christian participates in the power of the New Being. He thus has the courage to face all the implications of finitude. His "faith in the almighty God is the answer to the quest for a courage which is sufficient to conquer the anxiety of finitude. Ultimate courage is based upon participation in the ultimate power of being" (I 273). This victory over the anxiety of temporal existence enables man to speak of the "Eternal God"--"that which conquers the non-being of temporality" (I 274).

The most expressive symbol for the relation of God to the world is agape, "the desire for the fulfillment of the longing of the other being, the longing for his ultimate fulfillment" (I 280). "God works toward the fulfillment of every creature and toward the bringing together into the unity of his life all who are separated and disrupted" (I 281). This does not exclude justice. God's loving power reacts "against that which violates love" (I 283). This is experienced as condemnation, judgment, and "the wrath of God." But God's "judgment is an act of love which surrenders that which resists love to self-destruction" (I 283). In God, love and justice are united.

The final expression of the unity of love and justice in God is the symbol of justification. The ontological unity of love and justice is manifest in final revelation as the justification of the sinner. The divine love in relation to the unjust creature is grace (I 285). This is Tillich's way of stating the one paradox of the Christian message: Jesus is the Christ, the sinner is justified by grace. This is the christological answer to the question about God's relation and it is "given only in the manifestation of the divine love in existence"--in other words, in the Christ. As justice, God is "Lord," as love, he is Father, and these symbols can be used by the Christian because of "the manifestation of the Lord and Father as Son and Brother under the conditions of existence" (I 289). Again, this is derived from the Christian message.

Tillich does not present a fully developed Christian doctrine of God in Part II, because he has not yet discussed the appearance of Jesus as the Christ. Since we have presented his section on "The Reality of Christ" first, we have been able to read some of its meanings into this section.

This section on "The Reality of God" is, properly, a systematic foundation for a Christian doctrine of God. It attempts to lay a logical, rationally coherent, basis for an apologetic presentation of the God spoken of in the Christian message. Thus it is preliminary in character and, appropriately enough, Tillich's last sentence in this section states this. He says: "The question with which the doctrine of God concludes is the quest for a doctrine of existence and the Christ" (I 289).

We should here note that non-symbolic statement which Tillich feels can and must be made about God. Tillich says this is: "God is being-itself or the absolute" (I 239). This, he says, is "the most abstract and completely unsymbolic statement which is possible" (I 239). "Theologians make explicit," they put into rational concepts and statements, "what is implicit in religious thought and expression" (I 239). This is a necessary prelude for meaningful discussion--especially for discussion with those outside Christianity. The Christian theologian says if he talks about God it is to be understood that what he is talking about is being-itself. The reflexive form "itself" is significant.

God is not being, not even the totality of being--that would be pantheism. God is being-itself. When one speaks of an object-itself or of a man-himself, or of any thing as the thing-itself, one speaks of that centered, meaning-giving, structure-giving power of the object, the man, or the thing, which makes it what it is. This is something other than the elements which constitute it; even the totality of these elements. To speak of being-itself is to speak of that which makes all being what it is, which gives it its structure and meaning and reality. This is what the Christian theologian wishes to speak of in his doctrine of God. So, although the existential basis for his statements is not "derived from an ontological system" (I 243), he nevertheless begins with this "most abstract and completely unsymbolic statement" (I 239). He begins, that is, to lay the basis for the presentation of the Christian doctrine of God.

There is a sense, of course, in which even this statement is symbolic, because it, too, points to that which transcends it. Otherwise we could say that in this term we had defined God--and Tillich would sharply reject the idea that God can be defined. Behind being-itself there is that which we cannot fathom. We can only declare that it is a mystery. When we say this, we are saying that every statement, including "God is being-itself," is a symbolic statement. This statement is a nonsymbolic statement. Tillich points this out in the "Introduction" to Systematic Theology, Volume II.

It would seem to be impossible to have two statements of which it is said, "this is the only nonsymbolic statement that can be made about God." But, in this case at least, what is "impossible" is still necessary. If the theologian says, "Everything said about God is symbolic," he will be asked, "Why?" Then he must answer, "Because it is literally true, plainly and unequivocably, that God is being-itself, this is the most abstract and completely unsymbolic statement about God that is possible." The statement "everything that is said about God is symbolic" is a statement about *statements about God*, whereas the statement "God is being-itself" is a statement about *God*.

The statement, "God is being-itself," points to what the theologian is talking *about*. The statement, "Nothing can be said about God that is not symbolic," points to the theologian's *talking* about God and indicates how he wishes to be understood and how he is speaking. Both statements *are* nonsymbolic. They say what they mean directly. The first tells us *what* we are talking about when we talk about God, the second reminds us that even to speak about a "*what*," even if this is said to be "being-itself," is symbolic when speaking of God. "Being-itself" is not a *name* for the mystery which the word "God" names. Tillich would reject translating Genesis 1:1 as "In the beginning Being-itself created the heavens and the earth." The *name* "God" is nonsymbolic because it is *only* a name and affirms nothing about that which it names. The name "God" is not a self-evident, self-defining term. In itself it is not the basis of a doctrine of God. Tillich *lays a foundation* for such a doctrine by affirming that "God is being-itself," and by affirming, too, that everything that is said about God is symbolic.

"The Divine Spirit"

The section just discussed left things "up in the air" so to speak because the christological discussion was still to be presented. In the sections in which Tillich speaks of "The Spiritual Presence" and "The Divine Spirit" he discusses more fully the Christian doctrine of God because it is now clear that the God being discussed is the God who is manifest in Jesus as the Christ. We turn now to these sections in Part Four of Systematic Theology.

The answer section in Part Four of Tillich's Systematic Theology is an extended discussion of the Divine Spirit. As the other answer sections, this section, too, is based upon the Christian message and the event which it relates and interprets. The problem this section answers is the problem of the ambiguities of life, particularly the spiritual life of man, and its actualization in the realms of culture, religion, and morality. The answer that is given to this problem is the presence of the Divine Spirit in the spiritual life of man, which Tillich calls "The Spiritual Presence," and its activity in which these ambiguities are overcome.

The Christian message affirms that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ. His life, though fully human, is unique. It is a completely new mode of existence manifest not merely as a possibility, but rather as a concrete reality. He is the New Being. He is able to be this, not by his own power, but by the power of God acting in and through him. "God in him"--in Jesus as the Christ--is what Tillich means by "The Spiritual Presence."

> The divine Spirit was in Jesus as the Christ without distortion. . . . his human spirit was entirely grasped by the Spiritual Presence. . . . "God was in him." This makes him the Christ (III 144).

> . . . it is not the spirit of the man Jesus of Nazareth that makes him the Christ, but . . . The Spiritual Presence, God in him, that possesses and drives his individual spirits (III 146).

Spiritual Presence expresses the revelatory experience of "God present" (III 111). It is a symbolic expression which utilizes man's experience "of being determined in his nature by spirit as a dimension of his life," to express the revelatory experience of being grasped by God and receiving the impact of a meaning-bearing power in an ecstatic experience.

The experience of the Spiritual Presence is thus a revelatory experience. Tillich, as we have seen in his section on revelation, wishes to affirm the possibility and the actuality of many revelatory experiences, while at the same time insisting that they must all be judged by the criterion of the final revelation in Jesus as the Christ. In this section, where revelation is referred to as "the Spiritual Presence," he reaffirms this.

> . . . the divine Spirit which made Jesus into the Christ is creatively present in the whole history of revelation before and after his appearance. . . . the Spiritual Presence in history is essentially the same as the Spiritual Presence in Jesus as the Christ. God in his self-manifestation, wherever this occurs, is the same God who is decisively and ultimately manifest in the Christ (III 147).

Tillich says: "Every new manifestation of the Spiritual Presence stands under the criterion of his manifestation in Jesus as the Christ" (III, 148). And again, "the divine Spirit is the Spirit of Jesus as the Christ . . . the Christ is the criterion to which every spiritual claim must submit" (III 152).

This ultimate criterion is "the faith and love of the Christ," the actualization of the "radical self-negation and self-transformation as it is present as reality and symbol in the Cross of Christ" (III 154). The Spiritual Presence creates the Spiritual Community which is latent before the encounter with Jesus as the Christ, and actualized as the manifest Spiritual Community in the period of reception which follows this encounter. In the period of reception the Spiritual Community has certain "marks." These "marks of the Spiritual Community are derived from the image of Jesus as the Christ and the New Being manifest in him" (III 152). The latent Spiritual Community lacks "the ultimate criterion, the faith and love of the Christ. . . . such groups are unable to actualize a radical self-negation and self-transformation as is present as reality and symbol in the Cross of Christ" (III 154).

Latent Spiritual Communities are not lacking in faith or love, but they must be judged by the final manifestation of the Spiritual Presence which creates them. This is true, too, of the churches, whose creation is also the work of the Spiritual Presence.

Latent or manifest, the Spiritual Community is the community of the New Being. It is created by the Divine Spirit which is manifest in Jesus as the Christ. This origin determines its character: it is the community of faith and love (III 155).

The love of Christ is "the principle of agape embodied in his being and radiating from him into a world in which agape was and is known only in ambiguous expressions" (III 145). It is "the center of the Gospels as well as of their apostolic interpretations" (III 145).

The faith of Christ is the state of being grasped unambiguously by the Spiritual Presence" (III 146).

In the manifest Spiritual Community, "faith is the state of being grasped by the New Being as it is manifest in Jesus as the Christ" (III 131), and love (agape) is an ecstatic manifestation of the Spiritual Presence . . . because . . . it has the basic structure of the New Being" (III 137-138).

The act in which the Spiritual Presence creates the Spiritual Community and its faith and love is an act of grace. The way in which man's spirit receives the impact of Spiritual Presence is by an ecstasy which is creative and which does not destroy the structure of man (III 114-120). The media of this ecstasy, in the church, is Word and sacraments (III 120-125). But all "sacramental acts . . . must refer to the central revelation." And nothing "is the Word of God if it contradicts . . . the New Being as it is manifest in Jesus as the Christ" (III 125).

It is not possible in this study to examine all that Tillich has to say about the Spiritual Presence. But enough has been cited to show that the Christian message that Jesus is the Christ is the central point around which the discussion revolves. It is a long section and touches on many problems. Its primary concern is to elaborate the manifestation of the Spiritual Presence as it creates the churches and draws individuals into the life of the New Being. It is unfortunately divided into two parts, (II. The Spiritual Presence and III. The Divine Spirit), which is confusing since the terms are synonomous. The two parts could have been better titled: A. The Meaning of the Spiritual Presence, and B. The Actuality of the Spiritual Presence. Section IV in Part IV, "The Trinitarian Symbols," is, in effect, a rounding out of Part II, Part A, "The Meaning of God" (Volume I). Sections II - IV of Part IV are full of profound insights gained from a lifetime of creative theological labor. But they are in need of a creative editing to make it the nicely balanced architectonic work that is the hallmark of his other works. We can be grateful that he had time to publish these Parts, and also grateful that he included as much as he did in them. As the preface to Volume III indicates, he would have liked to have carefully reworked it himself, but felt that had he done so, it would never have been published.

It would perhaps be somewhat easier to follow Tillich"s presentation of the material in this section if the general procedure he follows in the previous answer sections is superimposed on this section. The entire section could then be labeled, "The Reality of the Divine Spirit," and divided into two main sections: A. "The Meaning of the Divine Spirit" and B. "The Actuality of the Divine Spirit."

The discussion of "The Meaning of the Divine Spirit" would include: 1. The Symbolism of the Divine Spirit, 2. The Experience of the Divine Spirit and Its Media, 3. The Work of the Divine Spirit, 4. The Trinitarian Dogma. The discussion of the "Actuality of the Divine Spirit" would include: 1. The Divine Spirit and the Actualization of the Spiritual Community (This would include the discussion of the churches), 2. The Divine Spirit and the Actualization of the Spiritual

Personality, 3. The Divine Spirit and the Ambiguities of Life: Theonomy and Healing Power. This outline is not alien to the Tillichian way of handling material and perhaps brings matters into sharper focus. A summary of the section might look, then, something like the following.

Man, as such, is a creature whose life is lived in a dimension of spirit. Like all life, spiritual life is a process in which there is an actualization of essential possibilities. The transition from possibility to actualization is the transition from essence to existence. In man this transition is to a mode of existence which Christianity calls the Fall. It is a mode of existence in which finite freedom pretends to be infinite freedom. This results in a chaos of conflict and ambiguity. God's response to this is activity in which he seeks to overcome and conquer this chaos. This activity is called the grace of God. Nothing in man causes this activity. It is solely due to the divine love which desires the fulfillment of all its creatures. For man this means the re-establishment of the divine-human relation which has been tragically disrupted in the Fall.

The divine activity is God's entering in to the dimension in which man lives. In revelatory and saving events, God makes himself present to man. These events are objective. They occur in reality, in human history, in time, and space. But they do not destroy the structure of reality or the structure of the lives of men who recognize the nature of these events. The objective events are "miracles," the recognition of their meaning is "ecstasy." Miracle and ecstasy together make up a revelatory event. Such events are referred to as the impact of the

Divine Spirit (or "The Spiritual Presence") on the life of men. This impact creates Spiritual Personalities and Spiritual Communities.

This activity of God is first "preparatory." It prepares for the full manifestation of himself in Jesus as the Christ, and creates the condition in which this full revelation of himself may be understood and received. The final self-manifestation creates the New Being, the mode of existence in which the tragic conflicts and ambiguities of man's life are overcome. Until all men participate in this mode of existence--at the end of history--unambiguous life is experienced only fragmentarily, even in Jesus as the Christ. The appearance of the Christ marks the creation, not only of a New Being--Jesus the Christ, but also of a community of the New Being which is dependent on him and in which the Divine Spirit works according to his manifestation in Jesus as the Christ. The preparatory revelatory events create what Tillich calls the Spiritual Community in the latent stage. The revelatory event of Jesus the Christ and the subsequent events dependent on this event create what Tillich calls the Spiritual Community in its manifest stage.

In all this activity, the Christian sees the grace of God. God accepting man and working for his salvation in spite of man's rejection of God and his disruption of the unity with God for which he was created. The driving power for this activity is solely in God and in God alone.

God encounters man in the dimension in which man lives--spirit. Man expresses this encounter symbolically by speaking of God as Spirit.

Man's relation to God, the relation of spirit to spirit, is the relation of creaturely existence to the creative ground (III 111). The encounter is one in which spirit "goes out of itself under the impact of the divine Spirit" (III 112). This being grasped by the divine Spirit is "ecstasy" (III 112). Man cannot force the divine Spirit to do this (III 112-113). When it occurs, ecstasy "does not negate structure" (III 114). Were this to happen, as it does, the state would be subjective intoxication and not ecstasy (III 120). But it does transcend the subject-object structure--as we have seen in the discussion of revelation.

The impact of the divine Spirit on the human spirit is accomplished through the use of "the media of the Spiritual Presence." These media are called "sacramentals" (III 120ff). There is an objectivity involved in ecstasy because "the Spiritual presence cannot be received without a sacramental element" (III 122). However, "in so far as the Spiritual Community actualizes the New Being in Jesus as the Christ no sacramental act can take place in it which is not subject to the criterion of that reality [Jesus as the Christ] on which the community is based" (III 123). The most significant medium is that of language--human words--because "language is the fundamental expression of man's spirit" (III 124).

God is not restricted to any particular words, or to any particular language. Any word can become a medium for the divine Word (III 125). But the criterion is always the biblical words. "They constitute the ultimate touchstone . . . Nothing is the word of God if it contradicts the faith and love . . . which constitute the New Being *as it is manifest in Jesus as the Christ*" (III 125, Italics added). The medium of the word is always present but the Word is not an inner word, that is, words of piety spoken to oneself (III 128).

The ecstatic experience in which the Divine Spirit speaks to the human spirit in a Word of God creates the state of faith--"the state of being *grasped* by the transcendent unity of unambiguous life" (III 129), and the state of love--"the state of being *taken into* that transcendent unity" (III 129). Both are gifts of divine grace. What is assented to in the state of faith is "the truth about or relation" to God (III 132). What faith includes is "first, the element of being opened up by the Spiritual Presence; second, the element of accepting it . . .; third, the element of expecting final participation in the transcendent unity of unambiguous life" (III 133). Love is "the Spiritual Presence's creation of *agape*. *Agape* is unambiguous love and therefore impossible for the human spirit by itself." This love is experienced "as blessedness" (III 136). It is the "basic structure of the New Being" (III 137-138). It, too, has three elements.

> . . . the first quality is . . . its acceptance of the object of love without restrictions; the second quality is . . . holding fast to this acceptance . . .; the third quality is . . . expectation of the re-establishment of the holiness, greatness, and dignity of the object of love through its accepting him (III 138).

In God there is love as *agape*. In the New Being there is faith and love. "Being grasped by God in faith and adhering to him in love is one and the same state. . ." (III 138). This is "the content of the manifestation of the Divine Spirit in the human spirit" (III 129ff).

The Divine Spirit works in history. It "breaks into all history in revelatory experiences . . . The Spiritual Presence acts . . . in every moment and . . . in some great moments, which are the historical kairoi" (III 140). But the participation in this divine activity is always "fragmentary" (III 140).

"The two most important examples of the experience of the Spiritual Presence are mysticism . . . and the exclusive monotheism of Judaism" (III 143). These are, of course, preparatory works of the Spiritual Presence creating the Spiritual Community in its latent stage.

The danger of mysticism is that in its transcending of all the concrete embodiments of the divine, and also the subject-object scheme of man's finite structure, "it is in danger of annihilating the centered self" (III 143). Eastern mysticism affirms such a goal, while Western mysticism tries "to preserve . . . personality and community" (III 143). Prophetic religion in the Old Testament "does not eliminate centered selves" but allows the Spirit to grasp them and drive them "to the heights of prophetic power" (III 143). This is because "for prophetic religion the Spiritual Presence is the presence of the God of humanity and justice" (III 143).

The divine Spirit manifests itself without distortion in Jesus of Nazareth. There was "a teleological predisposition in Jesus to become the bearer of the Spirit without limit" (III 145) (this leads to the "half-Docetic" (III 145) virgin birth legends). His baptism was the event which "confirmed him as the elected 'Son of God'" (III 144). Jesus the Christ "is the keystone in the arch of Spiritual manifestations in history" and " . . . the divine Spirit which made Jesus the

Christ is creatively present in the whole history of revelation and salvation . . ." (III 147). In the Christ, "God . . . is decisively and ultimately manifest" (III 147). There will be no religious experience "qualitatively beyond Jesus as the Christ" (III 148).

The presence of the Divine Spirit in Jesus and its reception led to the creation, by the Spirit, of "the manifestation of the Spiritual Community under the creative impact of the central event--Jesus the Christ" (III 149). This community is unambiguous but "fragmentary"--that means, like the Christ it appears "under the conditions of finitude but conquering both estrangement and ambiguity" (III 150). It is invisible, hidden, "but nevertheless real" (III 150). The Spirit grasps Peter and enables "his spirit to recognize the Spirit in Jesus that makes him the Christ" (III 150). Upon Jesus' death which threatened the disciples' faith in Jesus as the Christ, an event occurred in which "the Spiritual Presence grasped them and re-established their faith." And in that event they became a manifestation of the Spiritual Community (III 151).

The marks of this manifest community are: ecstasy, certainty of faith, self-surrendering love, reunion with all mankind, openness fo everyone. These are clearly seen in the Pentecost narrative (III 151-152). They "are derived from the image of Jesus as the Christ and the New Being manifest in him" (III 153).

The Spiritual Community is "not identical with the Christian Churches" (III 152). There is a latent Spiritual Community "before an encounter with the central revelation. This stage may persist even chronologically after the years 1 - 30. It is the essence of the churches' secular opponents. In such groups, however, although there is faith and love as a result of the Divine Spirit's impact and preparatory work, the ultimate criterion--"the faith and love of the Christ"--is lacking. It does not have "an ultimate principle of resistance" to demonization and profanization" (III 154). The church has this principle and is able to apply it. This is the basic difference between the two stages--latent and manifest--of the Spiritual community (III 154). Christian missions needs to recognize "pagans, humanists, and Jews as members of the latent Spiritual Community" (III 155). The Spiritual Community is not the ultimate fulfillment of the Kingdom of God, but it is the Spiritual essence and criterion of the ambiguous life of the churches" (III 157).

> This description of the Spiritual Community shows it to be as manifest and hidden as the New Being in all its expressions. It is as manifest and as hidden as the central manifestation of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ . . . everything Spiritual is manifest in hiddenness. It is open only to faith as the state of being grasped by the Spiritual Presence (III 161).

At this point it would be well to turn to the discussion by Tillich of "The Trinitarian Symbols" (III 283-294). Having discussed God, the Christ, and the Divine Spirit, Tillich can now make some further observations on Christianity's trinitarian doctrine of God. Christianity affirms three central statements about God: 1) He is the Living God, the Creator of all things; 2) He is "in" Jesus as the Christ fully and without distortion or diminished power; and 3) He is present in the life of the churches. The original function of the doctrine of the Trinity, says Tillich, is "to express in embracing symbols the self-manifestation of the Divine Life to man" (III 294).

"The application of the symbol of life to God," along with the "tension between the absolute and the concrete element" (III 285) is "preparatory for the developed trinitarian doctrine in Christian theology" (III 285). This doctrine is a part of the christological problem. The christological problem that arises with "the statement that the historical Jesus is the Christ gives rise to the trinitarian problem" (III 285). The substance of trinitarian thought, says Tillich, "is _given_ in revelatory experiences" (III 286, Italics added). These occur under the "impact of the Spiritual Presence" (III 286).

> The experience of God as a "living God" and not as a dead identity is a work of the Spiritual Presence as is the experience of the creative ground of being in every being, the experience of Jesus as the Christ, and the ecstatic elevation of the human spirit toward the union of unambiguous life (III 286).

Tillich insists that it "is not the Christian consciousness but the revelatory situation . . . . that is the source of religious knowledge" (III 285). And the aspects of God are "not merely different subjective ways of looking at the same thing. They have a _fundamentum in re_, a foundation in reality . . ." (III 283).

The trinitarian dogma results from the early church's wrestling with the christological and trinitarian problems in the framework of Greek thought(III 286-287). Greek theology first attempted to solve the problem by the use of the concept of the _Logos_, "the principle of the self-manifestation of God" (III 288). This was combined with the mysterious abyss of God, and together--form and abyss--they constituted the basis of a doctrine of the living God (III 288). This Logos was applied to Jesus as the Christ (III 288). "The decision of Nicaea claimed that both the Logos-Son and the God-Father were expressions of ultimate concern" (III 289). But it stated this in a formula involving *ousia* and *hypostasis*, and later in a formula involving *substantia* and *persona*. These terms may have satisfied theologians, but in terms of religious devotion, the "concepts of *ousia* and *hypostasis* or of *substantia* and *persona* . . . open the way to the unlimited number of objects of prayer . . . in spite of the theological distinctions . . ." (III 289).

Moreover, God's self-manifestation, his Logos, cannot be limited to the human dimension, he must be free "to manifest himself to other worlds in other ways" (III 290). This means that, although Jesus as the Christ is "certainly the face of God manifest for historical man," this does not require the eternal Logos *in himself* to have "the face of Jesus of Nazareth or the face of historical man" (III 290). This means a deliteralization of the symbol Son of God in trinitarian thinking.

Tillich mentions a further difficulty with the dogma of the Trinity. It has "become the politically guaranteed symbol of all forms of Christianity . . . put on the altar . . . adored . . . a powerful weapon for ecclesiastical authoritarianism and the suppression of the searching mind" (III 290-291). In this form it has lost its power and has not been really used, especially in Protestantism, but also in Catholicism, where the Holy Virgin "has by far surpassed . . . all three personae of the Trinity" for devotional life (III 291-292).

Tillich suggests that a doctrine of God as Ground and Abyss of Being, the Christ as the Crucified, and the Spirit as the ecstatic Spiritual Presence could recover something of the necessary female element lost Protestantism's rejection of the devotional use of the symbol of the Holy Virgin, and also express something of the common divine nature "above" the three personae (III 292ff). At any rate, thinks Tillich, the doctrine of the Trinity "is not closed." Something fresh must be done with it, because it "can be neither discarded nor accepted in its traditional form" (III 294).

According to Tillich, the actuality of the Divine Spirit, the Spiritual Presence, is an impact on the human spirit which creates faith and love, and unambiguous life, though fragmentarily (because the "universe is not yet transformed") (III 276). The Divine Spirit does transform "actually in the dimension of the spirit" (III 277). This "life in faith and love" is "health in the ultimate sense of the word," and "it is created by the Spiritual Presence" (III 280). This function of the Spiritual Presence--healing--is "an element in the work of salvation" (III 277). It is universal. "All dimensions of life are involved in it" (III 277), although it is direct only in the realm of the human spirit. It is indirect in the rest of the universe (III 276-277).

Health is integration, disease is disintegration. Spiritual health is the integration of the personal center. But this "integration of the spiritual center is possible only by its elevation to . . . the divine center and this is possible only through the impact of the divine power, the Spiritual Presence" (III 280). Tillich says that "the receiving function of man in this experience is faith; the actualizing function is love" (III 280). This experience is neither a substitute for other ways of healing, not can anything be a substitute for it (III 280). The various ways of healing neither impede nor conflict with each other. All of them try to break the predominance of one of the poles and revive the influence of the other (the "poles" here are "self-identity" and "self-alteration") (III 277). "They work for the self-integration of a centered life" (III 277).

The healing and saving activity of the Divine Spirit, then, can be seen as actualized in those processes where the ambiguities and destructive tensions in the realm of the human spirit are conquered. Tillich describes this activity at some length under the title, "The Divine Spirit and the Ambiguities of Life" (III 162-282). He discusses the Spiritual Community and its power, structure, and fight against the ambiguities in the churches and in the latent secular communities. He calls it "essentially determining and being resisted by existence" (III 163). He speaks at length of the Spiritual Presence conquering the ambiguities of culture (III 245-265) and the ambiguities of morality (III 266-275), with particular attention to the way in which this takes place in the churches.

The churches, says Tillich, are communities of faith and love. "If we call the churches or any particular church a community of faith, we say that, according to its intention, it is founded on the New Being in Jesus as the Christ" (III 173). "Faith," as Tillich sees it, is not to be identified with creedal statements (III 174). A church is a community of those who affirm that Jesus is the Christ, the decision of an individual is not to believe this or that creed but to want to belong "to a community which asserts that Jesus is the Christ" (III 175), "to participate in the life of a group which is based on the New Being as it has appeared in Jesus as the Christ" (III 175).

Of course the church must formulate its faith and even fight for it. But the fight is never about the foundation--if one denies this he has simply "left the Faith"--but about its formulations. The bitterness and rancor can be eliminated greatly if it is always remembered that no one formulation can make an absolute claim to express the New Being (III 176-177).

The community of faith is also a community of love. Like faith's formulations, the manifestations of love in the church are never absolute. They make a continual attack on that in the life of the community which prevents "the potentialities for humanity in the individual and justice in the group" (III 178). Love, in the community, also means helping "victims of a distorted social structure . . . to attain the material goods which sustain their potentialities as men" (III 178-179). What the community of love tries to do is "to create the conditions which make love possible in the other one" (III 179). There must be judgment in the community of love, but always with the forgiving element--the paradox of the message of Christianity --present (III 179-180). The community of love is open to anyone who has a "desire to participate in a group whose foundation is Jesus as the Christ" (III 181).

The actuality of the divine Spirit may be observed in the work of the churches. Tillich discusses three kinds of work the churches do as living entities which seek to express their dynamic essence. These are:

> The functions of constitution, related to the foundation of the churches in the Spiritual Community; the functions of expansion, related to the universal claim of the Spiritual Community; the functions of construction, related to the actualization of the Spiritual potentialities of the churches (III 182).

The discussion of these functions occupies pages 182 through 216 in Systematic Theology III. The functions, says Tillich, involve a paradox. They are involved in the ambiguities of life insofar as the churches are sociological entities--and "their aim is to conquer these ambiguities through the power of the Spiritual Presence" (III 183).

The function of constitution involves receiving and mediating "the New Being as it is manifest in the Christ and real in the Spiritual Community." And there is also a response, an "affirmation of that which is received--the confession of faith (some kind of creedal statement) and worship (adoration, prayer, and contemplation)."

The expanding function of the churches includes missions (the actualization of the Spiritual Community), education (introducing each new generation into the reality of the Spiritual Community), and practical apologetics and evangelistic preaching (answering questions about the church and refuting the skepticism and dogmatism with which the churches' critics protect themselves).

The constructing functions of the churches are discussed by Tillich under the headings of "aesthetics" and "theology." Artists are to utilize the forms of the aesthetic realm honestly and with consecration in order to express what happens in the religious encounter of those who are "grasped by the Spiritual Presence in their concrete situation" (III 199). Theologians utilize cognitive forms to express in concepts "the symbols given by the original revelatory experience and by the traditions based on them" (III 201). "Since theology is a function of the church, the church is justified in presenting to the theologian the concrete Objects of its meditation and contemplation and in rejecting a theology in which these symbols are rejected or have lost their meaning (III 202). Theology requires both meditation (a penetration into the Christian symbols) and discursive analysis and description of their meaning in a constructive synthesis.

These are the three expanding functions of the churches. The churches also have two functions which Tillich calls "the communal functions" (III 204ff), and "the personal functions" (III 209-212). These are also constructive functions by which the church "builds its life by using and trnascending the functions of man's life under the dimension of the spirit" (III 196).

> If the constructive functions of the church, in the power of the Spiritual Presence, conquer the ambiguities of religion (although only fragmentarily), they must be able to create a communal holiness which is united with justice and a personal saintliness which is united with humanity(III 204).

The communal element in the Spiritual Community means that organized religion cannot be totally lost, though any specific form of organization can be subjected to self-criticism. "The Protestant weakness of continuous self-criticism is its greatness and also a symptom of the Spiritual impact upon it" (III 207). The basic criticism against any organizational form must be against its inevitable violations of justice (III 204ff). In its community the church must strive for inclusiveness, equality, and offices adequately adapted to the exercise of the churches' functions. For Tillich, "no church office . . . is a result of a direct command by the divine Spirit, but the church and its functions are" (III 207). These functions which require "organizational provisions for the execution are not of ultimate but of necessary concern" (III 208).

The personal functions in the Spiritual Community aim at creating "saintliness" ("in the sense of being open to the Spiritual Presence" [III 211]). This is the achievement of the telos of humanity (the realization of one's own inner aim). One cannot himself successfully achieve this nor can he be determined by others or determine others to achieve it. It can only be achieved when one is determined by the Spiritual Presence, that is, by grace (III 211).

> . . . the Spiritual Presence cannot be produced but is given . . . it is the Spiritual Presence as grace which makes self-determination possible, [and] in the dealing with the other one the Spirit as creator of participation makes other-determination possible (III 211-212).

The churches have "relating functions" (III 212-216)--they must act upon, and receive from, other sociological groups. They often do this silently. "The churches silently give Spiritual substance to the society in which they live, and . . . silently receive Spiritual forms from the same society. They may openly and prophetically attack and judge society, but they must also remain open to judgment of society upon their own injustice and inhumanity. Because of the "royal function of Christ," they can and must exercise political responsibility in the society--but humbly, yet not weakly. And in doing so they must take care not to lose their character as expression of the Spiritual Community. In all its relations the church must remain holy and retain its radical otherness and still remember "that the world which is opposed by the church is not simply not-church but has in itself elements of the Spiritual Community in its latency"(III 216).

The relation of the divine Spirit to the individual is discussed at length by Tillich under the heading, "The Individual in the Church and the Spiritual Presence" (III 217-243). The individual in the Spiritual Community is a saint. That is, he is united with God in faith and love, but he "is a saint in spite of his lack of saintliness" (III 217). As a saint he is a priest "able to exercise all the functions of a priest" (III 217). He enters a community which precedes him whether he does so consciously or unconsciously, and there is no clearly defined moment when he is a "mature" member (III 217-218), or even when he "essentially" became a member (III 219). Conversion is a process in which the old being is negated and the New Being, created by the Spiritual Presence, is affirmed (III 219). It marks the transition from the latent stage of the Spiritual Community to its manifest stage (III 220).

In the church the individual experiences--that is, is aware of--the New Being and the divine Spirit in three ways: regeneration, justification, and sanctification.

Regeneration is "the event in which the divine Spirit takes hold of a personal life through the creation of faith" (III 222). This "faith is the creation of the Spirit," and it is not the case that man must first "have faith" in order to receive the gift of the divine Spirit (III 223). How does one reach such faith? One can do nothing, it is a gift. But if one asks, that is in itself, evidence that he has been grasped by the Spirit and already has what he asks for. What is required is only that one ask with ultimate concern; "the fact of his ultimate concern implies the answer . . . he is under the impact of the Spiritual Presence and accepted" (III 223).

Justification is this divine acceptance. The "cause" of this acceptance is grace, "faith" is the act of receiving it (III 224). This acceptance is the forgiveness of sins. "God declares him who is unjust to be just" (III 226). "The impact of this message . . . turns the eyes of man away from the bad and the good in himself to the infinite divine goodness . . . which gives itself without conditions" (III 226). This is a justice "which makes him who is unjust just by acceptance" (III 226).

> All this is mediated through the picture of Jesus the Crucified. God's acceptance of the unacceptable, God's participation in man's estrangement, and his victory over the ambiguity of good and evil appear in a unique, definite, and transforming way. . . . but it is not caused by him [Jesus]. The cause is God and God alone (III 226).

Sanctification is "a movement toward maturity . . . manifest in the religious as well as the secular life, and it transcends both of them in the power of the Spiritual Presence" (III 237). Its goal is "the saint" (III 237). Tillich suggests that this process includes the following: increasing awareness, increasing freedom, increasing relatedness, and increasing transcendence (III 231ff).

The second activity of the divine Spirit as it is actualized in the world is the conquest of the ambiguities of culture. In his discussion of this activity (III 243-265), Tillich raises the question: "What happens to culture as a whole under the impact of the spiritual presence?" His answer is: "theonomy" (III 249)--"wherever there is theonomy, traces of the impact of the Spiritual Presence are visible" (III 252). What is being discussed here is not simply the relation of the churches to their culture. Their existence can indeed be "a medium through which the Spiritual Presence works toward the self-transcendence of culture" (III 246). As we have seen, the divine Spirit engages in a preparatory work, the creation of the Spiritual Community in its latent stage. "This implies that the divine Spirit is not bound to the media it has created, the churches (and their media, word and sacrament), but that the free impact of the divine Spirit on a culture prepares for a religious community . . ." (III 246).

Tillich points out a number of "theonomous manifestations of the Spiritual Presence" (III 252-266). Fundamentally what happens in these manifestations is a conquering of the subject-object cleavage in the various cultural realms. Tillich does not tell us how this is done. Presumably the churches are to some extent the media for this, and equivalents of the churches' media (word and sacrament) in the other communities are also media.

The third activity of the Divine Spirit is the conquest of the ambiguities of morality. This is done analogously to the Divine Spirit's creation of a theonomous culture. It creates a theonomous morality--a transmoral morality. Here "the God-man image created by the Divine Spirit as the essence of the man Jesus of Nazareth" (III 271) is the criterion of the way in chich man is to sacrifice his potentialities. Jesus' sacrifice shows that all human potentialities may be sacrificed "for the sake of the one which man himself cannot actualize" (III 271). As in the Christ, this sacrifice can prove fruitful in all directions if the vertical dimension is maintained. Man cannot, of course, maintain this without God's grace. But this is given to him. "Where the Spiritual Presence is effective, life is turned . . . toward the ultimate in all directions" (III 270). In this gift of grace, man receives love. This love is able to enter into any concrete situation, using wisdom, and acting with courage, and the decision, though still ambiguous, will be "concrete and adequate."

Summary of "God" and "The Divine Spirit"

A summary of the sections dealing with God in Tillich's Systematic Theology need not be lengthy. Tillich derives his doctrine of God from what he considers to be "final revelation," namely, Jesus as the Christ. The section on "The Reality of God" is a "systematic foundation" developed for apologetic purposes. It is not Tillich's full-blown doctrine of God. The sections on "The Spiritual Presence" and "The Divine Spirit" elaborate what Tillich understands of the God that was manifest in Jesus as the Christ. It reiterates Tillich's belief that the God revealed in Jesus has been, and is, at work throughout human history revealing himself and saving mankind. God is seen as living, creative, related, and directing all creation towards fulfillment. Tillich's God is no impersonal force, but the ground of all being and one who reveals himself to persons through the personal life of Jesus the Christ as the culmination of his revealing and saving activity in history. God is *agape* love, a just love that drives toward fulfillment of his creation, even though this requires judgment and "the strange work of love"--the destruction of that which is against love. But God is not ultimately destructive. He is not a demon. He is grace. His condemnation is healing justice which is not eternal. The Christian message of the love of God as seen in Jesus the Christ is the guiding motif of Tillich's doctrine of God.

Tillich's effort to work out a doctrine of the Divine Spirit will be, in this writer's estimation, his greatest contribution to Christian thought in the twentieth century. This is a greatly neglected theme which needs to be recovered. Tillich, unfortunately, did not have the time to sufficiently rework the third volume of his *Systematic Theology*. When this is done (James Luther Adams was working on this and perhaps his work will be evidenced in the forthcoming one-volume edition of *Systematic Theology*), this part of Tillich's work may receive the critical attention it deserves and has not had to date.

CHAPTER V

SOME CRITICS OF TILLICH'S RESTATEMENT OF THE CHRISTIAN MESSAGE

In this study we have been concerned to point to the way in which the Christian message is in the theology of Paul Tillich. Accordingly, we have examined closely his Systematic Theology, since that is his mature, considered, and "summing-up" work. And we have focused our attention on the "answering sections" of each of the five parts since it is in these sections that Tillich states, and gives answers on the basis of, his understanding of the Christian message. We have also been attentive to what is said about the Christian message, and Tillich's handling of it, in his "Introduction" to the first volume.

We have followed a somewhat different order than Tillich used, examining first "TheReality of the Christ," then the sections on "Revelation" and "The Kingdom of God," and finally, the sections dealing with "God" and "The Divine Spirit." We have summarized our findings and concluded that the Christian message is at the core of Tillich's theology as its basis and that he cannot easily be dismissed as a Christian heretic.

There are, of course, scores of critics of Tillich who would take issue with this conclusion. The secondary literature on Tillich is extensive. To deal with it at all adequately would be a full-length study in itself. In this chapter we will examine three full-length studies of Tillich which seem fairly representative of the kinds of criticism leveled against Tillich's work. R. Allan Killen's work represents what could be called a "Biblicist's" criticism; Fr. George H. Tavard's, what could be called a "Traditionalist's" criticism; and Kenneth Hamilton's, what could be called an "anti-Idealist's" criticism. Killen resents Tillich's failure to cite Scripture; Tavard, his failure to cite ecclesiastical Tradition; and Hamilton, his failure to cite his "system-known" as the authority for what he says.

The present writer is engaged in gathering together a comprehensive collection of secondary literature on Paul Tillich, the present state of which may be seen in Appendix C. Thus he is well aware that the three critics chosen as representative do not at all exhaust the criticisms which have been directed against Tillich.

The manner in which these three critics will be discussed is as follows: we shall consider what they have to say about Tillich's presentation of Jesus, his person and his work; and we shall state what seems to be the chief issue that is at stake between Tillich and his critics.

To begin with, these critics are fairly convinced that Tillich has failed to base the Christian message on the historical Jesus of Nazareth. Killen feels that Tillich has eliminated every concrete fact of Jesus as of no significance except an "event" in Jesus' life in which he "became" the Christ (Killen 165). This "event" for Killen is not the entire life of Jesus of Nazareth, but a moment at which "in history a human person called Jesus became 'The Christ' by becoming absolutely 'transparent' for the divine that he bacame divine" (Killen 165). "Finally it is not Jesus who is of importance, nor his life, but 'the event' of essential being, Essential God-manhood, becoming reunited with existential being in a human person called Jesus so that he became 'The Christ'" (Killen 167). Killen finds that Tillich "places all his emphasis upon Jesus becoming divine and his becoming 'The Christ', while diverting attention from the 'human personality of the historical Jesus'" (Killen 145). Killen acknowledges that Tillich "is not trying to say, it seems clear, that there was no historical Christ" (Killen 152), but he feels that "the important thing, according to Tillich's view of the Christ, is not the historic human person called Jesus" (Killen 152). As Killen sees it, the factual side is quite irrelevant for Tillich. He allows it to fade away.

Tavard is also unsatisfied with Tillich's presentation of Jesus of Nazareth. He thinks that for Tillich it "is not the man from Nazareth that matters, but his witness to the New Being in himself" (Tavard 108). "Jesus is not necessary to the Christ" (Tavard 109). Tavard is aware of Tillich's skepticism about the "historical Jesus" of the old liberal theology, and thinks that "Tillich is right in being skeptical of the historians' efforts to rewrite the story of Jesus--but for the wrong reason" (Tavard 111). We already have this story, and the point really to be made is that "historians who doubt the value of the records have failed to establish their point" (Tavard 112). Yet he agrees that Tillich's opposition to those who replace the crucified

Christ with the historical Jesus is "the only sound attitude" (Tavard 108). Tavard feels that Tillich has backed too far away from the historical dimension because of this justifiable reaction against the Liberals' historical Jesus, though he thinks that Tillich now stresses "the ontological more than the historical dimension of Jesus as the Christ" (Tavard 112). This is unfortunate, as Tavard views it.

Hamilton finds that Tillich's system "denies the apostolic preaching which asserts that the One whom God has made both 'Lord and Christ' is, necessarily, 'this Jesus'" (Hamilton 161). Hamilton thinks Tillich is interested not in a man from Nazareth, but simply in a "picture" (Hamilton 162, 163). Hamilton says, "the system loses--or is prepared to lose--Jesus of Nazareth" (Hamilton 165). Hamilton thinks that Tillich's Essential God-manhood only "appears" in existence, but "it cannot properly belong to it--it cannot enter into the ambiguities of life in any true fashion" (Hamilton 165). Finally, says Hamilton, "when the system does turn to consider the man who bears the name of Jesus, it is not from interest in him but from interest in what may be gained through him. He is valued, not for himself, but for what he brings with him" (Hamilton 172).

From what we have seen of Tillich's concern for the factual side of the event upon which Christianity is based, as indeed his emphasis on an objective element in any revelatory event, and his insistence that this is Jesus as the Christ in the totality of his being, it is obvious that Tillich's critics are reading something into Tillich at this point, without warrant. (Perhaps reading "out" would be more accurate.) Tillich's critics are asking of him more than even the New Testament writers give us--a historical Jesus that is more historical, and emphasized as such more than the New Testament writers think it is necessary to present. They seem to want him to affirm a Jesus beyond (or before) Jesus as the Christ as the New Testament portrays him. Tillich sees no need for such a Jesus. He is content with what the New Testament gives us. He finds this historical Jesus "adequately" presented in the New Testament. Its picture of Jesus does indeed interest Tillich, but not as a mere picture. He is interested in the man this picture portrays and is aware of, and content with, the simple fact that this "picture" is the only authentic evidence we have of the historical Jesus.

From another angle, Tillich's critics find his doctrine of the "person" of Christ unsatisfactory. Killen is particularly insistent here. Over and over again he tells us that Tillich's Jesus is only a man who becomes deified. ". . . Jesus is only a human person for Tillich . . ." (Killen 148 and throughout). For Killen, Tillich's Jesus is not the Christ "in any real sense" (Killen 143), because Tillich's Jesus is not the Second Person of the Trinity come down from heaven at the birth of Jesus (Killen 258, 143). He finds that even if Tillich speaks of Jesus being united with the Logos, this was not from his birth, this union was only an "event" that took place at some point in Jesus' life after he had sufficiently surrendered himself so as to be transparent to God.

Tavard, too, finds Tillich's doctrine of the person of Jesus inadequate. He feels that Tillich cannot understand the way in which the two natures of Christ are united, because he "pays so little attention to the concept of *hypostasis* or *persona*" (Tavard 127). He finds it remarkable that Tillich does not discuss this concept . Says Tavard, Tillich has "not perceived the depth of this unconfused union" (Tavard 127). Tillich can describe Jesus as the Christ but he cannot answer, Who is Christ? (Tavard 129). Tavard chides Tillich for resorting to Adoptionist motives to protect the human element in Christ when Chalcedon does that adequately and, moreover, does not juxtapose the human and divine elements (as Tavard thinks Tillich does) but keeps them organically united (Tavard 131).

Hamilton finds Tillich rejecting the Incarnation because "it is exactly this that the system must at all costs deny. It is unthinkable that the Logos should *actually become* flesh, instead of merely appearing 'in and through' it" (Hamilton 170). Tillich's system, says Hamilton, prevents him "from accepting the unity of the person whom the New Testament knows as the Lord Jesus Christ" (Hamilton 172). Says Hamilton of Tillich's Christ: "He was not born into the world; he appeared in existence. He did not triumph over sin and death by his Incarnation, Cross, and Resurrection. . . . He is not the Son of God who died and lives forever . . ." (Hamilton 172). Tillich's idealistic theology leaves us "with a colourless medium instead of with a living Lord" (Hamilton 172). Tillich's system has led to a situation in which "the truth of Christianity has ceased to be a message about the Incarnate Son of God and has been transformed into a message about the real structure of the Universe" (Hamilton 150).

Thus the critics feel that Tillich's Jesus is not a divine person. Killen grants that he may become a divine person in Tillich's thought but this is not an adequate divinity. Tavard questions whether Tillich can say Jesus is God. Hamilton thinks all we have is a principle and no person human or divine at all.

Killen's criticism is based on Tillich's Jesus not being but becoming the Christ. But his whole case is vitiated by his failure to note that Tillich nowhere talks about Jesus achieving his unbroken, undisrupted unity with God, but of his maintaining it. Killen offers no evidence (because there is none) of Tillich's believing or teaching that Jesus ever existed in estrangement and separation from God. Surely that is unique! Killen's repetitious use of the phrase "Jesus who became the Christ" and variations of this is completely erroneous.

Tavard's criticism is directed at the universal aspect of the God revealed in Tillich's Jesus. Says Tavard, this is not "merely the God of Christianity; he is the universal God for whom all have been seeking and whom all have obscurely perceived even in their ignorance and doubt" (Tavard 60). And Tavard finds Sabellianism in Tillich's failure to spell out the difference between God the Father and God the Son in Jesus (Tavard 108). Tavard's criticism, oddly, seems to be that there is somehow too much God in Tillich's Jesus!

Tillich's critics find him inadequate in his presentation of the work of Christ. Killen finds no doctrine of substitutionary atonement in Tillich's theology. "Tillich rejects the idea of a substitutionary atonement, and presents a theory of reunion" (Killen 157). Reunion is, for Killen, no atonement. Tavard points out that Tillich is silent about what Tavard regards as "the transcendent meaning of the Cross," namely, that it was a "cult offered by Jesus the Christ to the Father . . . . an act of divine cult" (Tavard 78). Hamilton finds no forgiveness in Tillich's theology. Tillich uses the word, borrowing it from the vocabulary of faith, but it "is not a suitable vehicle for the reuniting power of being"--Tillich's "work" of Christ--because forgiveness, says Hamilton, "has to do with restoring a relationship rather than reunion within a totality" (Hamilton 139, 140). Tillich's critics, it seems, cannot speak of atonement apart from the framework of a sacrificial religious system in which something must be done to satisfy or placate an offended deity. And, apparently, they cannot think of reunion with God in any sense other than a condition in which man is swallowed up into the divine. No real attempt is made by these critics to think out what Tillich's reunion with God is about. But they did not have the final part of Systematic Theology to guide them.

Tillich's critics are highly suspicious of his"norm." Killen finds Tillich's notion of the kairos introducing "a condition of changing norms in theology . . . it makes the 'totality of man's creative self-interpretation in a special period' a ruling factor in forming theology" (Killen 211, 212). "Tillich presents a view of changing fluctuating norms, and uses it as a means of overcoming differences within the Christian Church" (Killen 274). Thus Tillich, says Killen, wipes out the sharp distinctions between the churches, and ends with a common denominator wide enough to include even the pagan religions"

(Killen 275). Killen thinks the norm of Protestantism, "the unchangeable character of God, and also of His Revelation in words and statements of truth in the Holy Scripture, needs to be explained and compared with such a view of relative changing truth" (Killen 275).

Tavard finds Tillich making his "personal experience of the New Being in Christ the theological norm" (Tavard 26). This is "the greatest danger that threatens theologians" (Tavard 26). A Catholic, says Tavard, would never do this; he "would never trust his own thinking on the ground that he has been grasped by the power of God." He asks, "How could my consciousness of this be a valid objective norm?" (Tavard 27). The Catholic theological norm, says Tavard, "transcends its mediation by the theologian in a communion with the Whole" (Tavard 27). Ultimately, thinks Tavard, Tillich's theology "will stand or fall on this point" (Tavard 26).

Hamilton thinks that Tillich's "norm" is "the New Being" which is derived from his system and attached to a mere picture of Jesus (Hamilton 162). It is really his idea of what theology is, what genuine religion is, and is solely the result of Tillich's reason. Tillich abandons the norm of the Chalcedonian formula, his proposals "abandon this norm in favour of a 'philosophico-religious principle' . . . a timeless truth which we know through direct contact with ultimate reality" (Hamilton 230).

The difficulty seems to be that Tillich's critics regard a norm for theology as something somewhere formulated once and for all, whereas Tillich wants it to be the churches' encounter with the Christian message which remains the same throughout its various formulations but which can never be formulated once and for all. Such a constancy amid changing forms seems incredible to Tillich's critics and they reject it, seemingly out of hand. What is at issue is the nature of authority and truth for theology.

Killen's view is simple. Truth is truth in words and statements in the Holy Scriptures. This is "a great body of truth" from which doctrines may be deduced (Killen 239). The authority for these truths is Christ himself, eternally wedded to the Bible. "Christ as the truth, and the revelation of truth in the Bible, cannot be separated, for as soon as they are separated Christ Himself is lost" (Killen 240).

Tavard turns to "the totality of Christian experience . . . that of all Christians of all times" (Tavard 27). What this really means is that Tavard regards "the consistent interpretation of Jesus the Christ that has developed in the Church along the lines set by the orthodox Fathers" (Tavard 2) as the standard. Any straying from "this standard is a betrayal of Christ himself" (Tavard 2). "An orthodox Christian . . . can only judge . . . in the light of the dogma of Chalcedon" (Tavard 124). Tillich forgets that "outside of orthodoxy there can only be heterodoxy. Orthodox Christology was formulated at Chalcedon. Every alteration of the Chalcedonian understanding of the Gospel is heterodox" (Tavard 132).

Hamilton appears to hold to a doctrine of truth that finds it finally in the Scriptures but not as interpreted by anything external, rather by the direct inner testimony of the Spirit to their truth. He resents anyone trying to show the truth of the Scriptures or the Christian message. The message is God's and He bears his own witness to its truth as he gives it to individuals in the heart. "The Christian message speaks to us" (Hamilton 239), "in faith we receive the Word of God, a Word that speaks to us and not just in us" (Hamilton 234). The kerygma must be its own authority. We must not absolutize "the traditional sources" (Hamilton 236), for the "result is that we are told to believe exactly what the words of the Bible say (but who decides what they say?), or else we are told to believe exactly what the true Church preaches (but who decides where the true Church is to be found?)" (Hamilton 236-237). Hamilton is content to rest in the authority of the authoritative kerygma, but he fails to ask who tells us what this is. He implies that the answer to this question is the inner testimony of the Spirit, but one wonders how to adjudicate between two conflicting claims based on this inner testimony of the Spirit. One can get pretty dogmatic and authoritative if one "humbly" declares, "This is not my own teaching, it is what God has spoken directly to my heart."

Tavard is right. One becomes finally either a Protestant or a Catholic at this point. Tavard opts for the authority of the Church, and so does Killen (his Church is the Calvinistic Orthodox Reformed Church).

Hamilton has a Church as an authority, too. Its members seem to be himself, Calvin, Kierkegaard, and perhaps Gore and Brunner (these people he cites).

Tillich wants to "let God be God" and not delimit the authority and truth of the Christian message to any of its ecclesiastically conditioned forms (or to his own Systematic Theology either). Tillich is

Protestant at this point. His critics are not. The argument has reached an impasse. Yet, oddly, each of Tillich's three critics, at the end of his study, calls for a *restatement* of the Christian message! Killen says, "The norm of Protestantism . . . requires it to be clearly *restated*" (Killen 275, Italics added). Tavard says, "A post-Chalcedonian Christology can be developed along these lines"--spelled out briefly in Tavard's last chapter (Tavard 171). And Hamilton suggests "taking a stand on some philosophy which offers at least some points of contact with the kerygmatic outlook, and, using this to provide a general conceptual framework, advance toward a reconciliation of faith and knowledge" (Hamilton 237). To be sure, he is not convinced that this is really possible or necessary. All that is *really* necessary is an apologetics "which shows the Gospel to be what it is, allowing it to speak for itself" (Hamilton 239). These critics grant that Tillich's *intention* was valid, even if his accomplishment was not. They each propose something of the same thing Tillich tried to do, namely, to proclaim the Christian message intelligently, to make it understandable to modern man.

But Tillich's critics fear he has gone too far in adapting the Christian message to the ears of modern man. Their specific criticisms, however, are often based on misreadings of Tillich. Their general objection is based on a conviction that some form of the message is a norm which Tillich has not sufficiently acknowledged.

This writer concludes that the critics never really come to grips with the problem Tillich was wrestling with, and are, largely, sniping at Tillich rather than engaging him in serious debate.

COTTON FIBER CONTENT

CONCLUSION

According to Paul Tillich, the Christian message is at the center of his theology. But he does not mean thereby that there are certain statements or propositions in his theology which are its basis and which are taken from an absolutely infallible source (i.e., Scripture or Ecclesiastical pronouncements) which might be regarded as *the* Christian message. Anyone committed to such a source is, *ipso facto*, bound to be suspicious, if not openly hostile, to what Tillich has to offer. Yet, though not willing to *identify* the Christian message with any propositional form--his own or anybody else's--Tillich nonetheless believes that the Christian message can and must be stated, and that his own work is *one* such statement. In other words, the Christian message is not inexpressible, but neither is it ever expressed "once and for all." Nor is just any expression employing Christian terminology necessarily an expression of the Christian message. In short, there is a definite content of the Christian message, but this content may be expressed in a variety of forms. The judge of the forms is the content. Form does not judge form, the *content* is the judge of the form. The basis of judgement is whether or not a particular form of the message actually conveys the message. Who can judge this? Only those who hear the message and are grasped by its power and drawn into the manifest Spiritual Community, who affirm their desire to be a part of a community which confesses that Jesus is the Christ, the fullest manifestation of God, God-for-us. Or, again, those who hear the message and understand its final paradox even though they refuse to accept it. The form of the message which may be said to be adequate for the message and its content is that form which makes possible a genuine encounter with and decision about the one paradox of the Christian message: that Jesus is the Christ and that God accepts a world that rejects him. Put in other words, the Christian message is expressed whenever men are able to hear its proclamation that Jesus the Crucified is the Christ who has brought the new reality for which mankind has yearned since it became aware of the ambiguity of its life and began asking for an answer to the problem of human existence itself.

Thus the content of the Christian message is focused on Jesus of Nazareth and the claim that what occurred in and through the personal life of this man has universal significance. Yet more must be said. The Christian community has found it necessary to "protect" the Christian message from being expressed in forms which would distort it. In its ecclesiastical tradition are to be found guidelines for what must be included in any expression of the Christian message. Whenever the message is expressed it must be made explicit that Jesus of Nazareth is not inhuman in any sense. It must be clearly stated that in and through him the one God of the Universe was and is at work revealing himself and saving man. It must be made explicit that man cannot by his own ability save himself, that his condition is one of being separated from his creator in such a way that only an act of the grace of God can overcome this separation and its consequences. And it must be expressed explicitly that the act of God in Christ is "final" in the sense that nothing will ever occur that will supercede this act in significance.

Paul Tillich's statement of the Christian message is faithful to the content of this message.

1. Throughout his theology, the central point of reference is the personal life of Jesus of Nazareth. This Jesus is affirmed as a fully human, historical, factual event, the event upon which Christianity is based.

2. Throughout his theology, the paradox of this man being the Christ, the final self-manifestation of God and his decisive, "final" saving activity, is affirmed.

3. Throughout his theology, the absolute uniqueness of the life of Jesus of Nazareth and its quality as the criterion of all revelation and all saving acts, is affirmed.

4. Throughout his theology, the universal significance of this life is affirmed as that in which all men can participate and through which all men are saved.

5. Throughout his theology, the paradox that God accepts man though man is unacceptable--that God reunites man and himself "in spite of" man's act which creates disunity and disruption between himself and God--and that this gracious act of God is inextricably bound up with the life, death, and resurrection of the Christ, is affirmed.

6. Throughout his theology, the major heresies of Christendom are recognized and studiously avoided.

a) He avoids Gnosticism by denying that creation in itself is evil.

b) He avoids Docetism by insisting upon the real historical character of the Christ and his real death.

c) He avoids Marcionism by insisting upon the Old Testament's character as a direct preparatory revelation for the final revelation in Christ.

d) He avoids Arianism by denying that Jesus is a half-god, half-man amalgamation.

e) He avoids Nestorianism by insisting that Jesus is the Christ in the totality of his being--there are not "two" totalities of being in Jesus the Christ.

f) He avoids Monophysitism by insisting that Jesus is not simply "God walking on earth" uninvolved in the tragic ambiguities of life.

g) He avoids Liberal Humanism by insisting that Jesus is not simply a moral teacher, or a social reformer, he is the "Crucified."

h) He denies the utopianism and perfectionism of left wing Protestantism by consistently presenting a theology of the cross.

i) He avoids the absurdities and false stumbling blocks of literalistic fundamentalism by insisting on the symbolic nature of all expressions of the Christian message.

j) He avoids a Syncretistic Universalism by insisting that the revelation in Jesus as the Christ is the final criterion of all claims to revelation.

k) He avoids the exclusive, demonic, limiting of salvation to the "elect" who have personally or existentially encountered the Christ by insisting that the Christ is the Logos and that the Logos has been and is at work universally revealing God and saving men.

l) He avoids sentimentalism by insisting on the reality of the wrath of God towards all acts which are against love, but at the same time keeping this from making God demonic by insisting that this "wrath" is "the strange work of love."

m) He avoids Sabellianism by insisting that trinitarian symbolism is unavoidable, finally, when expressing the nature of God, for God is living and man's experience of his presence and work in terms of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit has a fundamentum in re.

n) The Protestant principle that God must be free from all human efforts to limit him to any one or several of his manifestations is affirmed.

o) He avoids the idolatry of the Church by insisting that the Church is not identical with the Kingdom of God and must itself be subject to the criterion of the event upon which it is founded.

p) He avoids Pantheism by insisting that God is the power of being, being itself, and not simply being or even the totality of being.

7. Throughout his theology, although for apologetic purposes,

ecclesiastical and biblical terminology is avoided as much as possible; the biblical material and the christological dogma of the Church are regarded with utmost seriousness insofar as they are previous formulations of the Christian message that have conveyed that message. Though certain formulations have for the present situation become inadequate, these formulations, biblical and ecclesiastical, are nonetheless still sources for the apologetic theologian whose task it is to make their substance known for the present situation.

When one encounters Tillich's statement of the Christian message he finds himself faced with the decision of whether or not to accept the paradoxical claim that Jesus of Nazareth is the Christ, the final answer to the human predicament, the criterion of all other answers. He encounters the paradox that in and through Jesus the Christ one learns that God accepts all men and works for the fulfillment of man's life, even though man has made himself incapable of fulfillment and is inacceptable to God. If this is a "reduction" of the Christian message, if one does not really hear the Christian message unless it is presented in terms of a framework involving "the Second Person of the Trinity come down from heaven . . ." or of a framework involving "substitutionary atonement" and "the blood of Christ covering the sins of the world," then the Christian message has been reduced by Tillich. But if the Christian message can be reduced to one despair--separation from God, and one hope--reunion with God through his grace and love manifested in Jesus the Christ, then Tillich's theology is not reductionistic.

But one might ask if there is not also an expansionistic error as well as a reductionistic error possible in Christianity, and whether the former is not as harmful, and perhaps more so, than the latter. The present writer, a Disciple of Christ, is inclined to view Tillich as no reductionist since he affirms that Jesus is the Christ. He thinks that Tillich has been subjected to criticism by those whose error is an unwarranted expansionistic tendency which serves only to create unnecessary stumbling blocks for the men of our time who find it difficult to hear the Christian message because of the excessive ecclesiastical baggage its proclaimers often insist must go with it. Tillich, in the opinion of this writer, has contributed greatly to the Church's capacity for preaching the Gospel in our time by making ministers and theologians face the issue of the non-absolute character of previous formulations of the Christian message. If he is a reductionist, and in a sense he most certainly is, it is a reduction to the message, not of it, that he has helped bring about.

Tillich began his theological career in 1911, only to have his world collapse three years later with the onset of World War I. Throughout the remainder of his life he lived in a disintegrating society. In such a time, men look for a new world order, and Tillich shared this hope, while refusing to become a Utopian. As a Christian, he knew that Christ is the only "hope of the world," and he attempted to articulate this hope for the present world situation.

His theology spoke of Christ as the "New Being." This is what Christians have always believed Jesus to be. He spoke of the power in

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Jesus which is the true source of man's hope for a new order. He spoke of this power breaking into history, destroying unjust forms, and creating new forms of personal and communal existence. Tillich did not believe this power could be forced by men. We must wait on God, who in his own way will usher in the new day. Tillich was a realist, but a beliefful realist. He did not believe in panaceas, but he did believe on the God revealed in Jesus the Christ. He believed that God accepts the world in spite of the world's rejection of him, and he believed that nothing can ultimately defeat a God who participates fully in man's broken life and triumphs over all its ambiguities and tragedies. Tillich's theology is a theology of the Cross. It stresses God's victory even in his apparent defeat. It is a theology of grace--of God's great "in spite of." It is a theology of the Real Presence, God at work in, with, and under his creation, sustaining, directing, and healing mankind. It is a theology of joy and courage that is able to accept the present disintegration of society because it knows that in God the destruction of forms is not ultimately demonic, but is "the strange work of love"--God's justice preparing the way for new manifestations of his love. It is a theology of Life, the Blessed Life of the Divine and the deathless, joyful, life of man in the Eternal.

Tillich's critics largely miss the point of his theology. They seem more concerned with safeguarding this or that prior formulation of the message than with the communication of the message itself. They seem unwilling to permit the message to be stated in terms of modern man's experience of his world. They miss the deep commitment of Tillich to the substance of the message. They seem determined to read non-Christian meanings into the terms Tillich seeks to "baptize" into the Christian theologian's vocabulary. They do not wish to allow him the right to construct an ontology of the New Being. They wish to remain bound to a fundamentally Aristotelian ontology, which is no longer apropos in our world.

Tillich's work was pioneering. It was an attempt to speak to intellectuals, to those who truly live in the twentieth century. His critics opt for the maintenance of a previous world and insist that the Christian message be proclaimed in its traditional garb. But Tillich saw deeper than his critics. He saw that since July 31, 1914 the previous world has ended. And he saw that the Christian message has a depth that can survive the ending of this or any human situation and tells of the power of God to create new situations, and to enable men to live through periods of transition such as the present "sacred void." Tillich was truly an apostle to those who must live in this void. His work will be one day seen in its proper setting and for its real worth.

Paul Van Buren's curt dismissal of Tillich in a review article of Systematic Theology III drew a protest from an Iowa City layman which seems appropriate to close this study.

> . . . For a man involved in life's ambiguities, no one speaks to the point as Tillich does. Perhaps to the analytic philosopher the question of life's meaning is irrelevant; to the academic theologian wrapped up in logic, mathematics and semantics, life may have no ambiguities or questions. But to the layman, struggling with life's frustrations and joys, shaken by

> doubt, attempting to find significance in his Christian heritage, Tillich's apologetics is God-sent. What Christian thinker is in closer communication with 20th century man?
>
> Hal B. Richerson, M.D.
> Iowa City, Iowa
>
> (Letters to the Editor, Christian Century, March 11, 1964, p. 344)

It was for just such a person that Tillich labored to restate the Christian message for these times.

APPENDIX A

"THE PRESENT SITUATION" IN TILLICH'S THOUGHT

For Tillich, "the temporal situation" and the "Christian message" are two "poles" between which theology moves "back and forth." In this appendix, Tillich's understanding of the "temporal situation" will be considered.

"The temporal situation" in Tillich's theology is the present period in Western Civilization. Although there are no hard and fast lines between periods in a civilization, Tillich suggests that our present period, for all practical purposes, began with the onset of the First World War. He even names the day "when, with July 31, 1914, the 19th Century came to an end" (CB 137). On that day what had, in the previous period, been merely a revolt against the spirit of the times, namely the Existentialist revolt, became "the mirror of an experienced reality" (CB 137).

A situation is a "creative self-interpretation of the meaning of existence in a special period." If one wishes to discover this interpretation, he must look in three directions: to the previous situation,(for the present situation both affirms and denies elements of the previous interpretation); to the future, (for the present situation is aiming at something, and one must understand where the present interpretation is tending); and, finally, one must look in a direction that is not really a direction, that is, one must look at the present situation's attitude toward the eternal, to that "which supports the times but is not subject to them" (RS 35).

> Every spiritual phenomenon of a period expresses its eternal content and one of the most important characteristics of a time has been defined when we have discovered which of the various aspects of culture is most expressive of its real meaning (RS 37).

The eternal is what Tillich calls the ground and power of being and meaning. It is the infinite abyss of being and meaning. It is "a reality which lies beneath all time and above all existential forms" (RS 38). It is, in short, God.

Tillich's attempt to work out a statement descriptive of the present situation leads him to where that "which is really creative is at work" (RS 38) in our period, where elements of the nineteenth century are being affirmed or denied, where attempts are being made to direct our civilization toward the future, and where the relation to the eternal is being expressed. This last Tillich regards as the religious aspect of the present situation, and it is with this that he is primarily concerned. What is sought in the present situation are expressions of ultimate concern and attitudes toward what are regarded as life-or-death matters. These expressions and attitudes are, formally, the faith of those who hold them. This faith is

> the presupposition of life and is lived rather than thought of, this all-determining, final source of meaning constitutes the actual religious situation of a period. We must attempt to penetrate through to this faith (RS 40).

That the eternal, as Tillich defines it, is present in every situation is hard to deny. What it is, and how it is experienced, and what one's attitude should be toward it is not easy to define. But insofar as it is experienced, and an attitude toward it is assumed, as "the presupposition," "the final source of meaning" of life, the basis upon which life is lived in the period, it must be sought by the theologian. To speak of "the attempt to penetrate through to this faith" is highly characteristic of Tillich. Much of his life's work was just such an effort to "penetrate through" to the faith of "our" situation. We shall look at three works in which he summed up the result of this effort.

Die Religiose Lage der Gegenwart (Berlin, Ullstein, 1926), translated by Richard Niebuhr as The Religious Situation (New York, Henry Holt, 1932), is one of Tillich's earliest attempts to state "the creative self-interpretation of existence" of our situation. At its writing, his point of view was of one "located in the midst of deeply shaken mid-European society" in the mid-1920's. Forty years later this book is still important, (despite a certain provincialism which later events helped Tillich overcome), because the intervening years have proven Tillich to be truly a "seer," and because this work shows us Tillich at work as a "culture theologian," doing one of the essential tasks of an apologetic theologian.

Tersely stated, the theme of this book is that the "spirit of capitalist society" has betrayed its "eternal meaning," "the emancipation and high evaluation of the individual and his creative powers" (RS 49), by bringing into being a Leviathan-monster--capitalist economy. Enslaved to its own economy, "the spirit of capitalist society" has become "an extreme example of a self-assertive, self-sufficient type of existence" (RS 47).

> We come out of a time in which existence was directed toward itself, in which the forms of life were self-sufficent and closed against invasions of the eternal. . . . we come out of a time which no longer possessed any symbol by which it could point beyond itself. Capitalist society rested undisturbed in its finite form (RS 51).

But, says Tillich, "that situation has been destroyed" (RS 15). The present situation is "the slowly developing defeat of the spiritual temper of the nineteenth century" (RS 52). This has not been easy, for what is being attempted is the conquest of "forces which have claimed the minds and souls of men for almost five hundred years" (RS 52). This struggle is the religious situation of our time (RS 53).

In the preface, Tillich warns against a possible misunderstanding of this book.

> One misunderstanding must be guarded against from the beginning: the spirit of capitalist society, which occupies a central place in the following discussion does not mean the spirit of individual men or of a class or a party. It is rather a symbol for an ultimate, fundamental attitude toward the world. It is, to be sure, a very real symbol and in our situation it is most concretely visible in actual, capitalist society, whence it derives its name. But it means something far wider than this society (RS 27).

It is clear that what Tillich is attacking is not capitalist society as such, but rather its basic attitude--its spirit of self-sufficient finitude.

There are three major sections in this work. They are: "Science and Art," "Politics and Ethics," and "Religion." Tillich feels that the first two sections deal with material that is more revealing of the religious situation of the present than is the last.

The first major section is divided into three chapters: "Science," "Metaphysics," and "Art." The chapter on "Science" is in turn divided into: I. "The Vital and the Structure," II. "The Individual and the Spirit," III. "Philosophy and Method."

I. "The Vital and the Structure." Tillich notes that the fundamental methodology of mathematical natural science will probably remain firm for a long period of time. Yet is has been shaken. First, by the theory of relativity, which "revealed more clearly than was previously apparent the infinity of existence" (RS 57). Second, by the philosophy of life, which has insisted that the way into the profounder levels of life is by means of intuitive insight. Third, by the various special sciences, which began to see that the concept of structure (Gestalt)--of a living center with creative freedom and meaningful structure--was applicable in all spheres from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic. Tillich mentions biology, medicine, psychology, and sociology as areas of study affected by the concept of Gestalt.

II. "The Individual and the Spirit." Scientific methodology does not want to recognize the individual. "For the method which seeks general laws must abstract from individual events" (RS 65). But history cannot be treated in terms of general laws, although this has been tried. Tillich cites Rickert as a historian who successfully defended the view that history deals with "unique, non-derivable processes which can only be observed and described" (RS 65). He also mentions Dilthey's concept of "historical understanding" as aiding the growth of the "insight into the independent and underived character of the spiritual life" (RS 67). The George school, which reintroduced the importance of myth in the study of history, also contributed to the development of a nonmechanical view of history. There is also the rise of the "history of spirit--of mind and culture--in distinction from general history" (RS 68). Finally, there was Husserl's Logical Studies which led to the recognition "that the mind is independent of the psychical processes in which it actualizes itself" (RS 69-70). Tillich says, "the spirit is reasserting its own independent meaning" (RS 70).

III. "Philosophy and Method." The philosophical method of bourgeois society was the critical method of Kant. The attempt to go "beyond Kant" first tried the ways of Kant's successors--the way of German idealistic philosophy. But Idealism had suffered a catastrophe in the nineteenth century, largely by its refusal "to see the abyss which opens before every time and every present" (RS 73), by its unwillingness to "bear the burdens of the day" (RS 73), and by the fact that "war and revolution have revealed depths of reality which idealism cannot master" (RS 73). The Kant Society itself has recovered a philosophical interest "for which there was no room in genuine Kantianism" (RS 74). Original Kantianism is disappearing. Tillich also cites the appearance of Phenomenology, which brought about a decisive change in the intellectual point of view.

> The religious meaning of this change lies in the substitution of an attitude of surrender, of contemplation of the spiritual essence of things in their immediate givenness and meaning, for the dominating, bourgeois attitude which tears things to pieces and then seeks to reconstruct them (RS 75).

Phenomenology recognized a world of essence and truth which lies beyond the stream of time, and reintroduced a stream of mysticism into modern philosophy. This is of "decisive importance for the destruction of the self-sufficient attitude of finite existence" (RS 76). Finally, Tillich comments on pragmatism, which, he says, "is an almost picturesque expression of that attitude of domination over things which prevails in capitalist society" (RS 77), and "indicates the pre-critical but also the fundamentally pre-spiritual character of the American mind" (RS 77). (This last prompts Niebuhr to make the tart comment, in a footnote, that Tillich would have been well advised to remember "those limitations of all serious discussion of which he speaks in the Preface and Introduction," and to indicate that Tillich doesn't know what he is talking about here!)

The second chapter in this section is entitled "Metaphysics." Tillich observes that the attitude of the nineteenth century toward metaphysics is rejection. It is based on "faith in the self-sufficiency of the world and its forms--which itself is metaphysical." But this rejection is being challenged, and there is once again a serious consideration of metaphysics. Tillich defines metaphysics as "an independent, essentially religious attitude of direction toward the unconditioned. It uses scientific contents in order to express, symbolically, that element of transcendence which is effective in and which supports knowledge (RS 80-81). The current interest in metaphysics is not, however, in a metaphysics of being, but in a metaphysics of history. Tillich feels that the search is for a metaphysics of history which is not naively utopian, and which takes into account the freedom and the demonic as well as the divine qualities of the human spirit and its historical creations. Faith in progress has been broken. The presence of the eternal in tima and history has been recognized, and this is "extremely important for the religious situation of the present" (RS 82). A new metaphysics, says Tillich, "is the task of a whole time . . . to see itself and its situation in the presence of eternity" (RS 83).

"Art" is the title of the third chapter in the first section. Tillich deals with this subject under two headings: I. "Painting, Sculpture, Architecture and the Dance," II. "Literature."

I. "Painting, Sculpture, Architecture and the Dance." In an often quoted passage from this chapter, Tillich says,

> Art indicates what the character of a spiritual situation is; it does this more immediately and directly than do science and philosophy for it is less burdened by objective considerations (RS 85).

The art of the nineteenth century was naturalism and impressionism. These art forms reveal a quiet, sure confidence in man's ability to grasp and shape the world. Both limit the mind to finite forms and surface qualities. Neither attempts to penetrate to the essence of things, to that which is not grasped and shaped by the mind, but is simply there, grasping and shaping the mind. At the beginning of the modern period, some artists attempted to go beyond these forms. They broke up nature and its finite forms, not merely for the sake of an impression, but in an attempt to express the creative, vital, demonic-divine depth of the world. This was followed by a period of what Tillich calls "brutal realism," which mercilessly depicted the empty surfaces of bourgeois culture, which rejected all romantic expressions of this culture and all superficial beautification. Tillich thought he saw emerging a new art-form which he called "belief-ful realism." This would depict reality as it appeared, and at the same time penetrate to its depths.

About sculpture Tillich has little to say, simply noting that it follows lines similar to painting. In architecture, expressionistic forms appear only rarely. One example is the Chile House in Hamburg--a bank which tries, in its structure, to break through the self-sufficient finite limitedness of the times, and to create a meaningful space for economic activity. In a brief discussion of the dance, Tillich mentions various groups in which the defeat of individualism is expressed in dance forms, but he thinks the dance movement has a tendency to become a self-sufficient ritual.

His conclusion about art is that in it metaphysical meanings can only be expressed, not created. This is because "eternity is first of all the 'no' which is uttered against time" (RS 93). The temporal forms can only point toward the eternal, they cannot be the eternal.

II. "Literature." Tillich says, "the influence of literature on the religious situation of the period, by virtue of the superiority of words over lines and colors, is both more direct and more general than is the influence of art" (RS 94). He discusses the works of Zola, Ibsen, Flaubert, and Baudelair. He is of the opinion that these writers, while protesting the capitalist spirit, never really escape it. Strindberg, however, goes beyond the bourgeois period. His figures become symbolic and transparent. The boundaries of reality become vague.

Hauptmann and Hoffman also attempt to loosen up the fixed forms of reality established by the natural sciences. Tillich mentions a number of poets who attempt to break through the forms of the previous period, and claims that Rilke is most significant because he has a real religious sense of the ultimate in time. Steffan George is also highly significant. Tillich says of him, "his union of the classic with the catholic spirit in a highly disciplined style, was one of the most powerful protests against the spirit of capitalist society" (RS 97). Tillich finds Nietzsche's battle against hypocrisy and his attempt to express a dynamic flow of primal forces of will-to-power and erotic drive is very important in the struggle against the capitalist spirit. He feels that Dostoevski's figures do this but his characters are not perceived thus by Western men, and are appreciated only aesthetically, not religiously.

Literature was influenced by the wars and revolutions which marked the end of the old period.

> It is highly significant for our situation that no literature affirming and glorifying was was produced . . . The war was experienced everywhere as a catastrophe of culture, as the unmasking of the demonic character of capitalist society (RS 100).

Tillich's conclusion about literature is that

> . . . the realism and impressionism of the capitalist period have been destroyed in the development of symbolism, mysticism and expressionism but that a new realism is about to gain ascendancy . . . it has uncovered the demonism present in the social world and . . . it may be at the point of developing into a *belief-ful realism* (RS 101).

The second major section of the book has to do with Politics and Ethics. The chapter on "The Political Sphere" is in three parts:

I. "Economics and Sociology," II. "Nation and Mankind," III. "The State and the Constitution."

I. "Economics and Sociology." Tillich observes that capitalist society lives within itself by its preoccupation with the activities of the market place. Here things are dealt with, and dominated, by being transformed into "wares" which are exchanged, acquired, and disposed of with no attempt made to establish a sense of community between the person and the thing. This releases men from the bondage that comes from regarding things as holy, but men tend to be swallowed up by the endless process of producing and distributing wares. Personality is emancipated from things only to be re-enslaved by the unending, ever-increasing, life-consuming service of unlimited wants which are engendered by capitalist economy. All the other life-functions are subordinated to this one. The individual has no time to engage in reflection or meditation, or to consider things beyond time. Moreover, the market places force men into a war of all against all, a war that is a kind of built-in feature of the market place. This in turn creates classes and class conflicts. And it also creates, particularly among the workers, the "mass"--an artificial bringing together of individuals who have lost all individuality. Says Tillich, "the mechanized mass and its instinctive movements are the terrible, destructive by-products of the demonic element in the capitalist spirit" (RS 111). In capitalist society, spirit becomes reduced to a mere manager of things. Capitalist society sunders the reference of spirit to the eternal.

Socialism made a very great and very important protest against this state of affairs. But, says Tillich, the capitalist spirit conquered the socialist movement in part because socialism had to take the part of the worker, and had to deal with capitalist society in the terms of that society, so that socialism came to accept the thought patterns of the capitalist period and has not yet been able to break out of these thought patterns (RS 113). Various efforts were made within socialism to overcome its tendency to become capitalist in spirit, but these attempts were not successful. Romantic elements entered socialism, and romanticism cannot cope with the capitalist spirit. Religious socialism wants to penetrate socialism from the standpoint of religion, in which the eternal is seen as judging time, but it is not apparent that it will be successful. Tillich says, the economic order of capitalism has been shaken, and the tremors cannot be quited, but where this is going to come out is not clear (RS 116).

II. "Nation and Mankind." Tillich's first observation is that capitalist society is basically opposed to nationalism, and would eliminate nations if it could. It sees all men as united in a world-wide capitalist economy. Indeed, nations like England and France conceive it to be their divine vocation to spread capitalist society over the entire world. This, however, engenders resistance on the part of those nations which are exploited by the stronger capitalist nations. Capitalist society seeks to destroy this resistance, and the sense of nationalism which it fosters. And something is lost. "Mechanization and the formation of industrial masses have led to the loss of a living relation to the soil, to the homeland, to the native tongue, the common life and the spirit of the nation" (RS 120). The proletariat cannot feel any national sense, it is one only with the proletariat around the world. Socialists have little interest in the wars between nations, but they are not pacifists in the class wars. In spite of the fact that capitalism is fundamentally hostile to nationalism, it has apparently been able to capture the nationalistic spirit in most nations, and has made nations like America, France, and England feel that their national destiny is identical with the destiny of capitalist society.

III. "The State and the Constitution." The concept of the State in capitalistic society is very revealing of its real spirit, says Tillich. It is completely secular, exists solely to protect economic activity, has no ultimate meaning, no original sanctity, and is simply a technical machine. Even Marx and Lenin reflect this devaluation of the state by suggesting that the day will come when the state will simply disappear. This utopian idea is hardly able to effectively deal with the power of the capitalist state. Tillich wants to develop a concept of the state which would recover a sense of the vocation of the state, of its being one of the divine orders. He would like the relation of rulers and ruled to acquire some kind of sanctity, and not be simply a matter of manipulation. But he cannot see how this can happen in a democracy, especially as democracy is practiced in capitalist countries. This democracy is not a true democracy; it is a democracy of the middle classes. The middle class runs the state in capitalist society. It creates its "majorities" and when, for one reason or another it finds that it cannot control the state, it simply overthrows it. In conservative political theory, there is a kind of romantic feeling for the state, but it is aristocratic and too unrealistic to create the kind of state Tillich would like to see. On the whole, says Tillich, this topic has not received close enough attention. More effort is needed to attain theoretical clarity in this important realm of thought.

Chapter Two of this section is "The Ethical Sphere." Tillich treats it under three headings: I. "Social Problems," II. "Body and Soul," III. "Educational and Moral Ideals."

I. "Social Problems." Tillich begins his discussion of this topic with a few observations of the German Youth Movement. He says it was a protest against the spirit of capitalist society. Youth tried to recapture a sense of community, a love of nature, spontaneity, even religion. Mystical literature became popular. But the Movement was not able to do anything serious simply because it was made up of youth. When these youth became old, it became apparent that no structure had been created within the Youth Movement to oppose the structure of capitalist society. The movement was important, however, in that a whole generation revolted, for a time at least, against the spirit of capitalist society.

Tillich then takes up the social problems involved in sex, education, and medicine.

The problem of sex, in the present situation, is that the sacramental character of marriage, which was destroyed by Protestantism and secularized by capitalist society, has been lost. This means that there is no longer any sense of the eternal present in the relation between the sexes. Marriage has become an effort of one individual to unite with another individual, and, on the basis of this union, to create some meaning for life. This is impossible.

> Individuality can unite with individuality in living community only in the presence of a third superior individual. A community of life which does not rest on the foundation of the eternal is valid only for a time, even though this time coincides more or less accidentally with the total span of an individual life (RS 137).

In medicine, the relation of patient to physician has lost its priestly character. The physician deals with the body as a machine, and with its separate organs, but not with the whole person as a living structure. Psychoanalysis has tended to take the place of the confessional, but it fails primarily because it does not have, in the relationship between the analyst and the patient, any reference to anything beyond them. Between priest and parishioner there is always the reference to God, and from this comes the possibility of genuine healing.

Tillich finds a great deal of interest in the culture of the body--sports, gymnastics, physical culture--but feels that this emphasis is onesided. When it becomes professionalized, as in professional sports, this interest tends to become a romantic worship of the sports hero. There has been a lack of concern to master either the body or life.

The problem in education arises out of the pedagogy of capitalist society, in which there is no reference to anything beyond the present, and no real community. Things are studied, not for their own sake, but for the sake of learning how to master them. Any general liberal education tends to be limited to the scions of the ruling bourgeoisie and becomes a class symbol. Unfortunately, the masses are excluded from an education which leads to an appreciation of the general human venture; those who do receive such an education are not much affected by it. The ruling class are trained to become technicians in the market place. Protests have arisen against this pedagogy, but for the most part they have been futile. For the most part, they have not escaped the spirit of capitalist society and its exclusive preoccupation with the finite, the limited, and the manageable.

"Humanity" is the ideal of capitalist society. All possible human values are to be incorporated into individuals, and somehow in an organized form. The goal is to develop free individuals who are able to engage in free association with the greatest number of other free individuals. But there is no super-human element in all this. There is no judgment, no measuring scale other than the individuals themselves. This leads to mediocrity, as Nietzsche rightly pointed out. Unfortunately, Nietzsche's solution--Ubermensch--has become mixed up with theories of racial and national superiority. The kind of naturalism that has grown out of this is brutal.

Tillich sums up this section by saying that it would appear that the spirit of capitalism will prevail for some time, despite all the attacks made against it. There are some breakthroughs beyond this spirit in science and in art, but there are very few in politics, ethics, and economics.

The third major section of the book deals with what is formally called religion in Western civilization. There are three chapters: "Mysticism Outside the Churches," "Eschatological Movements," and "The Religious Situation in the Churches." The chapter on mysticism deals with two types: I. "Esthetic Mysticism," and II. "Occult Mysticism."

I. "Esthetic Mysticism." Mysticism is a form of protest against the spirit of capitalist society. It denies capitalism's denaial that man has a relation to something beyond time and space. In esthetic mysticism there is an interest in the documents of Eastern religions which are translated and read with interest. But, says Tillich, this interest is not serious. It plays with ideas. Unlike genuine mysticism, the esthetic mystics use mysticism to escape rather than to strengthen the religious institutions of the period.

II. "Occult Mysticism." In Tillich's opinion, all forms of Occult mysticism posit a world "next to" this world, which is not truly the eternal. Relations with this "other" world, therefore, are not genuine religious relations.

> In this mysticism of the second order intensification of human consciousness is always confused with the religious attitude. Self-sufficient finitude has been split; it is divided into a lower and a higher sphere, but it is not transcended, for even the higher world remains world, while in genuine mysticism the world in all its degrees vanishes in the presence of the invisible Beyond, of the Eternal itself. Occultism as such cannot overcome the spirit of self-sufficient finitude (RS 171).

The second chapter deals with eschatological movements. Tillich points out that eschatology, in capitalist society, means unending progress. This idea has been seriously challenged. Nietzsche and Spengler predicted the end of Western civilization. Socialism was more optimistic with its expectation of the coming of an utopian society. Religious Socialism tries to correct utopianism with the idea of the "Kairos" which is "fulfilled time, the moment of time which is invaded by eternity . . . not perfect completion in time" (RS 176).

Tillich takes note of the presence within religion of eschatologically oriented sects. Unfortunately, these sects do not want to do anything about the present, because their membership is limited to those who have given up hope for the present. Their membership is therefore limited and intentionally ineffective in the present situation--and also extremely self-righteous, which alienates them further from other groups in the present which are working to change the present rather than abandon it.

In the final chapter, Tillich discusses the religious situation in the churches. The divisions of this chapter are: I. "Catholicism," II. "Judaism," III. "Protestantism."

I. "Catholicism." Catholicism is in direct opposition to the spirit of capitalist society. Moreover, it is a society of which predates capitalist society, and therefore it has a more secure "base of operations" than other movements opposing capitalist society. Unfortunately, this society, says Tillich, has much the same spirit of self-sufficiency and refusal to be judged by the eternal. This makes the conflict a conflict between two self-sufficient realms. But, says Tillich, the victory over capitalist society is simply not going to be a return to the Holy Roman Empire. Greek Catholicism, of course, does not propose this, but since it lives on a level of primitive mysticism quite impossible for modern man to understand, it cannot provide help in the contemporary situation. Its influence on Western culture is necessarily indirect and roundabout, through representatives of Russian Orthodoxy in Western nations. The catastrophe through which the Russian spirit is going, makes it highly unlikely that it will have any essential role to play in the religious situation of the West.

II. "Judaism." Tillich first indicates the striking similarity between the spirit of capitalist society, Protestantism, and Judaism:

> The close connection between religion and morality, the high evaluation of personality, the de-valuation of the sacramental sphere, the secularization of nature, the exhaltation of the law, religiously inspired inter-worldly activity, all these characteristics Judaism shares with Protestantism and capitalist society (RS 189).

This means that Judaism has been able to enter and participate in capitalistic society, although the spirit of ancient prophecy has not been completely ruled out of Judaism. Orthodox Judaism, in its ghetto world, carries no weight in the present situation, however. And Jewish mysticism is directed too much toward the future. The problem, basically, is that Judaism is too closely inter-related with the capitalist system, largely because large circles of Jews are bound up exclusively with a commercial kind of life.

III. "Protestantism." The more extended discussion which Tillich gives to Protestantism is divided into two parts: a) Protestantism and Culture, and b) Religious Life in Protestantism.

a) Protestantism and Culture. The point here is that the culture of Protestantism is the culture of capitalist society, which makes it extremely difficult for Protestantism to effectively challenge capitalist society. Originally, says Tillich, Protestantism was the strongest kind of protest imaginable against all self-sufficient forms of life. In its struggle against the basis of the medieval world, however, Protestantism became bedfellow with Humanism. Between them they created the autonomous culture which is now in crisis. The rulers of this culture are also the rulers of the Protestant churches. This is because Lutheranism substituted German princes for bishops, and Calvinism substituted "outstanding citizens." Thus Protestantism is finding it difficult to effectively criticize the culture which it is, in fact, undergirding.

b) Religious Life in Protestantism. Tillich discusses three forms of Protestant religious life. They are: Orthodoxy, Pietism, and Rationalism. Rationalism--liberal Protestantism--is not respected by autonomous culture because "it does not have the power to oppose culture" (RS 208). Orthodoxy has the strength derived from the fact that "it encourages preaching to tap the springs of the pre-capitalist, prophetic and priestly spirit in religion" (RS 209). Beyond this, however, since it half rejects capitalism (for the wrong reasons) and half accepts it through compromises, it "has shown no evidence of ability to conquer the capitalist spirit" (RS 209). Pietism, with its individualistic strain, reinforces the individualism of capitalistic society. The resurgence of the power of the churches is in reality an effort to use the power of Protestantism to reinforce capitalist society. The liturgical revivals, rather than drawing on the strength of the past

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for effectual protest in the present, do not come to grips with the present, but seem to have a preoccupation with repeating forms from the past.

Only in the realm of Protestant theology does Tillich see any glimmer of hope in the church. He sees this in the recovery of interest in the essential nature of religion. He is impressed with Otto's The Idea of the Holy, and the breakthrough beyond Kant that this work represents. He thinks the renaissance of interest in Luther might be significant, but is uncertain of its success. He is impressed with Barth's stress on the transcendence of God, but is disappointed in Barth's open disinterest in the present situation which, thinks Tillich, only reinforces the complacency of the present time.

As a matter of fact, Tillich finds little going on in the churches in the way of an attack upon the spirit of capitalist society. Movements that are at all effective are outside the church. Those who want to participate in the present religious situation must engage themselves, meaningfully and responsibly, in the battle against the spiritual temper of the nineteenth century, and "it is demanded of them that they think and speak about the religious situation of the time with unconditioned active responsibility" (RS 219).

Tillich's remark about Kierkegaard applies to his own work. He said, "you cannot get anything out of Kierkegaard without reading him in his own works, without subjecting yourself to the power and aggressiveness of his style" ("Kierkegaard in English," American Scandinavian Review, Vol. XXX, September, 1942, p. 255). The short summary presented here certainly is no substitute for reading The

Religious Situation, which is itself a summary statement. The importance of this little book for understanding Tillich's theology can hardly be overstated. Here is Tillich's understanding of the "temporal situation" which was one pole of all his theological work. Its main characteristics are: the spirit of self-sufficient finitude which predominates, and the growing protest against this spirit. This protest, expressed for the most part outside the institutional churches, is the most significant "creative self-interpretation of existence" in our time. It is the "situation" of the present, and the theologian who wishes to address the present, must come to grips with it.

The importance of this book is that it shows Tillich doing the work of a "theologian of culture." It shows Tillich finding it necessary to range over matters like science, art, philosophy, psychology, sociology, medicine, politics, education, literature, and extra-churchly quasi-religious groups in order to penetrate to the religious meaning of the present situation. It shows him examining this material from the point of view of a Christian theologian's concern for the relation to "the Eternal." It is significant that Tillich has said that it was in 1925 that he began work on his Systematic Theology. Die Religiose Lage de Gegenwart appeared in 1926. One could, with considerable justification, regard this work as the first volume of the Systematic Theology, for it works out in some considerable detail the "temporal situation" that is the "polar element" of Tillich's theology.

Almost twenty years later, at the end of the Second World War, Tillich again presented a statement of "the present situation." This time he wrote from an American vantage point, and the intervening years had seen him vigorously participating in the "World Situation" of which he writes. It will be worthwhile to examine the ideas presented in this essay, which appears as the first chapter in a little book entitled *The Christian Answer* (Ed. Henry P. Van Dusen, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945 pp. 1-44). It is entitled simply, "The World Situation."

Tillich first observes that it is possible now to speak of a "world situation," since "the forces which are transforming civilization are dominant not only in Europe and America," but have drawn Asia, Africa, and Australasia also "within a single revolutionary vortex" ("TWS" 1). The material is presented under six main headings: I. The General Character of the Present World Situation, II. The Present World Situation as Revealed in Man's Cultural Life, III. The Present World Situation Reflected in the Economic, Political, and International Spheres, IV. The Present World Situation in the Intellectual Realm, V. Christianity in the Present World Situation, VI. Guideposts for the Christian Answer. It is obvious from these headings that Tillich intends to cover the same terrain of *The Religious Situation*.

Instead of using the term "capitalist society," he now speaks of "the manifestation of bourgeois society." This he divides into three main periods: "the period of bourgeois revolutions," "the period of victorious bourgeoisie," and "the present crisis in civilization" ("TWS" 2).

During the first period, there was a marked "belief in reason" as "the guiding principle" ("TWS" 2). Reason, in that period, was "the power of truth and justice embodied in man as man" ("TWS" 2). The ever-present presupposition was "the belief that the liberation of reason in every person would lead to the realization of a universal humanity and to a system of harmony between individuals and society" ("TWS" 3). In all areas of life, it was felt, there is a pre-established harmony which, if it were freed from arbitrary interference from authority--religious or state, would bring about a new world of peace and prosperity for all. Under this banner all authorities were overturned, and the bourgeoisie were triumphantly freed from the control of church and state and enabled to pursue their own destiny.

During the second period, the period of the victorious bourgeoisie, the new ruling classes made certain compromises with the remnants of feudalism and absolutism. "They sacrificed reason as the principle of truth and justice, and employed it mainly as a tool in the service of technical society" ("TWS" 4). Reason now became "technical reason" concerned with means but not ends. Using technical reason, man rapidly transformed the face of the earth. He created a "second nature"--a world-wide economic system of production. But this "second nature" proved to be a _Frankenstein_ monster which could not be controlled. The decisive feature of this period was "_the loss of control by human reason of man's historical existence_" ("TWS" 5).

We are now in the third period, which maintains the main features of the second period, but, faced with the obvious insufficiencies of the principle of automatic harmony, is seeking means of gaining some control over the "second nature created by the second period" ("TWS" 6). The first attempts at this are the totalitarianisms of the Fascist and Soviet systems. The characteristic feature of this third period is "planning reason" which is "the determining principle of our present world situation" ("TWS" 7). Tillich is not out of sympathy with this.

> The logic of bourgeois society in its struggle for survival is expressed in the development of reason from "revolutionary reason" through "technical reason" to "planning reason." This development must be held clearly in mind in every analysis of the present situation. . . . faith in automatic harmony cannot be re-established among the masses for whom it has meant oscillation between war, boom, depression and war renewed through thirty years. We must go forward toward an organization of society which avoids both totalitarian absolutism and liberal individualism ("TWS" 7,8).

Tillich introduces the biblical symbol of "Leviathon"--the all-consuming monster, and suggests that while the bourgeois revolutionaries were right to combat Leviathon when he appeared withe the face of late-medieval authoritarianism, they failed to recognize him when he assumed another face--"the all-embracing mechanism of capitalist economy." Today, he presents still another face--"totalitarian organization of national life" ("TWS" 8). He observes that "Christianity must give its message to a world in which Leviathon in its different aspects threatens all human existence to its very roots" ("TWS" 8).

II. The Present World Situation as Revealed in Man's Cultural Life. In this section Tillich wishes to show the impact upon personality and community in the present situation, since these, "in their interdependence are the very substance and basis of all social structure" ("TWS" 9). In its first period, bourgeois society wished to create a situation in which individuals could fully develop and a true community of fully developed individuals could emerge. Just the opposite actually happened. Tillich illustrates this by referring to four portraits (a Giotto, a Rembrandt, a Titian, and a Sargent), and shows the transition from the ideal of an individual "possessed and elevated beyond his individual character and personal experience" (Giotto's Francis of Assisi), to an individual "strong, lonely, tragic but unbroken . . . expressing the ideals of personality of a humanistic protestantism" (Rembrandt's self-portrait), and then to "individuals with highly developed intellectuality and strong will . . . the bearers of technical reason, the creators of large-scale world economy, . . . the anonymous directors of the world-wide mechanism of capitalistic society" (Titian and Sargent). Tillich says, this development prepares the way "for the Fascist type in which the last remnants of the classical and humanistic ideals of personality are completely lost" ("TWS" 10).

The trouble with the ideal of personality in bourgeois society is that the majority of individuals--the masses--cannot share in the realization of this goal. They are forced to be spectators of others' achievements. And even the privileged few do not really achieve this, since reason has been reduced to technical reason, and men are cut off from the depths of human reason which alone makes fulfillment of individuality possible. Technical reason even sought to rationalize and control the unconscious forces of human life ("TWS" 12).

A similar development took place in the sphere of community. Genuine community is lost. The individuals of bourgeois society have no common spiritual ground, and no common spiritual goal. Communities disintegrate into "masses" ("TWS" 13).

> Masses have neither common ground nor common purposes. They are driven in their objective existence by the incalculable movements of the mechanism of production, subjectively by the laws of mass psychology. This was the main sociological feature of the second period of bourgeois society ("TWS" 13).

Various attempts made in the third period to recover the lost sense of community have created groups which demand a conscious surrender of the individual to the collective. "These are consciously dehumanized groups of human beings, very different from the automatically dehumanized masses of the nineteenth century" ("TWS" 14). But they are not real communities, and the dehumanizing process is carried through to its logical end in these groups.

Tillich discusses the transformation of personality and community in terms of the changes that have occurred in the philosophy and method of education. The ideal of education, growing out of the principles of the first period, called for the education of everyone, the induction of all men into the world of reasonable human beings.

> But the humanistic ideal for education could not touch the masses. It requires favorable circumstances which society provides only for the few--a large measure of economic independence, outstanding intellectual abilities, rearing within a tradition of culture, etc. ("TWS" 15).

So the ideal of the first period is replaced in the second period by the ideal of a technical education for all. Education became education for "adjustment" to the needs of capitalist society. On the face of it, education was "liberal" and perhaps even "Christian," but in reality it was in bondage to Leviathon.

> . . . education becomes induction into a fighting, and eventually ruling, group. Rational criticism is excluded. Knowledge for

> its own sake is discounted. Everything is related to the ultimate purpose of this group. . . . Education for death . . . expresses this final form of education in the service of Leviathon. . . . standardized communication . . . tends to create standardized men who are all too susceptible to propaganda for old or new totalitarian purposes ("TWS" 17,18).

In the third period, Leviathon takes over the educational processes.

III. The Present World Situation Reflected in the Economic, Political, and International Spheres. In this section Tillich first notes that the laissez faire assumption of bourgeois economics was never completely practiced or ever in complete control. Since the beginning of the present century, there has been a marked trend away from the unrestrained pursuit of each individual's own purposes in the market place. "The present phase of economic development is determined primarily by state interference with the self-destructive mechanism of the capitalist economy" ("TWS" 20). But all measures so far have been half-way and ineffective. The question now is: Shall we return to monopolistic economy or move into an unified economy which is neither totalitarianism nor a war expedient ("TWS" 20)? Christianity, as such, has no technical advice in economic matters. What it can demand, however, is that the Leviathon quality of the system of production which "absorbs the creative powers of . . . souls by ruthless competition, fear, despair, and the sense of utter meaninglessness" be recognized and attacked ("TWS" 21).

Politically, the fighting bourgeoisie conquered absolutism with the weapon of democracy. But this democracy was always limited, by various devices, to protect the bourgeois upper classes. Today a marked anti-democratic trend is noticeable in all the democratic countries

("TWS" 22). It takes three forms: fascism, reactionism, and bureaucracy.("TWS" 23). These are temporary measures to protect society as it is, but when the point is reached that minorities within the democracies no longer accept the majority's decisions, democracy will crumble. Tillich suggests that we make a distinction between democracy as a way of life and democracy as a constitutional procedure. He wonders if it may not be necessary to modify democracy as a political process, in order to insure democracy as a way of life in which justice and the dignity of every human being are protected ("TWS" 24). At any rate, Christianity's task is to combat Leviathan whether "he present himself through democratic or authoritarian structures" ("TWS" 23).

> Christianity must declare that, in the next period of history, those political forms are right which are able to produce and maintain a community in which the chronic fear of a miserable and meaningless life for the masses is abolished, and in which every man participates creatively in the self-realization of the community, whether local, nation, regional or international ("TWS" 24).

This leads to a discussion of the international situation. Tillich shows that the balance of power theory, based upon a strong belief in the notion of pre-established harmony, worked for a time, especially while most of the world was an economic frontier-land. But now "world" is a reality, and the sovereignty of nations competing with one another in a world-wide economic market place has produced sharper and sharper conflicts, until it is realized that something has to be done. The old League of Nations had attempted some kind of control, but it was ambiguous since it did not strike at the heart of the matter --unlimited, absolute, national sovereignty. Fascism was another attempt. It imposed unity on the nations of Europe through conquest and the abolition of national boundaries. This resulted in hatred for the conqueror and a fanatically aroused sense of patriotism in the conquered nations, which only increased the power of nationalism. Such an artificially established harmony destroys creative freedom. Some think that the answer is some form of world federation. Tillich is in sympathy with this: "To the latter Christianity may lend its support" ("TWS" 26). But at the same time it must stress that there is a necessity for a common spirit within each federation of nations ("TWS" 27). This is a long way off.

IV. The Present World Situation in the Intellectual Realm. The intellectual is concerned with truth. In the first period of bourgeois society, reason was conceived as the organ of truth, and the quest for truth was identical with the development of humanity. Truth was conceived of as truth about life as a whole. Using the method of mathematics, the intent was to construct a "natural system of thought and life" ("TWS" 27). In the second period, the nineteenth century, "the spirit of the times became skeptical, positivistic, and conservative in every respect with the single exception of technical science" ("TWS" 27).

> Following the breakdown of belief in rational truth as the determining factor in life, "technical reason"--not aspiring to provide truth but merely to furnish means toward the realization of ends determined by instinct and will--became decisive throughout the world as far as the dominance of Western influence reaches ("TWS" 28).

The consequences of this development for man's self-understanding were devastating. Man divided himself into two parts, and made each part an object to be studied, observed, and treated as an element in the universal mechanism of nature. Man thus lost himself, his self-estrangement was "the price he had to pay to modern science and economy" ("TWS" 29). Many protests were made against this dehumanization of man, but the "tremendous success of natural and technical science doomed every theoretical protest against their universal applicability to futility" ("TWS" 29). Art reflected the spirit of the time. Naturalism simply reflected the spirit of capitalist society. Any realism which became too accurate a portrayal of the ugliness of that spirit was simply rejected. Impressionism was the reverse side of naturalism, a subjective naturalism which cultivated aesthetic intuition but which fled from objective reality with its distortions and horrors ("TWS" 29).

Expressionism and surrealism in art gave an indication of the rise of the third period.

> Expressionism has been well characterized as the warning of the earthquake which was approaching. In surrealism, the mechanisms of bourgeois society are used and cut into fragments at the same time, the real world disappears and objectivity is transformed into a phatasmogoria constructed of pieces and fragments of the bourgeois reality. A panic-driven humanity reveals the doom of its world in its artistic and poetic creations ("TWS" 30).

The result of the breakdown of mechanistic naturalism was the demand for "knowledge concerned with life in which the very existence of the knower himself is involved" ("TWS" 31). This demand is for existential truth. But there are many philosophies of existence. Tillich mentions Kierkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche, Bergson, James, and the apostles of the Social Gospel.

> In each of these definitions of existence, truth has a different content; but in each of them truth is a matter of fate and

> decision, not of detached observation or of ultimate rational principles. Nevertheless, it is claimed to be truth, possessing universal validity though not general necessity. It is supposed to be verifiable by subsequent experience, although not in the fashion of scientific experimentation ("TWS" 31,32).

This existential interpretation of truth tends to support the mechanism of the "second nature," thinks Tillich, because it surrenders reason and uses only technical rationality for its nonrational purposes. Totalitarian regimes can dictate which "truth" is to be expressed, and "technical reason is employed to execute the commands of an existential decision above which there is no rational criteria" ("TWS" 33). This misuse of existential truth creates a demand for a truth in which existential truth and universal truth can be united. Christianity faced a demand like this in its earliest period. Its answer then was the Logos doctrine of the Christ. Today, says Tillich, Christianity must give essentially the same answer though in different terms, and with different intellectual tools" ("TWS" 33).

> Christianity must seek to develop the Church toward an inclusive reality which unites different existential interpretations as far as they are compatible with each other and with Christian principles. The more the Church succeeds in this the more readily it can receive rational truth as an inherent part of Christian faith. If rational truth, with its contributions to the different realms of knowledge, is excluded, Christian faith necessarily becomes sectarian and exclusive. If existential truth with its practical bearing on religious and ethical activity is excluded, Christian faith becomes relativistic and sterile. Only by a proper union of the two can the intellectual needs of our present situation be met ("TWS" 33).

Thus Tillich moves to a consideration of Christianity in the present world situation.

V. Christianity in the Present World Situation. Christianity has had to deal with many different cultures and philosophies, and has always been able to adapt itself to new situations more or less successfully. But the Christian message is more than something to be merely adapted to a situation. It must also transcend every particular situation. "Therefore the role of Christianity today can be seen as one both of adaptation to, and transcendence over, the present world situation" ("TWS" 34).

Christianity has adjusted itself to the character of the present society, and itself has been drawn into the destructive consequences and contradictions of the present stage in history. It helped to create the autonomous culture in which we live through the attacks made upon Roman Catholic authoritarianism. This struggle in part created the secular sphere which today has invaded and mastered the sphere of the churches. "Thus religion itself became secularized and was drawn into the conflicts and contradictions of the new society" ("TWS" 34). Tillich traces this process in the major areas of our society.

The growth of the secular arts, and the secularization of the religious arts with their sterility, shows that within the Christian Churches a genuine religious reality has been lost. The Churches have been slow to realize this, and have failed to press for a new unity of cult and art in a genuine, expressive, religious style.

Religious personality and religious community have also disappeared. The transcendent center of personal life was destroyed, and despite all efforts to recover the "existential personality," the totalitarian "impersonal personality" remains ("TWS" 35-36). Religious community was destroyed by the removal of objective beliefs and sacraments.

Totalitarian efforts to create fighting groups with an unconditional devotion and a dominating spiritual center have resulted only in quasi-religions, fanatical orders that swallow up both personality and community ("TWS" 36).

In the intellectual realm, the possibility of religious knowledge has been pushed aside. "Either it is repudiated altogether or it is relegated to a corner, or it is transformed by secular interpretations. . . . Religious ideas are drawn down to the level of physical or psychological objects. . . . Faith becomes one emotion among others. . . . These transformations bring religious knowledge into subjection to rational knowledge, and thus destroys its ultimate character" ("TWS" 37). God is no longer "the presence in every reality of the transcendent source of being and meaning" but becomes a matter of argument or of irrational belief. Totalitarianism has stepped into the vacuum created by the failure of Christian theology to express an ultimate reality and spiritual center in terms of religious belief, and has tried to introduce an ultimate reality that is not really ultimate but which can command the loyalty of its followers ("TWS" 37-38).

The churches that broke from Rome tended to become agencies of the state or ruling class. They were unable to conquer Leviathan, instead they supported it. When the system was attacked, it was only natural that the attack should also be directed against the churches. Protestantism is especially affected by this, and more especially liberal Protestantism. The Church must find a way to escape being a mere servant to the social and cultureal system that is now crumbling. But it cannot turn either to totalitarianism (pagan or Catholic) or to the aloof attitude of Orthodoxy.

But the churches have not only supported and adapted themselves to capitalist society. They have also protested against it. By accepting the reign of reason, the churches have liberated themselves from many superstitious elements in the historical tradition, and thus it can make its message intelligible to the modern mind. In three ways, Christianity has borne the Christian message through the high tide of technical rationality. Traditional theology has preserved the treasures of the past, even when there was no way for them to be comprehended. There have been many attempts at mediation in theology which have sought to reformulate the Christian message in the light of the questions of the times. There has been what Tillich calls the dialectic approach in theology.

> The dialectic approach rejects the otherworldliness through which the first type seeks to preserve the Christian tradition. It breaks the protecting shell to reveal the relevance of its content to our time. But it does not intercept [sic. probably should be "interpret"] this content through the ideas of our period . . . Rather it relates these to each other in radical criticism. . . . It delights to declare "No" and "Yes" in the same breath. It is due to this type of Christian interpretation that both the dangers of all types of adaptation to current thought and also the riches and profundities of tradition have again become visible within the Churches ("TWS" 41).

Tillich observes that Christianity has used reason in the practical sphere and emancipated Christian personality from all forms of patriarchal community, and opened it to receive the riches of humanism. But it also has transcended the demonic powers of the modern world in various ways, and he lists pietism, the ethical concern of mediating theology, and the paradoxical type of theology which arose as a result of a protest against a merely ethical rendering of Christianity. Pietism kept the warmth, intensity, and creative power of personal relationship with God alive. The mediating theology enabled Christianity to penetrate into various areas of contemporary culture. And the theology of paradox "stressed the paradoxical character of all individual Christian existence, denied and affirmed by God at the same time" ("TWS" 41-42).

So the Christian community has had a profound influence in the modern world despite its partial secularization. This is especially seen in the resistence offered by the Christian masses to the attempts by pagan totalitarianisms to replace Christianity by tribal cults. And "the deeper meaning of the present world situation is not unknown to many individuals and groups within the Churches" ("TWS" 43).

VI. Guideposts for the Christian Answer. Tillich has five points to make:

1. The Christian message must be borne out of the depths of our present historical situation if it is to be effective. "These depths are not simply the depths of suffering or of profound insight or of proletariat revolution or of personal communion but something of all of these, and more" ("TWS" 43).

2. Christianity must not try to turn back the clock. It must accept the positive contributions of the modern period, particularly the elevation of reason as the principle of truth. "This is truly a Christian issue even if it is fought out largely in humanistic terms" ("TWS" 44).

3. Christianity must not suppose that the tragedy of the present situation is limited to this situation alone, something that is not rooted in the general human situation, something that can be finally eliminated. "The authentic Christian message is never utopian" ("TWS" 44).

4. Christianity must not turn its back on the present situation, since "it affirms that the influence of divine grace is never absent from any historical situation" ("TWS" 44).

5. Finally, "the Christian answer must be at the same time both theoretical and practical. It will have reality only if it is the answer in action as well as in interpretation of men and women deeply involved in wrestling with the time ("TWS" 44).

This last point was well-taken by Tillich himself, and a biography of his life might well take this as its "text." His life as a theologian of the church was surely both theoretical and practical, and it can be said of him that he was "deeply involved in wrestling with the time."

A comparison of these two statements of the present situation--the early book, and this later essay--shows that Tillich has taken into account the rise of totalitarianism. The present situation is still seen as the last stage of capitalist society, and the Fascist and Soviet systems are interpreted in terms of this. They are shown to be inadequate attempts to escape the dilemmas of the present. The forms which the next period of history will take are still unknown. We are still in a period in which previous understandings of the nature of man, the world, and God are radically questioned, and in which no new interpretations have proven adequate. Therefore we are in a period of emptiness, meaninglessness, cynicism, despair, and doubt. Humanist and Christian symbols are emptied of meaning. The theologian who wishes to speak to the age must recognize this. He must plumb the depths of the present situation, understand what has happened, and be realistic as he struggles to reformulate the Christian message for men living in the void of the present situation.

Almost a decade and a half passed, and Tillich was asked to do an essay for the "Adventures of the Mind" series in the Saturday Evening Post. Once again he tried to state what he believed to be the condition of our present situation. Again, it will be worth our while to consider what he had to say.

Tillich entitled his essay "The Lost Dimension of Religion." He points out that something has happened to religion in Western civilization, and, in spite of the apparent resurgence of interest in religion, as evidenced in the appeal of Billy Graham and Norman Vincent Peale, he suggests that what was lost has not yet been recovered. What has been lost, says Tillich, is the dimension of depth. This dimension of depth is

> . . . an answer to the question: What is the meaning of life? Where do we come from, where do we go to? What shall we do, what should we become in the short stretch between birth and death? ("LDR" 53)

When the dimension of depth is lost these questions are not even asked, much less answered. "And this is precisely what has happened to men in our period of history." This dimension is man's religious dimension, and it underlies all dimensions of his nature. To be grasped by these questions and to seek answers for them, is what it means to be "religious." These are questions of infinite concern, once they are raised, and "the man of our period has lost such infinite concern." How did this happen?

Tillich says one reason this dimension has been lost is that modern industrial society does not give man time to consider the depth dimension of life. It forces him to become preoccupied with the horizontal aspect of life. It tells him that the horizontal dimension is sufficient for man's concern. But this constant preoccupation with the horizontal has made man himself a kind of horizontal object, has flattened him out, made him into a tool, a tool about which one does not ask: a tool for what? Our daily experience confirms this.

> Our daily life in office and home, in cars and airplanes, at parties and conferences, while reading magazines and watching television, while looking at advertisements and hearing radio, are in themselves continuous examples of a life that ahs lost the dimension of depth. It runs ahead, every moment is filled with something which must be done or seen or said or planned ("LDR" 56).

With the loss of depth, the meanings of the great religious symbols of Western civilization have been lost. Tillich cites "Creation," "Fall," "Saviour," and "God" as symbols that have lost their depth and have been treated solely on the horizontal level. Yet, though the depth has been lost, man is still man enough to recognize this loss. If we want to know where religion is being expressed in our time, we must turn to those areas in which an awareness of the lost dimension of life is being expressed.

These places are art, literature, and philosophy. Tillich makes a few references to the ways in which the lost dimension of depth are expressed in art and literature, and then discusses briefly contemporary philosophy. Analytic philosophy, he says, has reduced itself to a virtual monastic poverty in its preoccupation with semantics, but this is religious, if only in the sense of an awareness of "learned ignorance." And existential philosophy tries to express in rational concepts the anxiety and guilt and the feeling of meaninglessness which the artists and writers are saying is the characteristic of the present situation ("LDR" 59-60).

But when, in our period, answers are preffered to our situation, these answers are inadequate. They do not take seriously enough the questioning of our time, or else simply confirm it. The increase in church membership is no answer, for, says Tillich, "church membership and religious activities do not mean much more than the religious consecration of a state of things in which the religious dimension has been lost" ("LDR" 61).

The only answer to our present situation, thinks Tillich, is simply to be aware of the loss. To be aware of the loss is the first step toward a recovery. "Such an awareness is in itself a state of being grasped by that which is symbolized in the term, dimension of depth" ("LDR" 61). Such an awareness would lead to an attempt to recover the genuine meaning of the religious symbols of our civilization. These offer a genuine answer, and it could come "in spite of" the lost dimension of depth which characterizes our situation. "In spite of the loss of the dimension of depth, its power is present, and most present in those who are aware of the loss and are striving to regain it with ultimate seriousness" ("LDR" 62).

This article is a summing up of Tillich's long years of wrestling with the problem of how to state the meaning of the present situation.

Tillich's attempts to state the nature of the present situation were not, of course, limited to these three works. Three collections of articles in which Tillich wrestles with the problem are also of great value to an understanding of how Tillich sees the present situation. These are: The Interpretation of History, The Protestant Era, and Theology of Culture. His three volumes of sermons also contain useful material. And, of course, his Systematic Theology is literally packed with this kind of material, since it is Tillich's conscious intention to move back and forth between the two poles of the Christian message and the "temporal situation." But it would extend this study to quite unnecessary lengths to examine all this material.

A summary of the major themes developed in the three works would include the following:

1. The major characteristic of the present situation is its lack of depth. The spirit of our time is still the spirit of self-sufficient finitude. It is a spirit which limits itself to concern with the horizontal. It is a spirit which concerns itself with technique--the manipulation of objects and the preoccupation with means rather than ends. This spirit has been inherited from the preceding period, the period of the triumphant bourgeoisie. Its relation to the Eternal is a turning away from the Eternal. It does not ask What for? it asks How?

2. The second major characteristic of the present situation is

the protest raised in many quarters against this prevailing spirit. This slowly developing protest against the spirit of industrial society is becoming stronger and more openly expressed, but it has not been able to produce a new interpretation of the meaning of existence. It remains a protest and lacks creative power.

3. The third characteristic of the present situation is the growing sense of meaninglessness. Modern man's confidence is reason, in pre-established harmony, in any ultimate meaning has been deeply shaken by the events of the twentieth century. This meaninglessness has led many into radical doubt, despair, and cynicism. Various attempts to escape this vacuum have not proven adequate. Each attempt has led further into existential despair.

4. Another characteristic of the present situation is the turning of man into an object and community into "the mass." The ideal of personality and community of the early Renaissance has not been fulfilled. Nature, too, has been devastated by the attitude of industrial society, by being regarded simply as a vast mechanism of things to be manipulated and treated as "wares" to be exchanged in the market place. The market place has become a Leviathan-like monster consuming all men's time and efforts, leaving him no opportunity to consider the vertical dimension of life, and thus dehumanizing man.

5. An important characteristic of the present situation is the rise of nationalism, with its demonic claim to be an Ultimate, able to provide the lost meaning of life.

6. A characteristic of the present situation is the dominance

of the secular, which extends even into the realm of the churches. The rise of secularism has presented all religions with a serious challenge, and forced the religions of the world to enter into a dialogue with one another in order to discover means of combatting this danger to religious life generally.

7. A significant characteristic of the present situation is the loss of power of the traditional religious symbols. These symbols have been reduced to absurdities by being separated from the dimension of depth which they represent. The task of the theologian is greatly complicated by this characteristic. He no longer has an assured body of language, widely understood, which he can make use of to speak the Christian message. He can no longer take for granted that people will know what he means when he uses traditional religious terminology. This forces him to begin at the beginning, so to speak, and patiently spell out the original meanings of the religious terms and symbols he uses.

8. The final characteristic of the present situation is its relegation of religion to one sphere alongside others, rather than as the depth dimension of all spheres of life. Religion becomes something about which one argues "objectively" rather than the underlying basis of the living of life. But since religion is really not this, what has happened is that what Tillich calls "quasi-religions" have been created which are the real substance of the present situation. The theologian's first quarrel must be with these "quasi-religions."

These characteristics of the present situation are what Tillich has in mind when he speaks of the "temporal situation" which is the polar element in all his theological work.

APPENDIX B

THE CHRISTIAN MESSAGE AS A MESSAGE OF GRACE

The Christian message has been, from the beginning, a message about what God has done to save man. His action has been called an act of divine grace. Tillich makes much of the doctrine of grace.

> The Christian message is above all a message of grace. . . . Christianity . . . has emphasized the idea of grace more than any other religion. The concept of grace in Christian thought contains a polarity between the element of forgiveness and the element of fulfillment. The former can be expressed as the forgiveness of sins or--in a paradoxical phrase--the acceptance of the unacceptable. The latter can be described as the gift of the spirit or the infusion of love controlled by agape (MB 63).

Tillich feels that this concept of grace has been "lost"--has "disappeared"--in the preaching of the church in the contemporary world.

> . . . the great paradox, that there is a reunion with the eternal "Ground of our being" without "right" action on our part, without our being "good people," or the "people of good will," . . . the message of grace has been lost. Grace as the power of accepting the person who is unacceptable, and of healing the person who is mortally sick, has disappeared behind the preaching of the religious and moral law (MB 14).

The great paradox of the Christian message is the christological paradox--"the appearance of that which conquers existence under the conditions of existence. Incarnation, redemption, justification, etc., are implied in this paradoxical event" (I 57). And Tillich says that "the christological paradox and the paradox of the justification of the sinner are one and the same paradox" (II 150). That is, the paradox of the event and the paradox of the significance of the event are bound up together--are the same paradox, as a matter of fact. When Tillich speaks of the event referred to in the assertion that Jesus is the Christ, of justification (the acceptance of the unacceptable), or of grace, he is speaking of the same thing: the power of the New Being conquering the forces of estrangement.

> . . . the Christ is not an isolated event which happened "once upon a time"; he is the power of the New Being preparing his decisive manifestation in Jesus as the Christ in all preceding history and actualizing himself as the Christ in all subsequent history (II 180).

And Tillich even wishes to make the doctrine of justification by grace through faith "the article by which Protestantism stands or falls . . . the universal principle of Protestant theology."

> . . . the article by which Protestantism stands or falls, the principle of justification by grace through faith. I call it not only a doctrine and an article among others but also a principle, because it is the first and basic expression of the Protestant principle itself. It is only for unavoidable reasons of expediency a particular doctrine and should, at the same time, be regarded as the principle which permeates every single assertion of the theological system. It should be regarded as the Protestant principle that, in relation to God, God alone can act and that no human claim, especially no religious claim, no intellectual or moral or devotional "work" can reunite us with him. It was my intention and it is my hope that this aim has been reached even if it has led to many quite "unorthodox" formulations in all parts of the system. . . . the doctrine of justification is the universal principle of Protestant theology . . . (III 223-224).

Tillich speaks of justification as "the eternal act of God by which he accepts as not estranged those who are indeed estranged from him by guilt and the act by which he takes them into the unity with him which is manifest in the New Being in Christ" (II 178). Tillich thinks that the phrase "justification by faith" tends to play down the role of grace that is involved, and that therefore it should be always expressed rather "justification by grace through faith."

> . . . the abbreviated form . . . "Justification by faith," . . . is extremely misleading, for it gives the impression that faith is an act of man by which he merits Justification. The cause is God alone (by grace), but the faith that one is accepted is the channel through which grace is mediated to man (through faith) (II 179).
>
> Not faith but grace is the cause of justification, because God alone is the cause. Faith is the receiving act, and this act is itself a gift of grace. Therefore one should dispense completely with the phrase "justification by faith" and replace it by the formula "justification by grace through faith." It should be a serious concern in the teaching and preaching of every minister that this profound distortion of the "good news" of the Christian message be remedied (III 224).

The phrases "the cause is God alone" and "God alone is the cause" express a recurring note in Tillich's thought. For he is quite convinced that the Christian message is about the event in which God's power is acting to do what man cannot accomplish--overcoming the destructive consequences of man's estrangement in existence. This is the meaning of the event on which Christianity is based, and if this meaning is lost, the message itself is lost, or "profoundly distorted."

But the meaning of the event cannot be separated from the event itself, and is not something that is imposed upon it from without. When Tillich is speaking of the meaning of the event as grace, he is speaking about the "factual" side of the event, and in the same way, when he speaks about "faith" he is speaking about the "receptive" side of the event, the human response. The event and its meaning are one, together they constitute what the Christian message is about, namely God's redeeming, reconciling, reuniting, saving, healing, justifying act in which he renews his creation--in which he creates a New Reality, a

New Being, a new state of affairs, a new relationship between mankind and himself. The meaning of the event on which Christianity is based that is expressed in the concept of grace, is so crucial in Tillich's theology that it must not be passed over lightly. A great deal of the misunderstanding of Tillich's thought might be regarded as Exhibit A for Tillich's case that modern man has created a situation in which the meaning of grace is scarcely intelligible. Indeed, Tillich's whole work may be regarded as a sustained effort to make this concept understandable to modern man.

> The "justification of the unrighteousness or of the unbeliever," the "pardon of the guilty," "the absolution of the condemned," "justification without works through faith alone"--these are methaphors, partly questionable, partly no longer intelligible. As more or less adequate terms they do not concern us. But the thing itself which they referred to and which is always real does concern us . . . (PE 201).

> Protestantism was born out of the struggle for the doctrine of justification by faith. . . . This whole complex of ideas . . . is now scarcely understandable even to our most intelligent scholars (PE 196).

> Nothing has been more misunderstood in Protestant theology than the term sola fide--by faith alone--because this has been understood not only by the Romans but also by Protestants themselves as an intellectual act of man called "faith," which forces God to give His forgiveness. But sola fide means that in the moment in which our sins are forgiven, we can do nothing else than receive this forgiveness, and that is what sola fide means. Anything else would destroy the activity of God, His exclusive grace (HCT 177-178).

> All Reformers fought the idea that man's "good works" as his fulfillment of the law, could be a contributing factor in salvation, or the acceptance of man by God. Not the fulfillment of commandments (which is impossible in the state of separation from God), but the acceptance of the message that we are accepted, is the motive of moral action (MB 54).

> Only God can forgive, because in Him alone love and justice are completely united. The ethics of forgiveness are rooted in the divine forgiveness.

> The power of God is that He overcomes estrangement, not that he prevents it; that He takes it, symbolically speaking, upon Himself, not that He remains in dead identity with Himself. This is the meaning of the age-old symbol of the god participating in creaturely suffering, a symbol which in Christianity was applied to the interpretation of the Cross of Him who was said to be the Christ (LPJ 112-113).

In these passages Tillich refers to some of the metaphors which have been used by Christians in an attempt to express "the complex of ideas" that is involved in the concept of Grace. Grace is an act of God. Grace is the power of God at work overcoming estrangement, forgiving the sinner, accepting man, participating in creaturely suffering in the Cross of the Christ, giving man salvation, justifying the unrighteous, pardoning the guilty, absolving the condemned, uniting love and justice in a creative act that man cannot force or bring about by his own "good works." Grace refers exclusively to God's work, and it is exclusively God's work. Faith is the acceptance of grace, made possible by the action of grace, and is in no sense productive of grace. Grace is God's answer to man's sin. It is given "in spite of" man's sin--"the religious answer always has the character of 'in spite of'" (LDR" 62).

> In the paradoxical formula, simul peccator, simul justus, which is the core of the Lutheran revolution, the in-spite-of character is decisive for the whole Christian message as the salvation of despair about one's guilt. It is actually the only way to overcome the anxiety of guilt; it enables man to look away from himself and his state of estrangement and self-destruction to the justifying act of God. He who looks at himself and tries to measure his relation to God by his achievements increases his estrangement and the anxiety of guilt and despair (II 178).

> . . . the message which is the very heart of Christianity and makes possible the courage to affirm faith in the Christ, namely, that in spite of all forces of separation between God and man this is overcome from the side of God (DF 104).

As we have seen, Tillich does not separate the paradox of the New Being from the paradox of justification by grace through faith. They are bound together as event and meaning of the event. And they are the Christian message.

> The paradox of the New Being, the principle of justification by grace through faith, lies at the center of the experiences of Paul, Augustine, and Luther (III 226-227).

These men, each in his own experience, had found that they could not overcome the opposition between their own power and their own best qualities even, and the moral imperative which stood over against them and judged them as men who were not what they should have been.

> This experience unites Paul the "righteous Pharisee," and Augustine the "sinner," and Luther the "ascetic monk." They took the moral imperative without compromise and without self-deception, and concluded that the "naked" moral law has no motivating power. They looked for something that had this power, and they found it in the religious element which they called "grace," a word that requires much interpretation to become an answer also for us (MB 56).

The awareness that one does not have the power that one must have to be what one ought to be leads to despair. "Outside of grace, God is law, a judgment which drives one to despair. He becomes God . . . through grace" (IH 96). That is, if He is experienced only as the one who demands that we be what He has created us to be, He is seen as law and we despair because we lack the power to be what He has created us to be. Only through the Christian message, which tells of the gift of power to be what we ought to be, is God experienced as grace. Prior to this understanding, He seems more like a demon, demanding of us what we have not the power to do--thus deepening the alienation between us. This alienation is at once punishment and despair.

> There is only one punishment, namely the despair of being separated from God. And consequently there is only one grace, namely reunion with God. That's all. And to this, Luther--whom Adolf Harnack, the great historian of the dogma, has called a genius of reduction--to this simplicity Luther has reduced the Christian religion (HCT 189).

"The trouble with the law is that it demands but cannot forgive," says Tillich, echoing Paul, Augustine, and Luther, again (MB 64).

> Therefore, forgiveness and acceptance, the conditions of the fulfillment of the law, must come from something above the law, or more precisely, from something in which the split between our essential being and our existence is overcome and healing power has appeared. It is the center of the Christian message that this conquest took place in the Christ, in whom a new reality beyond the cleavage appeared (MB 64).

This one passage gathers up a whole complex of ideas--forgiveness, acceptance, fulfillment, healing power, conquest of the split in our being, the Christ, a new reality--and expresses in another way what Tillich has in mind when he says, "The Christian message is above all a message of grace." These terms have a "new sound" but are intended by Tillich to convey the old meaning of the Christian term grace.

Tillich particularly likes the terms "acceptance" and "power" when interpreting the meaning of this term to the modern world.

> Biblical religion as well as Protestant theology are aware . . . that forgiveness can be accepted only if the power of acceptance is effective in man--biblically speaking, if the power of grace is effective in man (CB 187).

> Theology had to learn from the psychoanalytic method the meaning of grace, the meaning of forgiveness as acceptance of those who are unacceptable and not of those who are the good people. On the contrary, the non-good people are those who are accepted, or in religious language, forgiven, justified, whatever you wish to call it. The word grace, which had lost any meaning, has gained a new meaning by the way in which the analyst deals with his patient. He accepts him. . . . And that is the way in which, according to religious symbolism, God deals with us; and it is the way every minister and every Christian should deal with the other person (TC 124).

> You should always translate "grace" as Divine power of being, or power of New Being, which justifies or sanctifies . . . (HCT 131).

Grace, according to Tillich, is the power of accepting, the power of healing, the power of overcoming estrangement and guilt (MB 14).

> Grace unites two elements: the overcoming of guilt and the overcoming of estrangement. The first element appears in theology as the "forgiveness of sins," or in more recent terminology, as "accepting acceptance though being unacceptable." The second element appears in theology as "regeneration" or in more recent terminology, as the "entering into the new being," which is above the split between what we are and what we ought to be (TC 142-143).

This is the power of the New Being.

> . . . the term "New Being," when applied to Jesus as the Christ, points to the power in him which conquers existential estrangement or, negatively expressed, to the power of resisting the forces of estrangement. . . . the concept of the New Being re-establishes the meaning of grace. While "realism" was in danger of misinterpreting grace in a magical form, "nominalism" was in danger of completely losing the concept of grace. Without an understanding of "being" and "the power of being" it is impossible to speak meaningfully of grace (II 125).

And it is a power in which we can participate, according to the Christian message: " . . . the message that a new reality has appeared . . . a power of being in which we can participate and out of which true thought and right action can follow, however fragmentarily" (MB 14).

The way in which we are enabled to participate in this new reality is as paradoxical as the way in which the new reality has appeared. It is the way of surrendering our own goodness and acknowledging our own inability to act completely good, our own lack of merit, and of recognizing as an act of divine justice what seems to be injustice--namely, the declaring one just who is unjust.

> This surrender of one's own goodness occurs in him who accepts the divine acceptance of himself, the unacceptable. The courage to surrender one's own goodness to God is the central element in the

> courage of faith. In it the paradox of the New Being is experienced . . . (III 226).

> . . . only he who is grasped by the Spirit can accept the tremendous paradox that he is accepted. Nothing is more difficult than to face one's image in the mirror of the law and to say "yes" to it in terms of "in spite of" (MB 63).

> Indeed, there is nothing in man which enables God to accept him. But man must accept just this. He must accept that he is accepted; . . . how is this possible in spite of the guilt which makes him hostile go God. . . . "Because of Christ!" . . . one is drawn into the power of the New Being in Christ, which makes faith possible . . . Accepting that one is accepted is the paradox of salvation . . . (II 179).

> The Christian message is the message of a new Reality in which we can participate and which gives us the power to take anxiety and despair upon ourselves (TC 208).

Tillich likes to remind us that grace, in its original meaning, is a gift, a free, unmerited gift.

> It is useful to remember the origins of the word "grace" because it plays an immense role in Christian religion and theology, and its meaning and relevance have become incomprehensible for most contemporaries both inside and outside the church. Graces are divine gifts, independent of human merit, but dependent upon the human readiness to receive them. And the readiness itself is the frist gift of grace . . . (MB 61).

This understanding of salvation as a gift is the original understanding, says Tillich.

> This we have rediscovered: a new approach to the meaning of salvation--the original approach. Christianity is not a set of prohibitions and commands. And salvation is not making man better and better. Christianity is the message of a New Reality which makes the fulfillment of our essential being possible (TC 211).

This is not a discovery, but a rediscovery, a rediscovery of the Pauline-Augustinian-Lutheran approach. Tillich credits Martin Kahler for helping him make this the central insight of his theological work.

> Martin Kahler . . . I am indebted to him primarily for the insight he gave me into the all-controlling character of the Pauline-

> Lutheran idea of justification. The doctrine of justification on the one hand rends every human claim in the face of God and every identification of God and man. On the other hand, it shows how the decadence of human existence, guilt, and despair, is overcome by the paradoxical judgment, that the sinner is just before God. . . . From this point of view . . . it was impossible for me to find an approach to liberal dogmatics, which replaces the crucified Christ by the historical Jesus, and which dissolves the paradox of justification into moral categories (IH 32).

Tillich added to this insight the idea that "intellectual good works" no more than moral "good works" could be the cause of salvation. Not even the "good work" of believing Christian doctrines, like good "right-minded" people. This demand for an intellectual "good work" is untrue to the doctrine that God alone saves, and it also unnecessarily alienates people from the church.

> It cannot be required of the man of today that he first accept theological truths, even though they should be God and Christ. Wherever the church in its message makes this primary demand, it does not take seriously the situation of the man of today . . . (PE 202).
>
> . . . the principle of justification through faith refers not only to the religious-ethical but also to the religious-intellectual life. Not only he who is in sin, but also he who is in doubt is justified through faith. The situation of doubt, even doubt about God, need not separate us from God. There is faith in every serious doubt, namely the faith in the truth as such, even if the only truth we can express is our lack of truth. But if this is experienced in its depth and as an ultimate concern, the divine is present; and he who doubts in such an attitude is "justified" in his thinking (PE x).

Needless to say, Tillich is not defending casual, flippant, sophomore doubt--but the anguished doubt of one who truly seeks for truth, who believes that it exists, even though he is sure he has not found it yet.

The passages we have quoted from Tillich show clearly that he regards the Christian message as "above all a message of grace." Grace is the meaning of the event on which Christianity is based, and the message, whenever it is proclaimed, is a proclamation of the gracious act of God in Christ for us sinners and for our salvation.

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APPENDIX D

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